PLA corruption at the senior level does not translate into reduced combat effectiveness; India should not interpret the current purges as necessarily signalling military decline
This is the 192nd in the ‘China Chronicles’ series.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has witnessed several high-profile purges of top generals due to corruption. At first glance, these removals appear unseemly and raise concerns about the PLA’s battlefield effectiveness. However, existing evidence does not indicate a clear correlation between corruption and the PLA’s military performance, either generally or against India. Military performance is defined here as command competence and combat effectiveness.
The purges for corruption must be viewed with caution by China’s adversaries, as they represent a serious push by President Xi Jinping to overcome the PLA’s “peace disease”, which has become entrenched since the 1979 war between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Vietnam. Corruption is only one factor constraining the PLA’s use of force and is ultimately surmountable.
Existing evidence does not indicate a clear correlation between corruption and the PLA’s military performance, either generally or against India.
The issue turns on two interrelated themes. Corruption is most pronounced in the PLA at the highest echelons of command, as shown by numerous high-level dismissals, and has limited bearing on operational command, combat performance, or readiness. Second, it argues that the PLA need not be perfect to be militarily effective, specifically pointing to the Western Theatre Command (WTC), despite the purges it has suffered.
In the latest crackdown, two generals, including Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Zhang Youxia and Chief of the General Staff Department (GSD) Liu Zhenli, were targeted. In 2025, a series of high-profile officials were dismissed, overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, apex-level officials in the Central Military Commission (CMC), political commissars, and the Commander of the Eastern Theatre Command (ETC).
All five theatre Commands (TCs) were affected by purges during Xi Jinping’s latest anti-corruption campaign. The Western Theatre Command (WTC) experienced disruptions, with nine suspensions or dismissals recorded. It is also the PLA’s largest theatre command, covering the Xinjiang Autonomous Region (XAR) and the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).
Although the PLA under the WTC has suffered purges, one cannot infer that these will prevent poor military performance by the PLA in the future. Indeed, purges of upper-echelon commanders in the WTC do not empirically or definitively demonstrate military ineffectiveness due to corruption.
Since 2016, despite the dismissal of several senior commanders of the WTC, important qualifications must be noted: namely, that corruption has not in itself undermined military effectiveness or command competence. Zhao Zongqi, the Chinese general who precipitated both the 2017 Doklam crisis at the Bhutan–India–China trijunction and the April–May 2020 territorial aggression in Ladakh, was also a key figure in operational planning in both cases. These intrusions reflect careful planning that gave no clear indication of Chinese intentions in the months preceding the PLA’s aggression in Ladakh. This indicates command competence: having tested India at Doklam and observed New Delhi’s response, Chinese leadership identified an opportunity to expand territorial gains in Ladakh, thereby complicating an Indian Army (IA) response. Further, the Chinese military fully understands the importance of Auftragstaktik, or mission command, which involves giving lower-level officers latitude to exercise initiative, demonstrate flexibility, adapt, and exploit opportunities as they arise, while operating within the intent of superior headquarters (HQ).
Since 2016, despite the dismissal of several senior commanders of the WTC, important qualifications must be noted: namely, that corruption has not in itself undermined military effectiveness or command competence.
The Ladakh aggression by the PLA resulted from a combination of two factors: the PLA’s exploitation of the opportunity created by the demobilisation of the IA due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the conversion of an annual military exercise conducted by the WTC, involving large numbers of PLA forces in Xinjiang, into an attack. This tactically surprised the IA and made it logistically easier for the PLA to occupy territory. Indeed, it is very likely that General Zhao, with Xi’s approval, provided maximum latitude to subordinate commanders under “optional control”[1]—a form of command developed by Prussian General Helmuth von Moltke—to seize pre-selected areas of territory in Western Ladakh. Interference from HQ under optional control would occur only if there was a need to alter the axis of attack or in the event of significant casualty risk.
The PLA has sought to overcome its combat and operational deficiencies through domestic military exercises, joint exercises with other countries, and rigorous combat training. Consequently, there is no evidence linking corruption to poor battlefield performance or command competence within the WTC, including its apex leadership.
Corruption also existed in the PLA during the rule of Mao Zedong, but the PLA performed well in wars against US forces in Korea in the early 1950s and against the IA during the 1962 war. Assuming corruption was the reason for the dismissal of General Zhao Zongqi, who precipitated the Doklam crisis in 2017 and the 2020 Ladakh attack, there is no indication that the PLA performed poorly. The Galwan encounter between the PLA and the IA testifies to this assessment. This reinforces PLA expert Dennis Blasko’s observation that corruption plagues “rear area personnel” more than “operational leaders”. Further, it is best to avoid mirror-imaging because the PLA does not have to be “perfect to be effective”.
The PLA has sought to overcome its combat and operational deficiencies through domestic military exercises, joint exercises with other countries, and rigorous combat training.
Further, the Chinese, through their military action in Ladakh, have shifted the terms of engagement along the Sino-Indian frontier to the point that the 1993 and 1996 agreements on managing the LAC are no longer relevant. Thus, corruption, on the one hand, and command competence and military effectiveness, on the other, are not necessarily mutually exclusive or incompatible.
In addition, the Chinese possess a terrain advantage along the Sino-Indian boundary as they operate across the Tibetan Plateau. Compared with the IA, the PLA can mobilise more rapidly and access the LAC by concentrating a larger number of forces along the contested frontier. Indian forces, on the other hand, face a more daunting challenge along the LAC, as their access requires uphill movement. Moving uphill is considerably harder, especially in the eastern sector known as the “Southern Slope”. Lateral movement along the Sino-Indian frontier is far more difficult for the IA than for the PLA, and logistically supporting defensive positions is also harder in the mountains.
Despite improvements in border infrastructure, India is currently undergoing intensive development and cannot fully offset the attacker’s advantages. The Indian Army (IA) can undertake limited tactical offensives, as it demonstrably did at Rechin La in late August 2020 in response to the PLA’s ingress into Ladakh in April–May 2020 to compel a quid pro quo. Otherwise, it remains primarily restricted to defensive action in mountainous terrain along the Sino-Indian frontier. On the other hand, the PLA retains the initiative and can choose axes of attack along the Sino-Indian border, aided by the advantage of downhill movement.
India cannot infer or extrapolate sweeping conclusions from the current purges, ostensibly for corruption, that the PLA will underperform in actual combat if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were to launch a massive military offensive against India.
Consequently, attacking at sea in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has been offered as a prescription to offset or neutralise Chinese advantages on land. Since India enjoys the advantages of “interior lines” in the Indian Ocean, its logistics and bases are closer to home, which allows the Indian Navy (IN) to interdict China’s seaborne shipments transiting the region more easily. The Chinese Navy, on the other hand, must operate over great distances with limited logistical access. Therefore, strengthening the IN’s IOR presence and power becomes imperative, as does projecting Indian naval strength east of the Strait of Malacca, thereby giving it an offensive punch. The IN’s naval expansion must prioritise nuclear submarines. Further, India will need to establish an Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) and build a large stockpile of rocket artillery capabilities to strike targets across the WTC. These capabilities need to be supplemented by a swarm drone system, as the PRC is doing, and long-range Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) launched from long-range bombers.
History is also instructive for India. In the three years leading up to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) experienced significant internal upheaval—yet it ultimately delivered a decisive military defeat to Indian forces. Therefore, India cannot infer or extrapolate sweeping conclusions from the current purges, ostensibly for corruption, that the PLA will underperform in actual combat if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were to launch a massive military offensive against India.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
[1] Martin van Creveld, Command in War, Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 228.
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Kartik is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. He is currently working on issues related to land warfare and armies, especially the India ...
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