India’s first comprehensive national counter-terrorism policy, PRAHAAR, reshapes hybrid threat response through intelligence integration, legal consolidation and global coordination—yet demands sharper cyber, narco-terror and deterrence frameworks
On 23 February 2026, India unveiled PRAHAAR, its first comprehensive national counter-terrorism policy. PRAHAAR represents a doctrinal consolidation of measures that had previously evolved piecemeal through legislation, executive practice, and ad hoc institutional coordination. The policy takes shape against a backdrop of sponsored cross-border terrorism, hybrid warfare, encrypted digital communication, drone-based logistics, and the convergence of organised crime with extremist violence.
With this, India has taken its first step towards finding order in an increasingly disorderly security landscape, characterised by collusion between state and non-state actors, the blending of kinetic and non-kinetic methods, and the use of tech space to inspire, radicalise and mobilise the youth of the country — all unfolding with speed and scale.
PRAHAAR articulates a seven-pillar framework: (P)revention, (R)esponse, (A)ggregation of capacities, (H)uman rights and the rule of law, (A)ttenuation of radicalisation, (A)ligning and shaping the international alignment, and (R)ecovery through a whole-of-society approach.
PRAHAAR represents a doctrinal consolidation of measures that had previously evolved piecemeal through legislation, executive practice, and ad hoc institutional coordination.
By codifying these pillars, the doctrine transforms counter-terrorism from an ad hoc security function into a clearly defined national security framework. Its intelligence-led preventive model is particularly notable. The operationalisation of the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) and the Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI) strengthens real-time intelligence sharing between central and state agencies, shifting the emphasis from post-incident response to pre-emptive disruption. In a hybrid threat environment characterised by encrypted communications, decentralised cells, and cross-border facilitation, this intelligence primacy enhances early detection and reduces systemic vulnerabilities.
The doctrine recognises that terrorism confronting India is no longer confined to conventional fidayeen-style attacks or insurgent ambushes. Instead, it reflects a hybrid threat matrix with dark web financing, crypto-enabled transactions, narcotics trafficking, weaponised drones, cyber intrusion, and algorithm-driven radicalisation combined. This reflects a strategic awareness that contemporary terrorism operates in both the physical and digital domains. The policy moves beyond conservative counterinsurgency frameworks and situates India’s security posture within current realities. In this respect, PRAHAAR represents an attempt to systematise and consolidate counter-terror efforts across central and state agencies, law enforcement, intelligence structures, and international partnerships.
The legal foundation underpinning PRAHAAR constitutes another significant strength. Anchored in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967; the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002; and the newly enacted criminal codes, the policy benefits from a robust prosecutorial framework. This framework is supported by notably high conviction rates, with the National Investigation Agency (NIA) maintaining a rate of around 92 percent, according to a 2025 report. The emphasis on due process, judicial oversight, and adherence to the Protection of Human Rights Act, as well as international covenants such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), enhances normative legitimacy and mitigates concerns regarding potential overreach. In parallel, the doctrine’s focus on de-radicalisation and social prevention marks a departure from purely kinetic responses involving military or police force in counter-terror operations. Instead, it places greater emphasis on addressing the root causes of terrorism through social and psychological measures. By involving community leaders, NGOs, religious scholars, and youth empowerment initiatives, it recognises that counter-terrorism must address socio-economic vulnerabilities and ideological narratives that enable extremism.
In parallel, the doctrine’s focus on de-radicalisation and social prevention marks a departure from purely kinetic responses involving military or police force in counter-terror operations.
Another distinctive feature of the policy is its emphasis on international cooperation. Through extradition treaties, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), joint working groups, and engagement with the United Nations, PRAHAAR situates India’s counter-terrorism efforts within a broader diplomatic framework, thereby strengthening its global positioning against transnational networks. Finally, the inclusion of recovery and resilience measures—through public-private partnerships and community reintegration mechanisms—demonstrates an understanding that the aftermath of terrorism is as critical as its prevention. Collectively, these strengths position PRAHAAR as a comprehensive and forward-looking doctrine that integrates intelligence, law enforcement, legal safeguards, technological adaptation, and societal engagement into a unified counter-terrorism strategy.
A key question surrounding PRAHAAR is whether it adequately addresses the evolving nature of contemporary terrorism. Modern terror networks no longer depend solely on weapons and physical training; they increasingly exploit narcotics trafficking, digital platforms, financial opacity, and covert state sponsorship to finance and expand their operations. While PRAHAAR acknowledges several of these dimensions, certain areas would benefit from clearer articulation and stronger operational emphasis.
One major concern is the link between narcotics and terrorism. The policy acknowledges the growing connection between illegal arms networks and terrorist groups and highlights coordination between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. However, it does not clearly articulate a specialised strategy to address narco-terrorism. Narcotics trafficking hubs such as the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle have long financed extremist groups through the drug trade. In India, drug seizures in Punjab and the Northeast point to cross-border linkages involving hostile actors such as Pakistan, Myanmar, and Laos.
Although laws such as PMLA and UAPA strengthen legal action against terror financing, the policy would benefit from a dedicated mechanism that more systematically integrates anti-narcotics agencies, financial intelligence units, and counter-terror forces.
PRAHAAR also acknowledges several critical challenges, but certain gaps appear to warrant further attention. For instance, the policy addresses the use of crypto wallets, encryption, and the dark web for terror financing. However, it does not clearly outline how cryptocurrency tracking, blockchain analysis, or coordination with global exchanges will be operationalised. Informal systems such as hawala, which are prevalent in South Asia, are likewise not specifically addressed, even though they are often used to move terror funds covertly.
The policy also discusses online radicalisation and the misuse of social media, and promotes community engagement and de-radicalisation. Yet it does not clearly examine how algorithms amplify extremist content or how the government intends to engage with major technology companies. It also gives insufficient attention to encrypted messaging applications, online gaming platforms, and transnational digital echo chambers. These environments complicate monitoring efforts and hinder the development of AI-assisted tracking systems, as well as transparent oversight mechanisms that balance security concerns with civil liberties. Globally, extremist groups have used in-game chats, virtual currencies, and gaming communities to disseminate propaganda, recruit cadres, and transfer funds. Although India has implemented the Online Gaming Act 2025, the country’s rapidly expanding gaming population makes this a new and largely under-regulated domain that remains insufficiently examined.
PRAHAAR represents a doctrinal milestone in India’s counter-terror trajectory, synthesising intelligence coordination, legal robustness, international cooperation, and societal resilience.
PRAHAAR acknowledges that certain regional actors have used terrorism as an instrument of state policy, embedding counter-terrorism within a broader geopolitical context. However, the policy primarily focuses on operational and legal responses rather than strategic deterrence. It does not clearly define how India will respond to state-sponsored terrorism. With the post–Operation Sindoor articulation of a “zero tolerance” approach to acts of terrorism, there is no clear reference to thresholds for cross-border retaliation or to hybrid response strategies.
PRAHAAR represents a doctrinal milestone in India’s counter-terror trajectory, synthesising intelligence coordination, legal robustness, international cooperation, and societal resilience. Its reference to hybrid threats such as drones, cyberattacks, dark web financing, information warfare, and radicalisation signals strategic maturity.
However, terrorism’s adaptive ecosystem demands more granular financial intelligence integration, explicit cyber-domain doctrines, algorithm-aware counter-radicalisation strategies, and transparent oversight mechanisms. The absence of detailed frameworks for narco-terror disruption, online gaming misuse, AI-enabled threat detection, and private-sector cyber governance indicates areas for future doctrinal refinement.
PRAHAAR lays the foundation for recognising the changing nature of terrorism and the need to revitalise counter-terror strategy. Its effectiveness, however, will depend on operational agility, technological innovation, and the political will to evolve in response to emerging threats. A more integrated deterrence framework could further strengthen India’s posture against collusive state and non-state actors in the region. Whether it evolves into a living doctrine or remains a static policy document will determine its ultimate impact on India’s national and regional security architecture.
Soumya Awasthi is a Fellow with the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Dr Soumya Awasthi is Fellow, Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation. Her work focuses on the intersection of technology and national ...
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