With top leaders neutralised and territories reclaimed, India’s Maoist insurgency is in retreat—but only sustained governance can prevent its return.
Image Source: Getty
Chhattisgarh’s security forces recently achieved an unprecedented success by eliminating Nambala Keshav Rao alias Basavaraju—the General Secretary (No.1 position in the Maoist organisational hierarchy) in dense forests of Bastar in Chhattisgarh. Basavaraju’s loss comes at a critical juncture of nearly six decades-long Left-wing extremism, which is battling for its survival. It may be recalled that a decade ago, the Maoist organisation had an incredible and violent presence over as much as one-third of Indian territories, jeopardising development and governance in nearly half a dozen states, particularly central and eastern India.
Statistics bear the truth. Take the case of spatial spread. From dominating a third of territories (223 districts) in 2011–12, Maoist dominance has reduced to just 18 districts. However, according to a recent statement by India’s Home Minister Amit Shah, the Maoist spread is restricted to merely six districts of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, and Telangana. In every sense, Chhattisgarh—especially the Bastar region—remains the last stronghold of the Maoist organisation, which also appears to be slipping out of their control now.
With Chhattisgarh’s forces eliminating Basavaraju right in the heart of the once impenetrable Abujhmad region, it is only a matter of time before the Maoists' last recognised fortress too falls to the security forces.
In the past one and a half years, the combined security forces (centre and states) have captured many strongholds controlled by the Maoists with an iron grip. That security forces can so easily outmanoeuvre Maoists in their safe haven (Abujhmad, a forested and heavily mined area) was unthinkable until a few years ago. With Chhattisgarh’s forces eliminating Basavaraju—under Operation Black Forest in the Abujhmad region—it is a matter of time before their last recognised fortress falls to the security forces.
Beyond losing vast territories and key bases, Maoists have suffered massive losses in terms of hundreds of hardcore fighters being eliminated through sustained countermeasures aggressively mounted by the security forces (See Chart 1). In 2024, while a record 296 Maoists were killed, the security forces lost only 21 personnel in the combat operation—an unassailable ratio of 1:14. This was the highest yearly fatalities suffered by the rebels since 2009. However, if the fatality figures are to be believed, 2025 is likely to surpass the records of all previous years. The Maoist fatality figures are close to 300 in just five months of the year. What is more noteworthy is that both the number of violent incidents and civilian casualties have decreased drastically over the past five years (See Chart 1), indicating a sharp deterioration of the rebel organisation’s firepower.
Chart 1: Maoist-related fatalities (up to 31 December 2024)
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and SATP, India
Notably, the military prowess of the Maoist organisation has weakened significantly over the years. This can be attributed to the elimination of many of its top leaders in quick succession. Out of the 40 Central Committee and Politburo members, only 16 are alive today. After Basavaraju’s killing last month, the security forces eliminated Narasimha Chalam alias Sudhakar and Bhaskar alias Mailarapu Adella, a Special Zonal Committee member from Telangana state. This alarming thinning of top leadership has hugely demoralised the Communist Party of India (Maoist) organisation. This is reflected in a staggering number of ultras having surrendered in recent years and a drastic fall in fresh recruitments to the cadres. As confessed by surrendered Maoists, tribal youth—particularly the educated who have endured decades of hardship—show little interest in the revolutionary ideology.
Behind such a sharp decline of a mighty insurgency that had limitless ability to unleash violence and reign of terror in vast tracts of land is a revamped and purposeful counterinsurgency—combined with visible development outreaches—that has turned the tide against the Left-wing extremism in the past few years. Precision strikes backed by tech and seamless intelligence coordination between the centre and states, as demonstrated during the recent encounters in Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Telangana, have yielded rich dividends. With an aggressive push from the central government—pumping more financial and military resources, investing in connectivity and intelligence networks, facilitating the opening of security camps in Maoist dens/strongholds, and launching developmental outreaches in remote tribal areas—affected states have finally taken the ‘ownership’ of counterinsurgency operations.
Precision strikes backed by tech and seamless intelligence coordination between the centre and state forces, as demonstrated during the recent encounters in Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Telangana, have yielded rich dividends against the mighty insurgency.
In the current phase of Maoist annihilation, Chhattisgarh has delivered the most decisive blows to the rebel organisation. For a state that has been at the receiving end of Maoist violence—including the daring attack in 2013, where Maoists killed the entire top leadership of the state Congress Party—alongside the paralysis of governance since late 2000s, state security forces in active cooperation with central forces have given body blows to Maoists in last 18 months. The combined forces—led by state forces with active support from the Central Reserve Police Force’s CoBRA unit—were able to eliminate as many as 287 rebels in 2024. What is surprising is the Maoist fatalities stacked in the last five months. While close to 300 Maoists have been eliminated countrywide, Chhattisgarh alone has neutralised more than 200. The recent anti-Maoist operation titled ‘Operation Black Forest’—involving a record 25,000 security personnel stretching over 21 days—led to the elimination of 27 Maoists (including top Maoist leader Basavaraju), and was a decisive blow to the revolutionary organisation.
Behind Chhattisgarh’s inspiring comeback—especially after its failed Salwa Judum experiment in the late 2000s—is a revamped counterinsurgency strategy. Learning quickly from the failed vigilante militia approach of Salwa Judum, the Chhattisgarh government shifted its focus to strengthening state security architecture—particularly police modernisation—established a Special Task Force (STF), and shaped its combat capabilities by taking cues from the much-discussed Andhra Greyhounds model.
Following the successes of Greyhounds, the state leadership established a specialised force called the District Reserve Guard (DRG) in 2015. Unlike Greyhounds, which consisted of young and most combat-ready personnel from the state police force, DRG comprised largely local tribal youth and surrendered Maoists. Since these recruits are very familiar with local conditions, topography, hilly terrains, and importantly, having intimate knowledge of the inner workings of the rebel organisation, they have proved crucial in launching many successful counter-operations against Maoists, including the recent elimination of top Maoist leaders such as Basavaraju and Sudhakar. This is not to deny the critical roles of other security agencies, particularly the STF, Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) unit of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), which have actively aided DRG in launching several daring counter-operations in recent years. Yet, much like the Greyhounds in AP/Telengana, DRG has turned the battle against the Maoists in their last recognised fortress (Bastar).
Chart-2: Chhattisgarh Fatalities Figures (up to 31 December 2024)
Source: Collated from South Asia Terrorism Portal and Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)
While military victory looks imminent, what comes next is equally challenging. Post-conflict measures are vital to deny its re-emergence as it did in the previous cycles. It may be remembered that the Left-wing insurgency is a revolutionary movement which thrived in a vast region characterised by extreme poverty, lack of governance, widespread land alienation, and exploitation. Although the Centre and affected states have done well in improving connectivity through a slew of infrastructure projects in Bastar and adjoining areas, apart from delivering on welfare goods, they are grossly inadequate to transform the structural conditions that breed alienation and tribal disaffection. Welfare good, social and physical infrastructure blitz can sustain and result in a positive impact if inclusive governance and genuine political empowerment of the Adivasi population are achieved. A lot can change if state leadership can accelerate the implementation of the PESA (Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act. In short, counterinsurgency should not merely stop at military successes, thereby allowing the remnants of the revolutionary movement to regroup and revive in another form.
Niranjan Sahoo is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation
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Niranjan Sahoo, PhD, is a Senior Fellow with ORF’s Governance and Politics Initiative. With years of expertise in governance and public policy, he now anchors ...
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