As tensions flare in the Middle East, India must weigh its energy, security, and diplomatic stakes before the Israel/US–Iran conflict spirals into a wider war.
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Despite President Trump’s urging of adherence to the fragile ceasefire, the risk of expansion of the United States (US)–Israel conflict with Iran remains, and India must carefully consider its strategic posture. While Trump’s military modus operandi has so far involved performative one-off strikes (as seen this week and in his first term) rather than drawn-out war, pressures from within Washington and developments in the Middle East could still push the US to broaden its action on Iran. Being a country with arguably the greatest independent leverage over the US out of any of Washington’s friends, India has an opportunity to meaningfully urge restraint. Doing so aligns with India’s security and economic interests, and the reigning government’s political priorities. Moreover, what transpires in the Middle East could significantly impact India’s rise as a Great Power.
India has an opportunity to meaningfully urge restraint. Doing so aligns with its security and economic interests, and the reigning government’s political priorities.
First, a wider war would severely disrupt India’s energy supply. India sources just under half of all its oil imports from the Middle East. This was around 60 percent before the Ukraine War, and may have returned to that level again once Trump lifts sanctions on Russia and Western states begin competing with India for Russian energy. A wider war imperils this important energy source. Iran’s Parliament has already voted to close the Strait of Hormuz—a move likely to be approved by the Supreme Security Council and implemented in the event of further US involvement. Having already struck the American base in Qatar, Tehran may also retaliate against the US by bombing and setting alight the oil fields of the Gulf States it regards as complicit for hosting American forces.
This will cause the prices of oil and gas to surge sharply. Electorally, economic downturns—even those driven by external factors—tend to impact incumbents more severely. Trump’s first term sanctions already forced India to reduce Iranian oil imports drastically, making Iran drop from being the third-largest supplier to providing less than one percent of energy, costing India’s economy. Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi, safeguarding India’s interests by adopting a firm stance in engagements with Trump to help prevent further damage, would be viewed positively by the public.
The economic harm to India will not only be absolute but also relative. Compared to other Great Powers such as the US, Russia, and China, India is more reliant on energy imports—especially crude oil and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG). While China and the US have greater absolute imports, India requires a higher proportion of its energy to be imported. War may leave India weaker than its peer competitors during this era of increased Great Power resource competition.
Overthrowing the Iranian government would reduce opportunities for rising powers such as India to expand their strategic footprint in the Middle East.
Second, Delhi has other significant economic interests in the region. It has a larger diaspora in the Middle East—especially the Gulf—than any other Great Power. Disruptions by a full-fledged war will risk lives, destroy remittances, and force costly evacuations, as they have in the past.
Third, and less discussed, overthrowing the Iranian government will transform the distribution of power in the Middle East from multipolarity to US-led unipolarity. This would be the outcome whether a new regime takes over, as in Syria; if prolonged chaos ensues, as in Libya; or if Iran becomes balkanised. The toppling of the last major country that is more aligned with non-US Great Powers than it is with the US would effectively end the geopolitical contest in the region. This would reduce opportunities for rising powers such as India to expand their strategic footprint—something New Delhi has sought to advance over the last decade. India’s strategic-level engagement with the region would, in effect, be subject to Washington’s veto. New Delhi’s leverage in its relations with the Gulf States and Israel would be severely weakened without Iran’s balancing role.
Fourth, the transfer of US military resources away from Asia and toward the Middle East for what will likely be a prolonged war will strengthen China’s position. Beijing may even see benefit in bringing forward its plans to retake Taiwan, through war or peaceful means. A resultantly emboldened Beijing would weaken New Delhi’s leverage on several bilateral matters—including the border dispute. New Delhi should press Washington, highlighting that a status quo, multipolar Middle East is a more manageable cost for the US than a strategically stronger China. The latter harms US interests in Asia—a far more important geopolitical theatre for America.
Unlike many of America’s other partners, New Delhi has the independence and power to put some weight on the scales in Washington.
Fifth, US regime-change wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan have invariably led to increased terrorism. The efforts to topple the former Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan saw the birth of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq led to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Libya’s destruction saw the country overrun by ISIS and other groups. Syria is now controlled by an ex-Al-Qaeda and ISIS deputy leader. Iran’s regional opponents, many of whom subscribe to extremist Wahhabi Islam, will have their position strengthened. As Pahalgam showed, India is more vulnerable to fundamentalist terrorism than the US or China. For this reason, Indian foreign policy has consistently opposed the creation of conditions that cultivate extremism.
Sixth, by using its leverage in Washington to push for restraint, New Delhi has an opportunity to buttress its leadership credentials amongst the global majority who oppose the US and Israeli actions regarding Iran. This is increasingly evident considering even steadfast US allies—Japan and South Korea—have expressed concern regarding America’s attacks and were absent at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) summit. Dissuading the US from expanding the war aligns squarely with the Modi government’s ‘vishwaguru’ narrative, of India as a great and independent civilisation. This is particularly so given India’s links to Iran, not only predate Islam, but stretch back to proto-historic Vedic times—connections older than with any other country outside South Asia.
It is in India’s national interests that the US does not expand the war against Iran. In addition to security and economic factors—some of which never trickle through to public awareness—the Modi Administration can also attain electoral benefits from acting. Just as Trump risks losing his ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA) base and being seen as surrendering to neocon insiders, Modi risks being painted by Congress as too passive in the face of Western excesses, as seen with Sonia Gandhi’s recent op-ed. Unlike many of America’s other partners, New Delhi has the independence and power to put some weight on the scales in Washington.
Kadira Pethiyagoda is a geopolitics expert and former political advisor and diplomat.
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Kadira Pethiyagoda is a geopolitics expert and former political advisor and diplomat. His expertise on foreign policy stems from being a Fellow at the Brookings ...
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