Proximity to China’s chief is a double-edged sword

Since the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), being close to the No. 1 leader has not always guaranteed political success. There are several instances of deputies or anointed successors who have suddenly found that the sun has set on them.Just as China was busy celebrating the National Day holidays in October, Beijing was agog with the buzz that Dong Hong, who was once a secretary to current Vice President Wang Qishan, was under investigation. Between 2012-17, Wang Qishan was ranked sixth on the Politburo Standing Committee and headed the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection that spearheaded the anti-corruption drive. He is known to be close to President Xi Jinping. This triggered speculation that a major shake-up in the CCP hierarchy was on the cards, especially since the Central Committee—the largest of its decision-making bodies—will gather for a conclave from October 26-29. During the annual ‘plenum’ important decisions that have a bearing on policy and personnel are thrashed out. The CCP’s National Congress — during which a leadership transition takes place — is scheduled to be held in 2022, but jockeying for key positions seems to have begun. Wang has appeared in public on very few occasions, a worrisome signal in a Communist state. Another troublesome development is that his proteges have gotten into bad books. Dong Hong, who was recently placed under investigation for “disciplinary violations”, has been associated with Wang since nearly three decades. In September, Ren Zhiqiang, a former head of a state-owned property company, was given an 18-year prison term after his conviction in a corruption case. Ren is said to have known Wang since his school days, and that the latter may have had a hand in protecting him after he earlier made comments criticising the CCP. Jiang Chaoliang, who was the Party Secretary of Hubei Province where the novel coronavirus outbreak began, was removed from his post earlier this year. Jiang Chaoliang, a former banker is said to have had a close working relationship with Wang Qishan since the 1990s. In China, proximity to the No. 1 leader is a double-edged sword. Many senior CCP officials who were close to the ‘core leader’ have fallen by the wayside. Mao Zedong’s declared or putative successors met with sticky ends. Once seen as Mao’s heir, Liu Shaoqi, was disgraced out of office during the Cultural Revolution and died in a prison cell in 1969. Red Army commander Lin Biao, who was officially anointed as the Great Helmsman’s successor, died in a mysterious air crash in Mongolia. Lin was later accused of scheming to take over from Mao, and has been airbrushed from the CCP’s official history. Wang Hongwen and Hua Guofeng could not step into Mao’s shoes, Hua being outmanoeuvred in the ’70s by Deng Xiaoping who himself bounced back after many purges. In the Deng era too, the plug was pulled on anointed successors even before they could settle down in their posts. Hu Yaobang was axed as CCP General Secretary over his differences with Deng. Zhao Ziyang, who succeeded him, was forced out of office in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen protests. Under Xi Jinping, CCP leaders who seemed to be angling for the top job have been crushed. Former Politburo member Sun Zhengcai was seen as a leadership aspirant, but the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection put him under investigation in 2017. Days before the National Day holidays in 2017, he was expelled him from the CCP and a year later he was convicted of corruption charges in a widely publicised trial. Behind the carefully constructed façade of unity in the CCP, there are entrenched factions that bond over common interests that push for their men in key positions. While there is no unanimity among China watchers regarding the number and membership of factions, one can broadly whittle them down to 4-5. Usually, leaders have preferred to fill key positions with their trusted acolytes either from the regions or organisations they served. The period between Jiang Zemin ascendency into the presidency in the late 80s and his tenure till the early 2000s, saw the rise of Zhu Rongji (who served as PM), Zeng Qinghong (Vice President from 2002-07) and Han Zheng (currently on the Politburo Standing Committee). It is said that they belong to the “Shanghai” faction, given that Jiang Zemin had served in the port city in various capacities. ‘Communist Youth League’ (CYL), which is the CCP’s wing for youngsters, came into prominence as a faction with the rise of Hu Yaobang and later ex-President Hu Jintao. Current PM Li Keqiang is said to be from the CYL faction. The state-owned enterprises (SOEs) faction consisting of individuals who cut their teeth in the business corporations owned by the state also constitute a bloc. Another factor to contend with is the ‘Princeling’ faction that came into being with the rehabilitation of purged CCP veterans who were allowed to nominate an offspring. China watchers say that Xi Jinping has been trying to promote his loyalists, who are mainly from Zhejiang province (where he was Party chief) and Shaanxi (Xi’s home province). For example, Politburo members Li Zhanshu (ranked no. 3) and Zhao Leji (ranked no. 6) have been given key positions in Xi’s dispensation. Li Zhanshu presides over the National People's Congress – China’s legislature, and Zhao Leji heads the CCP’s graft-probing apparatus the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and both served in Shaanxi. Former Zhejiang Party secretary Xia Baolong and Li Qiang have seen their fortunes rise. Li Qiang was plucked out of a provincial career and made a politburo member in 2017, Xia Baolong was put in charge of the crucial Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office that is a link between the mainland and its special administrative regions. The job of being a deputy in the power hierarchy seems to be the most doomed one in China. The reasons why leaders in the CCP’s inner circle fall foul of the powers-that-be may remain a mystery. We can start with analysing some of the factors that ensure longevity in office. In his book, ‘From The Soil’ Fei Xiaotong describes the importance of the concept of guānxi (关系) in Chinese society that loosely translates into connections. Guānxi networks are the social capital in a society based on familiarity and dependability of people. Fei says, in Chinese society relations are akin to waves created after a stone is tossed into a water body in which each concentric wave centres on an individual. This parallel is apt to describe the CCP’s ruling elite where guānxi is forged through a patronage system and on commonality of interests. In 2012, the graft inquiry and oversight agency — Central Commission for Discipline Inspection — under Wang Qishan’s tutelage used physiological torture and prolonged detentions to extract confessions in graft cases against CCP officials. From 2012-2016, around 158 senior officials are said to have ended their lives forcing Xi to announce that he was ending the practice. Wang Qishan may have turned some powerful guānxi networks against himself. Under the revised rules, the limit of two five-year terms for the president and vice president were done away with. In a democracy, elections are a means for entering public office, but in a one-party state, a power struggle is the sole gateway of wresting high office. For this reason, the collective leadership principle and presidential term limits to effect orderly political succession were instituted in the Deng era. The next few months are likely to decide whether or not Wang remains in office after 2022. Ability to cultivate a powerful guānxi networks seem to have some bearing on the tenure in office. Deng’s heir, Jiang Zemin, flourished after the demise of his mentor and was ranked number 2 in the warrant of precedence even after demitting office in 2002. This can perhaps be attributed to his skill of managing relationships in the CCP during a provincial career that lasted between the ’50s to the ’80s, and later on the national stage till the 2000s. Jiang’s predecessor Zhao Ziyang was not so lucky and his meteoric rise may have probably stalled creation of patronage grids. Zhao was pulled out of provincial Sichuan where he had clandestinely initiated private farming that had become a success story. Within three years between 1977 and 1980, Zhao made his splash on the national stage as Premier, but could not succeed after Deng’s favour ebbed. To sum up, having experienced the terror of one-man rule and its calamitous effects due to campaigns like the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, the CCP in the 1980s instituted two five-year term limits and a retirement age for its elite. With the CCP getting rid of term presidential limits, China has reverted back to one-man rule. The 2012-13 power transition where the fourth-generation yielded to the fifth was first such changeover without the influence of a strongman. China witnessed huge intrigues ahead of the shift with the fall of “contender” Bo Xilai who was enmeshed in a corruption scandal and Xi disappearing from public view for prolonged periods, cancelling scheduled meetings with then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Xi’s second term runs out in 2022 and he is under no obligation to step down. If the 2012-13 power shift is any indicator, one may possibly see more manoeuvrings in the days to come. What remains to be seen is the impact that eradication of orderly political succession will have on China.

• International Affairs
• China Foreign Policy
• China
• CCP
• Chinese Communist Party
• XI Jinping

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