Nepal’s upcoming elections will test whether the country’s political order can meaningfully respond to demands for generational change or retreat into familiar patterns of entrenchment
Five months after Gen Z-led protests rocked Nepal and compelled then Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli to tender his resignation, the country is all set to vote on 5 March to elect a new government. An interim cabinet headed by Sushila Karki has been holding the fort since September last year. While concerns about no single party securing a clear majority are not entirely unfounded, the context in which these elections are taking place and the manner in which political parties have responded to calls for change will have a significant bearing on the trajectory of Nepal’s politics.
Last year, as Nepal reeled from the violence and destruction that accompanied the September protests, President Ram Chandra Poudel appointed Sushila Karki to head the interim government on 12 September, after consultations between the army and different groups representing the Gen Z protesters concluded. A cabinet meeting subsequently dissolved the House of Representatives (HoR) and announced fresh elections. The primary mandate of the technocratic, non-political administration led by Karki was to create the conditions for the successful conduct of elections, while managing everyday affairs and addressing grievances that had emerged in the aftermath of the unrest.
While concerns about no single party securing a clear majority are not entirely unfounded, the context in which these elections are taking place and the manner in which political parties have responded to calls for change will have a significant bearing on the trajectory of Nepal’s politics.
In preparation for the election, the administration facilitated the registration of newly eligible voters and extended the deadline to enable more young people to enrol. It also mooted enabling overseas voters to cast ballots, although the proposal could not materialise this year. In December, the interim government signed an agreement with several leaders of the Gen Z movement, institutionalising their demands. These varied from amending the constitution to reforming the electoral system, the judiciary, and public administration, as well as measures to address corruption. The protests were also formally categorised as a ‘jana andolan’ (people’s movement), positioning them as a successor to the country’s two previous mass movements. However, divisions within the Gen Z movement have also fuelled criticism of the interim government in recent months. In November 2025, more than twenty groups with monarchist leanings submitted a memorandum to the President calling for Karki’s resignation.
Since Nepal’s transition to a federal democratic republic in 2008, the country’s nascent democracy has seen fourteen prime ministers, with politics oscillating between the making and breaking of fragile coalitions. This churn reflects the structural issues afflicting the polity and is one of the reasons why the younger generation mobilised last year to challenge the prevailing status quo. The reactions of political parties to the events of last September — and their subsequent action plans — were varied, but largely driven by the imperative to retain power. While leaders across party lines condemned the violence on the second day of the protests and urged a non-partisan investigation, their interpretations of the causes of the unrest and whether the protestors’ demands were legitimate also differed significantly.
The reactions of political parties to the events of last September — and their subsequent action plans — were varied, but largely driven by the imperative to retain power.
Initially, most mainstream parties described the interim government as unconstitutional and opposed the dissolution of the HoR, with only the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) and the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) not opposed to the decision. The Oli-led Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) [CPN (UML)] cast the protests as a targeted attack on the government’s assertive nationalist agenda, with Oli holding external actors responsible. In the months following the announcement of elections, the party organised multiple ‘show of strength’ rallies across the country. The four-time prime minister also refused to relinquish the party’s leadership and will contest the upcoming election from his long-held Jhapa-5 constituency. Oli’s stance is dichotomous: even as he has deemed the interim government illegal and called for the restoration of the HoR, his party has simultaneously prepared to contest the elections. The CPN (UML) also filed a petition challenging the dissolution and likened the protests to a ‘colour revolution.’ Meanwhile, the Ishwar Pokhrel-led faction of the party, which emerged in the aftermath of Oli’s refusal to cede power, has shown some willingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of the protesters’ demands.
On the other hand, the Nepali Congress (NC), then a coalition partner of the CPN (UML), took a different approach. The party’s top leadership, including former PM Sher Bahadur Deuba, found itself at the receiving end of the public’s anger. Gagan Thapa, who was then General Secretary, called for self-correction and reform within the party. Internal tensions over the demand for change had been building for some time, with Thapa increasingly viewed as an alternative centre of power. The party has since formally split. The old guard under Deuba was unwilling to hold a general convention of the party, even as 54 percent of elected representatives demanded a special convention and submitted a petition in October. Despite Deuba’s reservations, Thapa, along with Bishwa Prakash Sharma, proceeded to hold the convention and articulated a reform programme for the party. A new central committee under Thapa’s leadership was formed. While Deuba ultimately chose not to contest the upcoming elections, Thapa has been projected as the party’s prime ministerial candidate.
Initially, most mainstream parties described the interim government as unconstitutional and opposed the dissolution of the HoR, with only the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) and the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) not opposed to the decision.
As part of the reform process, the NC laid out eighteen proposals. These included introducing a two-term limit for the prime minister, ensuring fairer budgetary allocation, safeguarding the rights of non-resident Nepalis, instituting merit-based evaluations in appointments, rejecting power-sharing arrangements, ending nepotism, and systematising candidate selection. Thapa also called for more inclusivity, lateral entry, and investigation into corruption cases. Some ‘legacy-linked’ leaders were also bypassed in the ticket-granting process for the upcoming elections. For now, the Election Commission has upheld the validity of the convention, even as some members from the established NC have moved the Supreme Court against it.
The Maoists, meanwhile, have consolidated forces with smaller communist parties to form the Nepali Communist Party (NCP). In addition to the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) [CPN (MC)], the alliance includes the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Socialist) [CPN (US)] and six other smaller parties, with Pushpa Kamal Dahal as chairperson and Madhav Kumar Nepal as co-coordinator.
The party spearheading the agenda of alternative politics in the elections, the RSP, has sought to hatch coalitions with emerging leaders. While its chief, Rabi Lamichhane, has refused to step down as party president, it has remained engaged in dialogue with other political actors, with its leadership emphasising the power of a united front of alternative political forces in the upcoming election. In December, Kathmandu’s enigmatic mayor, Balen Shah, joined hands with Kulman Ghising, the widely discussed former Managing Director of the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), who held three portfolios in the Karki administration before launching his own outfit, the Ujyalo Nepal Party (UNP). However, the consensus broke down in less than two weeks, underscoring the fragility of such alliances. While Ghising cited disagreements over issues related to federalism and inclusivity, reports indicate dissatisfaction over the composition of the central working committee and the RSP’s unwillingness to cede party leadership to him. Meanwhile, other political formations like the Progressive Democratic Party, the Janata Samajwadi Party, and the Gatishil Loktantrik Party have also emerged, and Harka Sampang has assumed the chairmanship of the Shram Sanskriti Party.
For many in Nepal, the elections are a credibility test of how seriously political actors have responded to the demands articulated by the younger generation and of the extent to which the electorate is willing to place its trust in new leaders.
The significance of these elections extends far beyond which party emerges victorious or whether a coalition government assumes office. For many in Nepal, the elections are a credibility test of how seriously political actors have responded to the demands articulated by the younger generation and of the extent to which the electorate is willing to place its trust in new leaders. This is also a test of whether Nepal’s political elite possesses both the capability and the willingness to reform its ways of working. The events of September 8-9 will likely long remain a subject of political contestation, with rival groups continuing to frame those days in ways that serve their respective interests. Both mainstream and emerging parties have responded either with intransigence or have shown some flexibility in accommodating the demands of the younger generation. Even so, prospects for change are still bleak. While approximately 52 percent of the electorate in the upcoming election falls within the 18-40 age bracket, youth representation among major parties remains modest, with 30 percent of the more than 3,400 candidates under 40 years of age.
Leaders across political parties have been reticent to allow a generational transfer of power, reflecting a deeper malaise that continues to impede the country’s progress. An optimistic assessment would expect that whichever formation assumes office will be compelled to address calls for reform, however challenging. But the resistance to change signals that the process will likely be difficult and protracted.
Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. Her research focuses primarily on India’s neighbourhood- particularly tracking the security, political and economic ...
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