This year’s Quad Summit is a key moment for India to help redefine the group as a focused, results-driven force in the Indo-Pacific
Image Source: Drew Angerer/Staff Getty Images
India is set to host the Quad Leaders’ Summit later this year at a critical moment in the group’s evolution. Donald Trump’s re-election in January 2025 has ushered in a renewed era of transactional diplomacy, with a sharper emphasis on national self-interest, burden-sharing, and a marked scepticism of multilateral cooperation. Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific region is becoming increasingly fraught. China continues its assertive manoeuvres in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea; maritime disruptions persist in the Red Sea; and global governance remains fragmented in the wake of the multiple protracted wars around the world. How these compulsions play out to impact the Quad remains to be seen.
The direct military involvement of the United States (US) in the Middle East, a possibility that appeared distant at the beginning of this year, is now looming.
This year’s challenges are further compounded by the tensions in the Middle East, particularly the unprecedented flare-up between Israel and Iran and deteriorating prospects for long-term stability in the region. The direct military involvement of the United States (US) in the Middle East, a possibility that appeared distant at the beginning of this year, is now looming. General Michael Kurilla, Commander of US Central Command, recently highlighted the labyrinth of threats that Washington finds itself increasingly engaged in, preventing it from fully dedicating resources to the Indo-Pacific. These challenges, coupled with the anticipation from the Trump administration’s trade and tariff pressure, including on Quad members, may impede progress. In this context, the upcoming summit is more critical than ever, perhaps even a litmus test for the Quad’s credibility and strategic coherence.
Although India has emphasised continuity about US support for the Quad under a second Trump presidency, scholars caution that trust built in previous administrations doesn’t ensure future cohesion. Trump’s return demands ‘tangible gains’ before committing to multilateral projects. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated, alliances must make America “safer, stronger and more prosperous”, reflecting a sharpened lens of cost-benefit analysis, a view that could impact Washington’s approach to global partnerships, including the Quad.
Notwithstanding this anticipation, a strong posture towards the Indo-Pacific has been signalled by the Trump administration. This was underscored by the Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth’s visit to Honolulu reaffirming support for INDOPACOM alongside a significant increase in the Pentagon’s budget. During his first official trip to Asia in March 2025, Hegseth reassured Asian counterparts on strengthening the collective posture against China. Further, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, he re-emphasised the Indo-Pacific being America’s “priority theatre” and that the US is “here to stay”. America’s tone of commitment to the defence of Taiwan sounded even more resolute when he asserted that America stands ready to “fight and win decisively” in the event of a military conflict over Taiwan. But Hegseth’s confrontational tone, invocation of the Cold War rhetoric, and demands for steep military spending have a latent concern from regional partners and fail to reassure Asian allies, sparking regional concerns of abandonment, amplifying fears that Washington’s promises ring hollow in a climate of ideological division and strategic distraction.
Coming on the back of a strong counterterrorism stance from India after the Pahalgam attack in Jammu and Kashmir, the Quad is likely to resoundingly condemn terrorism and coordinate more effectively on the issue than before.
This year’s Quad Foreign Ministers’ Joint Statement may have set the tone for the upcoming Leaders’ Summit and underscored the Quad’s evolving priorities towards enhanced hard security collaboration. It stressed support for the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), reinforced maritime deterrence, and weaved in technological resilience through collaboration on semiconductors and Artificial Intelligence (AI). Coming on the back of a strong counterterrorism stance from India after the Pahalgam attack in Jammu and Kashmir, the Quad is likely to resoundingly condemn terrorism and coordinate more effectively on the issue than before. New initiatives such as the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative, the Ports of the Future Partnership in Mumbai, and a collaborative logistics exercise are likely to be key areas of focus and underscore the bloc's expanding influence in transnational security and regional disaster response. Given emerging tilts in the American foreign policy focus, a bigger question looms over the Quad Summit: will other softer priorities like climate, health and institutional reform receive adequate attention?
For the Quad, Trump’s return to the White House signals both opportunity and risk. On one hand, security cooperation may intensify; on the other, the grouping’s broader soft power agenda, climate resilience, health security, and digital infrastructure face potential marginalisation. Thus, the 2025 Summit convenes amid dual pressures: external geopolitical uncertainty and internal recalibration of U.S. strategic priorities. These concerns are not unfounded. During his first term, Trump reduced funding for USAID, exited the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organization, and moved the U.S. away from multilateral frameworks. In his second term, he has only doubled down on these actions, heightening concerns that the Quad’s development agenda, particularly regarding climate finance and pandemic preparedness, might be overshadowed by hard security concerns. This could mark a significant departure from the vision promoted under President Biden, whose 2024 Wilmington Declaration had redefined the Quad as a partnership of equals concentrating on public health, climate innovation, and regional infrastructure. In contrast, Trump's ‘America First’ doctrine prioritises narrowly defined national interests and perceives multilateralism as a transactional endeavour, undermining the frameworks that the US once helped establish and raising doubts about its dedication to the Quad’s softer objectives.
The US aims to streamline the Quad's framework, condensing its numerous working groups into a few key priorities focused on hard security and economic resilience.
The Trump administration is already influencing the direction of the Quad. As noted in a recent report, the US aims to streamline the Quad's framework, condensing its numerous working groups into a few key priorities focused on hard security and economic resilience. This shift may lead to the phasing out or merging of existing groups focused on climate and health, while reorienting energy discussions to emphasise security rather than sustainability. Although there are still opportunities in areas like critical minerals, subsea infrastructure, and maritime collaboration, there is a clear risk: an overly securitised Quad could distance regional partners who appreciate its broader collaborative agenda.
The Quad's broader agenda is seen as intertwined with other minilateral coalitions such as AUKUS, Blue Dot Network, the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), IMEEEC and other such initiatives. A mix of varying priorities over the years has led to both fresh opportunities and a level of strategic uncertainty regarding the group’s fundamental objectives. While initiatives like the IPMDA enhance maritime surveillance and information-sharing among Quad members, they also support US-led initiatives which are outside the Quad. Although these synergies, for instance, between the Indian Ocean Region and the Pacific theatre, improve deterrence and resilience, they also complicate the Quad’s form, complicated by differing internal identities and external perceptions.
In the 2025 Leaders’ summit, one of the primary tasks facing the Quad will be to overcome its ‘initiative fatigue’ due to its numerous overlapping working groups, with limited tangible outcomes. In his second term, Trump’s strategy of offshore balancing has marked a turn, minimising US overextension and demanding more burden-sharing. Growing concerns about the long-term US commitment to the region and unilateral tariffs imposed by the US on Japan, a Quad member, are likely to lead to more hedging.
Despite the flux and rapidly shifting grounds in American foreign policy, the Trump administration seems tethered to the idea of bolstering the Quad in principle. At its core, the demands from the Trump administration within the Quad could be dependent on lesser commitments from the U.S. financially, more self-reliance among the member countries, and yet a greater alignment with views on countering China in a robust way.
One way to accomplish these objectives, the Quad may want to merge similar working groups, such as those centred on climate, energy, and infrastructure, into more cohesive categories with defined, goal-oriented results.
The forthcoming 2025 Delhi Summit represents a pivotal moment. India's position as the host of the summit brings both increased visibility and a significant responsibility to guide the Quad during a time of geopolitical uncertainty and shifting alliances. The Delhi Declaration offers a crucial chance to shape the coalition's future by aligning strategic objectives with achievable goals. India has the opportunity to spearhead this initiative by focusing on three main priorities: enhancing maritime coordination, promoting collaboration in emerging technologies such as AI and semiconductors, and strengthening development partnerships in areas like climate adaptation, public health, and digital infrastructure. One way to accomplish these objectives, the Quad may want to merge similar working groups, such as those centred on climate, energy, and infrastructure, into more cohesive categories with defined, goal-oriented results.
This year’s Quad Leaders’ summit is significant beyond mere symbolism and offers member countries, particularly India, a crucial chance to redefine the Quad as a cohesive, results-oriented coalition that can address both the geopolitical concerns stemming from great-power competition and the developmental ambitions within the Indo-Pacific.
Vivek Mishra is the Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
Sandra Thachirickal Prathap is a Research Intern with the Observer Research Foundation
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Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation. His work focuses on US foreign policy, domestic politics in the US, ...
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Sandra Thachirickal Prathap is a Research Assistant with the Observer Research Foundation’s (ORF) Strategic Studies Programme (SSP). Her research examines the geopolitical dynamics of the Global ...
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