Expert Speak India Matters
Published on Feb 16, 2019
The immediate consequence of the Pulwama carnage is the sense of fear developed in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Post Pulwama attack: 10 questions for the government The Pulwama terror attack, which took away lives of over 40 paramilitary men, has sparked a raging debate on how India should respond to Pakistan. Planners of this attack, their logistical support and infrastructure are still in place. In a video recorded before the attack, the young suicide bomber claimed that there are more attacks waiting to happen. While the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir has admitted of the security lapses that lead to this attack, there should be a determined focus on preventing a second strike. There is also a loud chorus arguing for a Pakistan centric response, but the establishment should not lose track of the internal lapses and the possible future consequences of the internal failures. Below are the 10 hard questions that come before me. First. The suicide bomber Aadil Ahmed, in the video, spun out a communal lexicon while explaining his reasons and motivation for conducting this strike. Some clashes have already been reported from Jammu. The collective moral of the nation will be tattered if communal clashes occur in Jammu and Kashmir and other States. It should be ensured that law and order is maintained and communal backlash is prevented.

While the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir has admitted of the security lapses that lead to this attack, there should be a determined focus on preventing a second strike.


Second. The large quantity of explosives used in this attack raises serious questions on the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency (and counterterrorism) grid. How did such a large cache of explosives reach the Pulwama district of South Kashmir? Were the explosives smuggled across the border? Were the explosives procured internally? Irrespective of whether the explosives were smuggled in or procured internally, serious questions need to be asked about the effectiveness of the security forces in controlling further proliferation of the explosive materials. Third. The planners of the attack may have recruited a local Kashmiri boy to execute the suicide bombing, and he may not have needed elaborate training for the execution. Perhaps, the only qualification for such an attack was driving skills and a die hard motivation to carry a Fedayeen strike. Given the rising level of recruitment of local Kashmiris in the Pakistan-based groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), would it not be easy for the recruiters to find motivated local youth to conduct more attacks? Do the security forces have an elaborate intelligence gathering mechanism to track the activity of such recruits? Four. There has been a vehement denial in Kashmir and in some circles in Delhi regarding the trend of radicalisation of Kashmiri youth. Fardeen Khanday was one of the first Fedayeen attackers recruited by the JeM. In a video recorded before his death, he called for more boys to join the cause of JeM. From the news reports, it appears that the suicide bomber Aadil Ahmed joined JeM two months after Fardeen’s attack. Is a new crop of homegrown suicide bombers and Fedayeen attackers coming up in Jammu and Kashmir? How will the security forces deal with this development and prevent such recruitments?

Is a new crop of homegrown suicide bombers and Fedayeen attackers coming up in Jammu and Kashmir? How will the security forces deal with this development and prevent such recruitments?


Five. As per a report published in The Times of India, Afghan war veteran and IED specialist Abdul Rasheed Ghazi infiltrated into the Kashmir valley in December last year. This report, quoting intelligence inputs, suggested that Ghazi was sent by the JeM to avenge the killing of Azhar Masood’s nephews, Talha and Usman. The video released by the suicide bomber also claimed that one of the main motivations of the attack was a revenge of the killings of Talha and Usman. This raises serious questions on the growing infiltrations along the line of control. The Union Government has largely maintained a silence on the cross border infiltrations. At a time when the JeM is sending its best fighters, which include nephews of Azhar Masood, to conduct attacks in India, the questions that arise are (1) what is the likely number of such highly trained fighters active now in the valley? (2) Why are these infiltrations not being curbed on the Line of Control? (3) How do infiltrators traverse the distance and maneuver through the security grid from the LoC to the districts of South Kashmir? Six. The Jammu-Srinagar highway is the main connectivity route between the two regions of the State. It is the most utlised route for the mobilisation of the troops connecting the two different regions. Numerous attacks have happened on this route. Is the highway secure for the movement of troops anymore? How will the route be secured if India decides to go on a full-scale strategic escalation against Pakistan? What are the mechanisms in place to secure the highway? Have any lesson been learnt from the continued attacks on the highway since the year 2016? Seven. Before and after the hanging of Afzal Guru, the parliament attack accused, the Indian media and intelligentsia brazenly eulogised the convict, turning him into a cult figure. While the JeM has taken the responsibility for the Pulwama attack, why is the media shying away from naming the “Afzal Guru Squad” — the Fedayeen wing of the JeM — for conducting attacks post-Burhan Wani encounter? Did the sympathy wave created by the media and intelligentsia for Afzal Guru overlook the consequences of the glorification of individuals accused of terrorism?

Before and after the hanging of Afzal Guru, the parliament attack accused, the Indian media and intelligentsia brazenly eulogised the convict, turning him into a cult figure. While the JeM has taken the responsibility for the Pulwama attack, why is the media shying away from naming the “Afzal Guru Squad” — the Fedayeen wing of the JeM — for conducting attacks post-Burhan Wani encounter?


Eight. Some sections of the Indian media and security establishment had oversealous obsession with Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hafeez Sayeed. This singular obsession with this terror group made other Pakistan based groups appear less significant in comparison, and perhaps that is why the strategic community didn’t pay much attention to the JeM. With the revival of the JeM, followed by the re-emergence of the Al Badr group in Kashmir valley, it seems the prime time analysis which is prone to myopic viewpoints fail to inform policymakers and the general public of the looming threats. Al Badr, along with Gulabadeen Hikmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami, is known to have fought in the Afghan war against the Soviet forces. The JeM is also said to have been linked with Deobandi Afghan Taliban. Nine. The immediate consequence of the Pulwama carnage is the sense of fear developed in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which could possibly lead to rescheduling or cancellations of the parliamentary polls in the State. Ever since the Jammu and Kashmir came under the central rule, efforts have been made to revive the electoral politics in the State. The State and Central Governments have failed to conduct elections in the Anantnag parliamentary constituency of South Kashmir and the Lok Sabha seat is vacant since April 2016. Should the government give Pakistan, the terror groups and the separatists a sense of victory by not holding or delaying the parliament polls? Ten. There was a clear intelligence input regarding a possible IED attack. An intelligence note, which is now in public circulation, suggests that all branches of the CRPF, the BSF, the Indian Army, the CISF, the ITBP and the Jammu and Kashmir Police were warned of a large scale attack. The Governor of Jammu and Kashmir has admitted “security lapses” leading to the deadly attack. While the Governor’s admission is welcome, can the individuals involved in the key decision-making at the highest level of the State and Central Government continue to hold the charge? The current security is not just precarious but utterly insensitive too. The possibility of another terror strike looms large, and the government has as per allegations appointed “yes-men” in key security assignments in the State. Most of the most talented officers, including officers with decades of counterinsurgency (counterterror) experience, have been given insignificant postings in the State police and central agencies. What does it say about a government that has turned some of the best Kashmir and terror experts into fence sitters, as the new face of terror unfolds? Clearly, no lessons have been learnt from the past experiences, especially the IC 814 hijacking in December 1999 and also the Sukma Maoist attacks in which also CRPF had suffered heavy losses. Before any strategic or a diplomatic response is calibrated by the Government of India, accountability for the internal failures must be fixed. And heads must roll!
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.

Contributor

Khalid Shah

Khalid Shah

Khalid Shah was an Associate Fellow at ORF. His research focuses on Kashmir conflict Pakistan and terrorism.

Read More +