Author : Kabir Taneja

Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Dec 07, 2021
As the two key players have returned to the negotiating table, it seems that it has become even more difficult for them to see eye to eye
Re-negotiating the Iran nuclear deal and trajectory of security in West Asia

The trajectory of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or simply known as the Iran nuclear deal, signed after years of geopolitical wrangling, sanctions against Tehran, and talks between the P5+1 group of states and Iranian leadership culminated in the signing of the agreement in 2015 in Vienna, Austria. The deal was celebrated by some, vehemently criticised by others, but it set in motion Iran’s return to the political mainstream of international politics, economics, and helped avoid a military conflict. Fast-forward to May 2018, and former President Donald Trump’s impolitic decision to unilaterally withdraw the US from the agreement guided the situation back to square one.

Iran and the P5+1 are now back into dialogue, looking for ways to mend the immense damage done since, and the road ahead looks rockier than ever before. Over the past few years, Trump’s immense pressure against Iran, which at times almost led to military conflict, also undermined the presidency of Hassan Rouhani in Tehran, a moderate politician who managed to rally (till a certain extent) the powerful conservatives and the Ayatollah behind him as his administration went into dialogue, which eventually led to the JCPOA. The deal was an imperfect yet practical first step towards a meaningful dismantling of the status-quo between the seat of power for Shiite Islam and the Western block, and more importantly, bringing the former’s nuclear programme under international regulation and scrutiny.

Iran, under the new dispensation of President Ebrahim Raisi, has already called for unequivocal removal of sanctions, a return to the terms implemented in 2017, along with guarantees that a future US president cannot reverse them, before any further negotiations.

Now, Iran, under the new dispensation of President Ebrahim Raisi, has already called for unequivocal removal of sanctions, a return to the terms implemented in 2017, along with guarantees that a future US president cannot reverse them, before any further negotiations. These, along with other demands, are already being termed as “unacceptable changes” by European diplomats, with some also saying Tehran has, in fact, sped up the development of its nuclear programme. While the world, including India, rallied to make the JCPOA a reality, the task may not be as simple in 2021. Even China, which has a strategic-partnership with Iran and is seen as a major benefactor in Tehran amidst a wider rise of US–China rivalry, has reportedly aired frustration over Iran’s approach towards the negotiations.

The JCPOA is seen as a critical factor of achieving a stable security infrastructure in the Middle East (West Asia). Trump oversaw the signing of the Abraham Accords, bringing a conglomeration of Arab states, led by the UAE, to officially set up relations with Israel, stymying decades’ worth of Arab-Israel animosity. However, on the contrary, the Trump administration’s push to isolate Iran even further, getting significant help from Israel, arguably missed a trick on attempting to patch up the fissures of the Middle East’s geopolitics further. There is no doubt that Iran’s regional campaign as of today, ranging from the wars in Yemen and Syria to Hezbollah’s positioning in a flatlining Lebanon and the positioning of Hamas around the Palestine issue, is seen as the main roadblock by Arab states and Israel alike. In fact, both Israel and Iran have been in conflict for some time now, albeit much of the same has taken place behind the curtains, with covert tactics being deployed by both across the region, and often even beyond. Israel’s expansive capabilities of targeting Iranian assets within Iran, specifically those relating to its nuclear programme, has been for lack of a better term, impressive.

The Trump administration’s push to isolate Iran even further, getting significant help from Israel, arguably missed a trick on attempting to patch up the fissures of the Middle East’s geopolitics further.

However, the recent manoeuvres undertaken by the UAE, earlier working to orchestrate a thaw with Turkey and more recently conducting a high-level outreach to Iran, shows that efforts to minimise the potentials of conflict coming from this singular point of friction are underway. This also puts Abu Dhabi in an interesting position, with an ability to be a medium between Israel and Iran, an idea that on one side has caught some eyes at least. Even on the Saudi Arabia front, Riyadh’s direct outreach to Iran mediated by Baghdad is a step in the right direction, and a host of regional changes in traditional geopolitical posturing in the Middle East, ranging from reliance on oil as an economic design to heavily banking on US military and political might for both internal and external security are fast changing realities themselves. Witnessing the US’ botched withdrawal from Afghanistan did manage to shake up the view of banking on American power as a strategic and tactical guarantee, both for US allies in the Arab states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia and for Israel as well, the strongest traditional ally of Washington in the region.

Despite the change of rule in Iran, a running argument that the intensive anti-Americanism within Iran’s polity, specifically the current conservatives-led dispensation will not come to any agreement with the US is a flawed premise. In fact, this may be the most opportune time to sign the return of the JCPOA, as hardliners within Iran, now in power, will find a deal negotiated and agreed upon by one of their own much more palatable than done by a leader from the moderates, as was the case earlier with Rouhani.

Despite the change of rule in Iran, a running argument that the intensive anti-Americanism within Iran’s polity, specifically the current conservatives-led dispensation will not come to any agreement with the US is a flawed premise.

The driving criticism against the JCPOA has been that it does not address various other friction points regarding Iran, such as its foreign policy in the region, support for certain terror groups and so on. This remains true; however, the JCPOA did bring Tehran to not just the negotiating table, but beyond, to a dotted line as well, keeping the nuclear question on the front burner, prioritising international security over regional. In this case, a flawed deal in the eyes of JCPOA’s detractors is in fact much better than the alternatives and opens various other forums of debate on other points of crisis. Kinetic action against Iranian interests in Yemen, Syria or beyond has already proven to have limited outcomes for all parties involved. Add the fact that Iran would rather talk to the US than not, despite their public posturing, the possibility of a return to the deal’s core values by all parties (with some compromises sprinkled in for good measure by both sides), remains attractive.

For the time being, despite a rickety start to the talks, strategic patience by the West and tactical patience by the likes of Israel could lead to an acceptable juncture of diplomacy in the short term. The alternatives, other than diplomacy, could set off an international catastrophe.

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Author

Kabir Taneja

Kabir Taneja

Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on Indias relations with West Asia specifically looking at the domestic political dynamics ...

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