As the global quantum race accelerates, India’s strategy must prioritise calibrated, threat-proportionate preparedness over panic-driven acceleration
India’s National Quantum Mission (NQM), approved in 2023 with an allocation of INR 6,000 crore through 2031, marks a significant step toward technological sovereignty in quantum computing, communication, sensing, and advanced materials. Union Budget 2026 has reinforced this trajectory, linking quantum ambitions with semiconductor development, artificial intelligence capability, advanced materials research, and the security architecture underpinning India’s Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI).
Globally, quantum technologies are increasingly framed as instruments of strategic competition. The United States continues to advance its National Quantum Initiative architecture while preparing for cryptographic transition under national security frameworks such as the NSA’s Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) 2.0 Suite. China has made sustained state-backed investments across quantum communication and computing, including satellite-based quantum key distribution experiments. The European Union’s Quantum Flagship programme supports coordinated research across member states.
In such an environment, urgency is understandable. Yet urgency without calibration risks strategic distortion. The central policy question is not whether India should invest in quantum technologies—it must—but whether investment sequencing reflects engineering realities rather than geopolitical momentum.
The foundation of global cryptographic concern lies in Peter Shor’s 1994 algorithm, which demonstrated that a sufficiently large, fault-tolerant quantum computer could efficiently factor large integers and compute discrete logarithms. Such a capability would undermine widely deployed public-key cryptographic systems such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography.
The more consequential risk lies in domains where confidentiality must endure for decades: strategic defence archives, intelligence assets, diplomatic communications, critical infrastructure designs, and long-lived identity systems.
However, “sufficiently large” remains the operative phrase. Breaking RSA-2048 would require thousands of logical qubits and, under prevailing surface-code error correction models, potentially millions of physical qubits operating at extremely low error rates and sustained coherence. Present systems remain within what John Preskill termed the noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) regime. No cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) currently exists.
The vulnerability is therefore conditional. The timeline remains uncertain. Strategic policy must distinguish between mathematical inevitability, engineering feasibility, and strategic immediacy. Conflating these categories risks misallocation of national resources.
The “harvest now, decrypt later” (HNDL) scenario has accelerated global discussions on post-quantum cryptography (PQC). The concern is that adversaries may collect encrypted data today for decryption once scalable quantum systems become operational.
Yet most encrypted traffic—retail payments, routine communications, operational exchanges—has limited long-term value. The more consequential risk lies in domains where confidentiality must endure for decades: strategic defence archives, intelligence assets, diplomatic communications, critical infrastructure designs, and long-lived identity systems.
India’s Digital Public Infrastructure, including Aadhaar-linked identity frameworks and digital payments architecture, represents long-horizon national assets. These systems merit structured transition planning. However, transition must remain threat-proportionate and periodically reassessed against hardware developments. India’s vulnerability is not imminent cryptographic collapse; it is strategic mis-sequencing.
The standardisation efforts led by the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) represent important scientific progress in post-quantum cryptography. Yet no post-quantum algorithm has been empirically tested against an operational CRQC. Security assumptions rest on alternative mathematical hardness frameworks, themselves subject to future scrutiny.
Procurement decisions must remain standards-driven and independently validated rather than influenced by commercial acceleration cycles. Without strong certification frameworks, the transition risks being vendor-driven rather than threat-informed.
In this environment, the language of “quantum-proof” or “future-proof” security should be approached cautiously. Procurement decisions must remain standards-driven and independently validated rather than influenced by commercial acceleration cycles. Without strong certification frameworks, the transition risks being vendor-driven rather than threat-informed.
An underappreciated dimension of quantum preparedness lies in certification capacity. Cryptographic migration requires implementation testing, side-channel resistance evaluation, lifecycle assurance, and interoperability validation under internationally recognised frameworks such as ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria).
While India possesses accredited evaluation institutions under the Standardisation Testing and Quality Certification (STQC) Directorate and technical depth within C-DAC, dedicated PQC testing ecosystems remain globally nascent.
If migration accelerates without parallel development of sovereign evaluation infrastructure, India risks reliance on external validation ecosystems. Establishing a National Quantum Testing and Evaluation Centre—integrated with existing institutional frameworks—would strengthen preparedness under the National Quantum Mission.
Quantum sovereignty must extend beyond research funding and hardware ambition to include certification sovereignty.
India’s quantum preparedness is not confined to civilian policy discourse. The establishment of the country’s first dedicated quantum technology laboratory at the Military College of Telecommunication Engineering (MCTE), Mhow, signalled early recognition within the Armed Forces that quantum technologies will shape future operational environments.
This development is strategically significant. Military institutions approach technological adoption through operational viability rather than narrative acceleration. In defence systems, cryptographic integrity, signal resilience, and hardware assurance are mission-critical imperatives. The discipline embedded in military validation cycles naturally enforces calibration between laboratory promise and field deployment.
Defence communication networks also represent long-duration security architectures. Encryption systems protect information whose sensitivity extends across decades, placing the Armed Forces directly within the HNDL risk horizon. Their transition planning therefore provides a realistic benchmark for national cryptographic sequencing.
If migration accelerates without parallel development of sovereign evaluation infrastructure, India risks reliance on external validation ecosystems. Establishing a National Quantum Testing and Evaluation Centre—integrated with existing institutional frameworks—would strengthen preparedness under the National Quantum Mission.
Moreover, defence procurement processes already incorporate layered validation—hardware verification, firmware assurance, side-channel evaluation, and lifecycle risk management. Integrating this culture of assurance into broader national quantum transition frameworks would strengthen civil–military synergy rather than duplicate effort.
Quantum preparedness, therefore, should be understood as a whole-of-nation capability anchored in institutions that operate daily under adversarial conditions.
Union Budget 2026 situates quantum development within a broader deep-technology ecosystem that includes semiconductor fabrication, artificial intelligence, and secure digital infrastructure. These domains evolve on distinct maturity curves. Effective strategy requires sequencing rather than simultaneity.
India need not pursue reactive funding parity with larger economies. Strategic differentiation may offer more sustainable advantage—in quantum communication security, sensing applications for defence and infrastructure, governance frameworks, and partnerships across the Global South.
Leadership in emerging technologies is not defined solely by expenditure volume. It is defined by coherence, calibration, and institutional depth.
Quantum computing represents a long-term structural frontier. The risk of under-preparation is real. Equally real is the risk of narrative-driven acceleration detached from engineering realities.
India’s strength lies in disciplined governance—distinguishing between mathematical possibility, engineering timelines, and strategic necessity. A calibrated roadmap should sustain foundational research under the National Quantum Mission, prioritise sector-specific cryptographic transition, expand sovereign certification capacity, integrate military-grade assurance practices where appropriate, and periodically reassess hardware readiness.
Quantum preparedness—not quantum panic—should guide India’s trajectory.
Lt. Gen. M.U. Nair (Retd.) is the former National Cyber Security Coordinator (NCSC).
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Lt Gen M Unnikrishnan Nair PVSM, AVSM, SM (retd) is a former Signal Officer-in-Chief of the Indian Army with nearly four decades of service in ...
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