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Since its liberation in 1948, South Korea has had its share of political instability. After 1987, however, democracy started flourishing with the sixth republic. In its political history, the country has witnessed 17 rounds of martial law—emergency martial law and security martial law, and three impeachments against its leaders (Table 1). Therefore, the 2024 martial law is not the first since its inception as an independent state. However, this was the first in 45 years under its democratic phase, making this a serious event. While much analysis has focused on the reasons behind the declaration of martial law, such as focusing on the First Lady’s role and political strife between the President and the Opposition, a lot has been missing on the takeaways from this political contest. This piece highlights some of the fine points that need much attention.
While much analysis has focused on the reasons behind the declaration of martial law, such as focusing on the First Lady’s role and political strife between the President and the Opposition, a lot has been missing on the takeaways from this political contest.
On 3rd December, President Yoon announced martial law in the country, bringing everything to a standstill. However, the Opposition reacted quickly and vetoed his decision, forcing the President to lift martial law. The episode lasted six hours, making it one of the shortest martial laws in the country's history. Following the decision, the Opposition tried impeaching the President but failed. If successful, this would be the third impeachment of a president in the country’s history after President Roh and Park.
Table 1: Troubled History of South Korea (Martial Law, Impeachment, and Prison sentences)
South Korean Leaders |
Martial Law Declaration |
President Impeached/Impeachment Motion Passed/ Prison Sentences |
Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) |
Implemented Ten Times |
Ousted in the April 1960 revolution, lived in exile in Hawaii |
Yun Posun (1960-1962) |
May 1961 |
Removed by a Military Coup led by Park Chung-hee |
Park Chung-hee (1963-1979) |
June 1964, October 1972, October 1979 |
Assassinated in October 1979 |
Choi Kyu-hah (1979-1979) |
Emergency Martial Law after President Park Chung-hee's Assassination on 26 October 1979 lasted for 440 days |
Removed by a Military Coup |
Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1988) |
May 1980 |
Chun was condemned to death for the 1979 coup and later given amnesty. |
Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993) |
|
Sentenced to 22.5 years for corruption and the 1979 coup, later given amnesty. |
Kim Young-sam (1993-1998) |
|
|
Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) |
|
|
Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) |
|
He was impeached for election violations by the assembly in March 2004; two months later, a constitutional court restored his presidency. |
Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) |
|
Sentenced to 15 years in the case of Corruption in October 2018, later pardoned by President Yoon |
Park Geun-hye (2013-2017) |
|
Impeached on Dec 2016 and confirmed on March 2017 by the Constitutional Court, later pardoned by President Moon Jae-in |
Moon Jae-in (2017-2022) |
|
|
Yoon Suk Yeol (2022-Present) |
3 December 2024 – 4 December 2024 |
Impeachment Motion Not Passed |
Source: Compiled by the Author
Reading between the lines
Many political experts and scholars have examined the immediate impact and the reason behind President Yoon’s martial law declaration. However, focusing on institutional and systemic flaws, such as procedural violations that led to martial law, is missing from the discourse. These issues are critical in answering the ‘how’ question rather than the ‘why’ question, which has been dealt with in detail. Two critical observations from the episode highlight these systemic and institutional flaws:
The martial law chapter has again highlighted the fragility in civil-military relations and the military’s partisan alignment in South Korea.
The first was about the military and intelligence partisan alignment with the conservative government and procedural inadequacies in this occurrence, making it easy for Yoon to proceed with martial law declaration and implementation. This point refers to the partisanship within the country's institutions. Following this incident, the role of military and defence counterintelligence officials has again been criticised, leading to senior officials' suspension. More than 10 active-duty military officials, including Park An-su, the Army Chief of Staff, are under investigation for their role. The Apposition has taken strict action against the intelligence and military officials. The martial law chapter has again highlighted the fragility in civil-military relations and the military’s partisan alignment in South Korea. It will likely have future implications for the functioning of the military.
Besides, many procedural inadequacies have also been identified. For instance, the bypassing of the martial law command and control from the Joint Chief of Staff to the Army Chief Park An-su. This has raised concerns regarding the Yoon administration's politicisation of the military. Apart from this, the President’s direction to the head of the National Intelligence Service to arrest opposition lawmakers and Han Dong-hoon, his party leader, with whom he shares inimical relations, has raised red flags in both parties about the violation of Article 13 of the Martial Law Act, that gives the lawmakers immunity from arrest unless caught in any criminal act.
The second flaw pertains to the prevalent cronyism in the Yoon administration. This was visible in forming a power circle as Yoon's close aides occupied many of the cabinet and high-ranking official positions, also known as the Choongam faction—people from the Choongam High School. For instance, in the current administration, Kim Yong-hyun, the former defence minister who took the martial law decision, Lee Sang-min—the interior minister, and the commander of the defence counterintelligence command were all part of the Choongam faction. Lee Jae-myung, the Opposition leader, shared his concern regarding this issue and raised a red flag pointing towards the likelihood of martial law due to the primacy of the Choongam faction in September. This suspicion became stronger, particularly with the elevation of Kim Yong-hyun, former presidential security service chief, to the position of defence minister.
While martial law has highlighted the resilience of Korean democracy, it has also highlighted the problems that continue, particularly about the concentration of power with the President.
While martial law has highlighted the resilience of Korean democracy, it has also highlighted the problems that continue, particularly about the concentration of power with the President. Therefore, going forward, we will likely see greater scrutiny concerning appointments and oversight over the military and intelligence. The Opposition is expected to bring countermeasures to curtail presidential powers and establish a robust constitutional mechanism overseeing the state institution.
Who is in charge?
After lifting the martial law, the country's attention turned towards the President and his wife. Immediately after the status quo was restored, the Opposition passed a motion calling for Yoon’s impeachment, which failed on 7th December as the quorum couldn’t meet the two-third support in the National Assembly. Even though some lawmakers like Ahn Cheol-soo from the ruling party voted against the party line, it didn’t match the magic number 200. Now that the first chance has passed, the Opposition will push for a second vote on 14th December when the second session starts. However, until then, two things can happen. Either the President willingly resigns or continues until the next impeachment motion is tabled in assembly. But what until then?
While the ruling party has publicly condemned the President's action, it has decided to boycott the impeachment motion to stop a repeat of Park Geun-hye's episode. The party calculation is focused on minimising damage to the ruling party by putting the responsibility for everything on the president. Nonetheless, to ensure that the political drama does not impact the economy and foreign policy, the PM has overtaken the responsibility as the second in command. The Prime Minister has taken prompt action to ensure that the governance functions smoothly and that the fear of second martial law is countered. However, the PM’s decision has attracted criticism, particularly due to the heavy influence of the party head; he said that ‘all cabinet members and public officials, including myself, will put the people’s will first and pool our wisdom with the ruling party to operate all state functions stably and smoothly’. The PM with Han Dong-hoon also released a statement stating, ' What is most important is that there should not be even an inch of vacuum in state affairs’, adding that they would consult weekly to discuss the state of affairs.
The Prime Minister has taken prompt action to ensure that the governance functions smoothly and that the fear of second martial law is countered.
Nevertheless, Cho-Kuk, one of the Opposition leaders, criticised this decision of the PM and Han, calling it a second coup d’etat, first for shielding the elected president from saving him from impeachment and second for sidelining him and trying to take over the President’s position.
Will we see a second political shake-up?
This whole episode has turned out to be an eye-opener for South Korean citizens, who believed that the era of martial law was a thing of the past. Therefore, this episode will lead to more scrutiny and accountability from the politicians. Thus, from hereon, we will likely see a careful examination of the whole episode, including procedural violations and misuse of power by the Yoon administration. This also includes a greater probe, particularly the role of intelligence agencies and the military, which has raised red flags after the incident. Nonetheless, the political strife is expected to continue, seriously impacting the assembly's functioning and governance.
Abhishek Sharma is a Research Assistant with the Observer Research Foundation’s Strategic Studies Programme.
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