Author : Sohini Bose

Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Apr 17, 2026

Rahman’s New Delhi visit reflects cautious, issue-based engagement, with India and Bangladesh seeking to stabilise ties through incremental cooperation despite persistent frictions

Rahman in New Delhi: Cautious Engagement in India–Bangladesh Ties

Since the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Tarique Rahman, won the 13th general election on 12 February, questions have grown about the future trajectory of Dhaka’s ties with India, given the party’s history of difficult ties with New Delhi. Yet, Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman’s visit to India from 7 to 9 April suggests the early contours of a diplomatic thaw. As his first official overseas visit after taking office, the trip underscored the importance Dhaka attaches to New Delhi. Rahman held meetings with India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal, Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister Hardeep Singh Puri, and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. Rahman described his experience as one of diplomatic convergence, with both countries “willing to engage, talk and take initiatives,” normalising ties “slowly but surely.”

Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman’s visit to India from 7 to 9 April suggests the early contours of a diplomatic thaw.

Indeed, after nearly a year and a half of strained ties between India and the interim government that preceded Bangladesh’s current administration, both countries are keen to rebuild confidence. This requires not only constructive efforts to revive stalled projects and agreements but also a willingness on both sides to address the key concerns that continue to impede cooperation. Several such issues surfaced during the visit, each pointing to the opportunities and constraints in resetting bilateral ties.

Energy Dependence and the Politics of Supply

A principal reason why Khalilur Rahman sought to meet Hardeep Singh Puri was to request more supplies of diesel and fertilisers from India. Bangladesh, which relies on the Middle East for nearly 63 percent of its crude oil, has been significantly affected by disruptions to fuel flows through the Strait of Hormuz amid US–Iran tensions. This has aggravated the energy shortages that the country has already been facing due to the Russia–Ukraine war, taking a toll on its industries and daily life. As a result, the BNP government has adopted several power-conserving measures, including the closure of universities and daily fuel sale restrictions to prevent stockpiling and panic buying. However, with the possibility of a prolonged war still threatening to reduce Bangladesh’s GDP by nearly 3 percent in the coming years, it has become necessary for the administration to seek foreign assistance.

As a result, Tarique Rahman sought to increase refined oil imports and reached out to India for an increased supply via the India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline from its Numaligarh refinery in Assam. Inaugurated in 2023, this infrastructure was designed to enhance India’s diesel sales to Bangladesh, in addition to the existing rail and sea routes. However, with Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in 2024 and growing differences with the interim government, India halted the expansion of this project. Other media reports suggest that Muhammad Yunus, Chief Adviser of the interim government, had put an embargo on diesel supply. The resumption of operations under BNP not only helps address Bangladesh’s energy crisis but also marks a step towards restoring bilateral ties. Consequently, Puri indicated that Rahman’s request would be considered “readily and favourably,” after domestic requirements were met.

The resumption of operations under BNP not only helps address Bangladesh’s energy crisis but also marks a step towards restoring bilateral ties.

As a result, Tarique Rahman sought to increase refined oil imports, reaching out to India for an increased supply via the India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline from its Numaligarh refinery in Assam. Inaugurated in 2023, this infrastructure was designed to enhance India’s diesel sales to Bangladesh, in addition to the existing rail and sea routes. However, with Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in 2024 and growing differences with the interim government, India halted the expansion of this project. Other media reports suggest that Muhammad Yunus, Chief Adviser of the interim government, had put an embargo on diesel supply. The resumption of operations under BNP not only helps address Bangladesh’s energy crisis but also marks a step towards restoring bilateral ties. Consequently, Puri indicated that Rahman’s request would be considered “readily and favourably,” after domestic requirements were met.

Water-Sharing and Structural Constraints

Khalilur Rahman’s visit also comes as the Ganga Water Treaty between the two countries is due for renegotiation this year. Signed in 1996, the pact was intended to ensure that Bangladesh, a lower riparian state, receives sufficient water from the Ganga during the dry season (1 January–31 May) to support agriculture, livelihoods, and ecological stability. However, it has been criticised on several grounds. Firstly, experts argue that Bangladesh has often not received its fair share during the most critical dry spells. India, however, maintains that it remains compliant with the agreement, releasing more water than required during other periods of the sharing cycle. A key limitation is that the Treaty does not guarantee a minimum water supply for Bangladesh. Instead, it states that “in the event flow at Farakka falls below 50,000 cusecs in any 10 days, the two Governments will enter into immediate consultations to make adjustments on an emergency basis, in accordance with the principles of equity, fair play and no harm to either party.” While the Joint River Commission is tasked with conflict resolution, its effectiveness depends on cooperative ties between the two governments, leaving little room to manage disputes during periods of diplomatic strain, such as those seen last year.

Secondly, it is also perceived that the Treaty’s sole focus on the water supply at the Farakka Barrage is a flaw, as much of it is already used upstream by India before the flow is allocated for Bangladesh. If upstream Ganga flows are reduced, the ecologically fragile Sundarbans Delta could face severe ecological stress. This makes it necessary to view the Ganga’s flow more holistically, from its source to its mouth, rather than limiting attention to a single point.

Thirdly, with the onset of climate change, the Treaty requires a re-evaluation. The flow of the Ganga is different now than it was thirty years ago, with floods and droughts occurring at unprecedented times. Hence, adaptive water allocation has become necessary to balance equitable distribution with ecological resilience. “Proactive flood management, guided by data-driven insights, also needs to be incorporated into the renegotiated treaty.”

Securing the renewal of the Ganga Water Treaty on Bangladesh’s terms will win considerable public approval for the BNP, establishing its ability to negotiate favourably with India, the country’s largest neighbour, with which it shares multiple core interdependencies.

Therefore, it is understandable why Rahman underlined the need for an equitable and climate-resilient arrangement for river water during his visit. Although he emphasised the humanitarian aspect of the concern, stating, "People are people. Whether it is in India or Bangladesh, we are facing exactly the same type of climate crisis," there is also a distinct underlying diplomatic motivation. One of the sternest criticisms levelled at the former Awami League government was its inability to conclude the Teesta River water-sharing agreement with India, despite the amity in bilateral ties. Securing the renewal of the Ganga Water Treaty on Bangladesh’s terms will win considerable public approval for the BNP, establishing its ability to negotiate favourably with India, the country’s largest neighbour, with which it shares multiple core interdependencies. This will further help secure its position against the Jamaat-e-Islami, the largest opposition in the country, which had a reportedly anti-India bias.

Extradition Expectations and Legal Constraints

Extradition figured in the discussions, with Dhaka reiterating its demand for the return of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who has been in India since August 2024. The Yunus administration had earlier formally sought her extradition, along with that of former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal, following their conviction by Bangladesh’s International Tribunal. While India had previously said that the matter was being examined through legal and internal processes, it has since remained publicly cautious. At the same time, its willingness to return the suspected killers of Osman Hadi suggests a degree of responsiveness to Dhaka’s concerns. This points to an important diplomatic distinction in the evolving relationship: while cooperation on some politically sensitive matters may be possible, Hasina’s case remains far more difficult, not least because of the death penalty attached to it. For New Delhi, any move on extradition carries legal, political, and reputational consequences. Both sides, therefore, appear to be treating the issue with restraint while attempting to prevent the Hasina question from overwhelming cooperation in other critical sectors.

For New Delhi, any move on extradition carries legal, political, and reputational consequences. Both sides, therefore, appear to be treating the issue with restraint while attempting to prevent the Hasina question from overwhelming cooperation in other critical sectors.

Beyond these major issues, Rahman also emphasised the importance of people-to-people connectivity, particularly the need to restore smoother visa operations between the two countries. India had sharply reduced visa services after the regime change, though it later eased them in phases, especially in view of medical travel. This is significant because India remains the principal destination for Bangladeshi medical tourists, owing to its relatively affordable and high-quality healthcare, as well as linguistic, cultural, and culinary familiarity. Although China had offered its facilities in Kunming as an alternative during the period of strained ties, that option lacks the same affordability and social comfort.

This dependence on India for medical tourism, crude oil, and water sharing underscores the importance of strong and functional bilateral ties. Unlike other strategic partners, neighbouring countries share common resources and transnational concerns, necessitating sustained cooperation. Moreover, in the event of exogenous shocks that disrupt global supply chains—such as the COVID-19 pandemic or a potential US–Iran war—neighbourhood linkages can serve as a safety valve.

Khalilur Rahman’s visit signals the beginnings of a much-needed rapprochement between India and Bangladesh. While speculation persists about the lasting impact of early differences between India and the BNP, and the possibility of the latter aligning with other powers in ways that could disadvantage New Delhi, Rahman’s assertion that Dhaka’s foreign policy is not a zero-sum game is reassuring. His remark that India constitutes a structural presence for Bangladesh, rather than merely an external partner, captures the enduring logic of the relationship.


Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

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Author

Sohini Bose

Sohini Bose

Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Kolkata with the Strategic Studies Programme. Her area of research is India’s eastern maritime ...

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