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Myanmar’s protracted conflict has turned into a defining test for ASEAN, revealing how its long-standing principles of consensus and non-interference now constrain meaningful action
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Four years after Myanmar's 2021 military coup, the crisis has become a stark test of the credibility of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—and one that the bloc continues to struggle with. In Myanmar, despite more than 7,000 civilians killed, over 3.6 million displaced, and a collapsing economy, ASEAN's diplomacy remains caught between its aspirations and its structural limitations.
The 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur from 26-28 October offered a fresh stage but not a new script: strong statements, renewed pledges on ceasefire support and humanitarian access, yet no real enforcement tools capable of changing conditions on the ground for Myanmar.
What emerged instead was a revealing snapshot of ASEAN's dilemma. Its long-held principles of consensus and non-interference, once seen as the foundation of regional stability, now act as constraints on decisive action. As violence intensifies, governance structures unravel, and cross-border spillovers grow, the bloc finds itself relying on diplomatic methods that are increasingly outpaced by the crisis unfolding in its neighbourhood.
Adopted in April 2021, the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) was meant as a unified political roadmap and marked a break from ASEAN's long-standing principle of non-interference in members' internal affairs. It signalled one of ASEAN's first direct interventions on a member state's serious human rights abuses. The plan called for stopping violence, encouraging inclusive dialogue, appointing a special envoy, providing humanitarian aid, and granting the envoy access to all stakeholders. However, each part depended on the junta's cooperation. Although agreed upon by the military general at the time, the junta has continued to sideline the approaches, leaving the process unbalanced as the military sticks to what it prefers. As a regional group, ASEAN advocates for a constructive approach; it cannot impose sanctions but can only persuade, coordinate, and withdraw political legitimacy. Consequently, the 5PC has, over time, become a reference framework rather than a practical plan.
As a regional group, ASEAN advocates for a constructive approach; it cannot impose sanctions but can only persuade, coordinate, and withdraw political legitimacy. Consequently, the 5PC has, over time, become a reference framework rather than a practical plan.
To maintain pressure without fracturing internal unity, ASEAN restricted Myanmar's participation in high-level meetings by excluding senior junta leaders while allowing only technical-level representation. The bloc also suspended Myanmar's turn as ASEAN Chair for 2026, with leaders at the 2023 Summit deciding that the Philippines would assume the role instead. While these steps signalled disapproval without overtly challenging the principle of sovereign equality, they had little tangible impact. Conflict escalated in Sagaing, Karen, Rakhine, and Kachin, resistance forces expanded territorial control, and the military intensified aerial bombings and drone strikes—while leveraging strategic and logistical support from China to regain ground in key areas.
Internal divisions further constrained the bloc's functioning. Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand maintained functional ties with the junta, driven by security, economic, and political considerations. Thailand prioritised border stability and cross-border ethnic dynamics; Laos required cooperation on narcotics, energy, and infrastructure, while Cambodia emphasised non-interference. Conversely, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines advocated greater engagement with the National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic armed groups.
These different positions impeded consensus on sanctions, monitoring mechanisms, and alternative diplomatic pathways. Thailand's unilateral 2023 peace initiative, undertaken without wider consultation, underscored ASEAN's weakening coherence and opened space for external powers, particularly China, to shape conflict outcomes within Myanmar. Last December, Thailand convened a set of informal meetings, including a proposed "Troika-plus" engagement to revive momentum on the Myanmar crisis. Despite bringing together regional stakeholders, the discussions produced no substantive progress or a unified strategy.
Aid delivered only through state channels risked strengthening military authority while leaving resistance-held regions underserved. As a result, displaced populations increasingly crossed borders, causing overcrowded camps in Thailand and prompting irregular migration to India, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Humanitarian conditions have worsened significantly. By 2025, nearly 19.9 million people were estimated to need assistance, including 6.3 million children and 7.1 million women, with almost 3.5 million people internally displaced. The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) tried to operate within 5PC parameters, but its access remains limited to junta-controlled areas. Aid delivered only through state channels risked strengthening military authority while leaving resistance-held regions underserved. As a result, displaced populations increasingly crossed borders, causing overcrowded camps in Thailand and prompting irregular migration to India, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
The breakdown of governance in Myanmar's border regions has also enabled the growth of transnational crime, such as cyber-scam operations and trafficking networks. Although the military leaders have launched operations to curb these activities, questions remain about their true motives, as they continue to benefit financially from these illegal activities.
The ASEAN Troika—comprising Indonesia (2023 chair), Laos (2024), and Malaysia (2025)—was designed to ensure continuity and provide support to smaller chairing nations such as Laos. Indonesia prioritised quiet diplomacy, maintaining discreet communication with all actors. Laos largely upheld this approach with an emphasis on humanitarian access, while Malaysia adopted a more activist posture, engaging in over 117 interactions focused on humanitarian corridors and exploring ceasefire options. Yet the Troika could not overcome ASEAN's structural constraints and remained bound by the 5PC and the consensus principle, resulting in continuity rather than strategic innovation.
As ASEAN's incoming chair, the Philippines has also signalled that it will not introduce a new political framework for engagement with Myanmar. However, this does not mean simply mirroring previous chairs. Philippines’ Foreign Affairs Secretary Theresa Lazaro—appointed as President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.'s special envoy to Myanmar—has clarified that Manila will not attempt to replicate Malaysia's intensive diplomacy as ASEAN chair, describing it as neither feasible nor strategically advisable. Instead, the Philippines aims to "work on what has been established," prioritising unity and institutional stability while adopting a more restrained, pragmatic form of continuity.
Philippines’ Foreign Affairs Secretary Theresa Lazaro—appointed as President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.'s special envoy to Myanmar—has clarified that Manila will not attempt to replicate Malaysia's intensive diplomacy as ASEAN chair, describing it as neither feasible nor strategically advisable.
The first phase of voting in Myanmar will take place on 28 December, with a second phase planned for January. Yet 121 constituencies, including 56 townships, will be excluded due to ongoing fighting. Resistance forces control significant areas of the country, making the elections a tool for the military regime to regain national and international legitimacy. Since the 2021 coup, the junta has dissolved dozens of political parties and imprisoned an estimated 30,000 political detainees, raising serious concerns over the credibility of the process.
On the junta's announced elections, widely dismissed as lacking credibility, Lazaro said any ASEAN observer mission would require bloc-wide consensus, a process unlikely to conclude before Malaysia's chairmanship ends on 31 December.
Lazaro also mentioned that ASEAN might consider appointing a long-term special envoy during the Philippines' 2026 chairship, indicating a potential move away from the current yearly rotating system. Establishing a permanent ASEAN envoy would reduce the disruptions caused by yearly chair transitions, strengthen institutional mechanisms, and support more consistent engagement with Myanmar's various stakeholders, a point under discussion for some time.
While Manila is unlikely to bring about significant shifts in ASEAN's handling of the Myanmar crisis during its chairmanship, it can still play a meaningful stabilising role. Its efforts could focus on maintaining continuity within the bloc, sustaining diplomatic pressure by continuing to non-recognise the junta-organised elections, and promoting incremental yet concrete steps to reduce violence and expand humanitarian access.
Establishing a permanent ASEAN envoy would reduce the disruptions caused by yearly chair transitions, strengthen institutional mechanisms, and support more consistent engagement with Myanmar's various stakeholders,
While the Troika has technically been operational, its consultations have yielded little beyond continuity, underscoring how ASEAN's structural constraints prevent the mechanism from evolving into a force capable of shaping outcomes in Myanmar. As a result, it remains a procedural tool rather than a catalyst for change, making it even more critical for the Philippines to pursue deeper, more organised coordination with Malaysia, the outgoing chair, and Singapore, the upcoming one in 2027, particularly to align assessments and strengthen joint humanitarian strategies.
Beyond Myanmar, Manila is expected to address the South China Sea Code of Conduct and to drive the early implementation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2045, a long-term strategic blueprint adopted in May 2025 to guide the bloc's evolution over the next two decades. This will unfold against intensifying US–China rivalry, disruption in global commerce, and renewed volatility in mainland Southeast Asia. Despite Thailand and Cambodia agreeing to pursue a peace arrangement at the ASEAN Summit, tensions remain high, with Bangkok recently suspending parts of the deal following a landmine blast and accusing Phnom Penh of failing to uphold key commitments. Collectively, these converging pressures—from Myanmar's protracted conflict to intra-ASEAN border frictions—underscore the increasingly complex landscape in which the bloc must operate.
ASEAN cannot afford another year of drift. As Manila takes the helm, the challenge is to turn symbolic measures into practical outcomes and ensure the bloc does not lose relevance amid worsening conflict. Even modest but consistent steps could help reposition ASEAN as a meaningful actor in Myanmar's future.
Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation.
Asmita Bhattasali is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme. Her work focuses on the geopolitical and strategic affairs concerning two Southeast Asian countries, namely ...
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Asmita Bhattasali is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation. ...
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