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A sovereign, co-development–driven partnership between India and the Gulf states holds the key to reshaping the defence ecosystem
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Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Saudi Arabia - cut short by the dastardly terror attack in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir, which killed 26 civilians - intended to further strengthen bilateral relations between New Delhi and Riyadh. This was Modi’s third visit to the Kingdom as part of the current dispensation’s aggressive policies to build political and economic bridges with the Gulf states.
Along with other crucial sectors, defence has been highlighted as a core component of strengthening strategic cooperation between the two states. Relations between India and Saudi Arabia had long been largely transaction-based around New Delhi’s voracious requirement for oil to satiate its delicate energy security balance. However, a traditionally risk-averse Indian security thinking has been more active in the recent past in protecting its interests in the Middle East, more specifically, in the maritime space. In the Red Sea, as attacks by Houthi militants against commercial shipping increased, the Indian Navy deployed 10 warships across the western Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden to protect both Indian-flagged ships as well as Indian seafarers, who make up a large section of the personnel manning global shipping. Previously, in 2019, the Indian Navy had also launched Operation Sankalp, conducting similar operations in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman as tensions between Iran and the United States (US) escalated.
A traditionally risk-averse Indian security thinking has been more active in the recent past in protecting its interests in the Middle East, more specifically, in the maritime space.
India and Saudi Arabia have conducted joint military exercises in all three theatres of conflict—sea, land, and air—with chiefs from the Indian Army, the Indian Air Force, and the Indian Navy having visited the Kingdom over the past few years. In general, India’s successful economic outreach to Arab states, in particular the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has delivered larger geopolitical and geoeconomic dividends. The next logical steps in these bilateral relations involve much more complex and ambitious prospects, such as the joint development of technologies, including in the sphere of defence.
India has broad and ambitious aims under its ‘Make in India’ programme to become a hub for defence technologies and manufacturing. In August 2024, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh announced ambitious targets to drastically reduce Indian military dependency on foreign equipment. He further claimed that India now imports only 35 percent of its defence requirements, compared to 65-70 percent in the preceding decades. Nonetheless, big-ticket exports of indigenous military systems remain elusive, with more headlines than actual sales. From the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) (HAL Tejas) to the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) (HAL Dhruv), India has made strides in indigenous development, but not nearly enough to puncture through the hyper-competitive international defence bazaars.
Simultaneous to New Delhi’s aspirations, countries in the Gulf are also looking to diversify their shopping baskets. For long, it was the US— acting as the security guarantor of the region via its unchallenged military might—that was able to influenceand shape the strategic realities of the Middle East. However, today, the UAE operates Chinese drones, Egypt flies Russian MiG-29s, and Beijing has been knocking on Riyadh’s door for expanding defence cooperation. In February 2024, at the World Defence Show in Riyadh, Chinese firms commanded the most floor space, even though US firms continue to lead in sales.
The UAE operates Chinese drones, Egypt flies Russian MiG-29s, and Beijing has been knocking on Riyadh’s door for expanding defence cooperation.
Saudi Arabia has been actively exploring multiple defence collaborations across the board. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are in the market for not just purchasing, but funding a fifth-generation fighter aircraft, where they can claim part ownership. The Saudis have been linked to two such projects: The first being regional rival Türkiye’s TAI Kaan, already in its flight-test phase, and the second, South Korea-led KAI KF-21, which conducted its first flight in 2022.
India has missed the bus on high-technology requirements in the defence sector by miles. However, while plugging technological gaps is essential, conventional warfare equipment—from carbines to ammo—will remain a mainstay for most global armed forces, particularly when it comes to land-based operations. This was evidenced in the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, where European powers continue to scramble and struggle to plug gaps in supplying ammunition to Kyiv.
The UAE-based defence manufacturer Caracal emerged as the winning bidder (by way of offering the lowest-cost deal) in a contract floated by the Indian Army to supply 93,895 close quarter battle carbines. This global tender was launched after both the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) failed to meet the Army’s expectations. However, the Caracal deal also fell through for multiple avoidable reasons, resulting in an overall soured experience. Nonetheless, Caracal has partnered with a local Indian firm to set up a small arms manufacturing unit in Hyderabad, keeping future opportunities in mind.
Both India and the Gulf states find themselves in a precarious geopolitical environment, at a time when most states are arming themselves at the fastest pace registered since the end of the Cold War. The time is opportune today for conceptualising the joint development of conventional defence capabilities between India and its Gulf partners, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Both India and the Gulf states find themselves in a precarious geopolitical environment, at a time when most states are arming themselves at the fastest pace registered since the end of the Cold War.
The aims of such a cooperative framework will need to be realistic. Research and Development (R&D) for indigenous platforms remains an Achilles’ heel for India. In 2023, only 6.59 percent of the country’s defence budget was allocated for R&D. While the Indian private sector is looking to expand its portfolio to meet the state’s defence needs, fostering global partnerships in a steadfast manner remains a sure-shot way to compound the industry manifold in a short period of time.
India and the Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, could set up dedicated R&D funds to develop co-owned defence products in areas of asymmetric warfare, such as counter-drone technologies and cybersecurity tools for the protection of critical infrastructure. Such a fund should however be concentrated in developing a private sector-led defence industrial base in India. Other collaborations in manufacturing equipment, such as armoured vehicles, carbines, small arms, training equipment, mobility equipment and even small boats and ships, could present low-risk but high-value investment opportunities to develop a ‘defence bridge’ between the two geographies. Successful small to medium-sized projects led by co-funding and co-development can lead to larger and more progressive ventures, such as in naval shipbuilding. This could include the development of aircraft carriers, where Indian shipyards have made notable strides for the country’s strategic demands.
While it remains true that defence sector is a difficult area to navigate—oscillating between issues of technology transfers, intellectual property rights, national security, and a competitive market where Western companies reign supreme—a sovereign partnership-driven approach to secure the basic supply chains of defence equipment is an open avenue for India and the Gulf states. With political will in place, businesses and bureaucracy must align more efficiently for such ambitions to realistically materialise—something that has repeatedly failed in the past.
Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow with the Strategic Studies programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow, Middle East, with the Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on India’s relations with the Middle East ...
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