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India’s engagement with Syria underscores a consistent, interest-driven approach shaped by regional stability, strategic continuity, and geopolitical pragmatism
Against the backdrop of the first anniversary of the Ahmed al-Sharaa government in Syria, India announced an Arab ministerial meeting to be held in February 2026, which would be attended by the Syrian Foreign Minister, Assad al-Shaibani. This outreach builds on a July 2025 visit to Syria by Suresh Kumar, Joint Secretary for West Asia and North Africa at the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
India’s engagement with Ahmed al-Sharaa, a leader of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham—previously designated as a terrorist by the United States (US), a label removed shortly before al-Sharaa visited the US in November 2025—may come as a surprise to some observers. This raises a key question: What explains India’s decision to engage the Ahmed al-Sharaa regime, which adopts a version of political Islam seemingly incompatible with India’s own ideology?
What explains India’s decision to engage the Ahmed al-Sharaa regime, which adopts a version of political Islam seemingly incompatible with India’s own ideology?
India has maintained cordial relations with Syria since the establishment of formal diplomatic ties in 1950. Since then, ministers and officials from both countries have undertaken 30 different bilateral visits. India’s interests stem from a desire to expand trade and support stability in Syria, given its implications for India’s broader economic interests in the Middle East. In addition, India has consistently supported Syria’s right to take back the Golan Heights, captured by Israel during the 1973 Arab–Israeli war. In return, Syria supported India’s position that the Kashmir issue should be addressed through bilateral discussions with Pakistan.
India has remained invested in a stable Syria, particularly over the last two decades, for several reasons. First, with approximately 10 million Indian citizens working in the Gulf and other parts of the region, instability in Syria or the broader Middle East could have ripple effects—forcing returns, a loss of remittances and other high short-term costs. Moreover, Syria’s location near Iran, Türkiye, Israel and the Gulf nations—key trade partners for India—underscores its strategic importance. Finally, Syria could play a pivotal role in the proposed India–Middle East Corridor, an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, that is expected to boost India’s trade and exports.
India’s interests lie in a peaceful Syria, as well as its economic interests in the wider West Asia region, remain unchanged.
Amid the Arab uprisings, when the Assad regime faced a revolution, India maintained a neutral stance, neither cutting off ties with the Assad regime nor actively engaging with it beyond a few visits. This policy was consistent with India’s general stance to stay neutral in various conflicts and rivalries in the Middle East, as argued by many other scholars. The goal of such neutrality was to avoid overcommitting to any side. In Syria, this meant that it was cautious about engaging with groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
Consistent with India’s neutrality, its outreach to the al-Sharaa government aligns with its broader policy of cultivating relations with new regimes. India’s interests lie in a peaceful Syria, as well as its economic interests in the wider West Asia region, remain unchanged.
In addition, India has had no compunctions about engaging with a government that is anchored by any type of religious ideology. A similar stance has also been taken with Afghanistan, where India has cultivated relations with the Taliban government for geostrategic reasons. The fact that Ahmed al-Sharaa himself has taken a much more pragmatic approach to politics provides India additional leeway to deepen bilateral relations.
It is not only India, but also other regional and global powers that have engaged diplomatically with the al-Sharaa regime.
Notably, it is not only India, but also other regional and global powers that have engaged diplomatically with the al-Sharaa regime. The US, for instance, has been one of the largest supporters of Syria, with President Trump hosting al-Sharaa, removing his terrorist designation, and lifting sanctions. Iran and Russia, formerly key supporters of the Assad regime who provided military support against various rebel groups, including Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, also established diplomatic relations with Syria shortly after Assad was deposed, displaying that the geostrategic importance of Syria far outweighs past relationships. These diplomatic approaches are means of engaging in reconstruction within Syria, which constitutes a strategic investment for external actors, an area that India is also interested in exploring further.
In the near future, India–Syria relations remain uncertain; however, the exchange of official visits between the two countries provides grounds for expecting further cooperation. This may include cultural exchanges and scholarships, some of which have already been announced. India is also interested in investing further in Syria’s reconstruction efforts. It is also quite possible that India would seek Syria to remain neutral on the Kashmir issue in multilateral platforms such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).. India could engage in counter-terrorism efforts with Syria to help stabilise the country further. Ultimately, India’s engagement with Syria follows a realist pragmatic approach, which falls in line with its previous policies of ensuring neutrality. India’s stakes in Syria are similar to those in much of the wider region: maintaining trade ties, ensuring stability to safeguard its economic interests and citizens, and balancing geopolitical relations with other regional and global powers active in the region.
Mohammed Sinan Siyech is a Non–Resident Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Dr. Mohammed Sinan Siyech is a Non – Resident Associate Fellow working with Professor Harsh Pant in the Strategic Studies Programme. He works on Conflict ...
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