Justice Mission 2025 highlights how Beijing is institutionalising military drills as calibrated coercion to shape cross-Strait dynamics and deter external intervention
On 29 December 2025, the Eastern Theatre Command of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched the Justice Mission 2025, a joint military drill involving army, navy, air force and rocket force units operating in the Taiwan Strait and five areas surrounding Taiwan. The two-day drills were branded as operations to counter the Taiwan Independence forces on the island and their external supporters. The exercise concentrated on integrated sea-air combat readiness patrols, the coordinated pursuit of comprehensive battlespace superiority, the blockade of key ports and strategic areas, and the projection of multi-domain deterrence beyond the island chain. It is important to examine why this exercise is being organised now, how it differs from previous high-intensity exercises, and what China has achieved through these drills.
Beijing’s snap exercises were launched in response to the Trump administration’s decision in late 2025 to approve a US$11.1 billion arms package for Taiwan. The arms sale is the result of President Lai Ching-te’s decision to increase defence spending to three percent of GDP in 2026 and to five percent by 2030. Lai also introduced a historic US$40 billion supplementary budget for arms acquisition from the United States and other partners. The supplementary funding is aimed at establishing the T-Dome, a multi-layered defence architecture to shield Taiwan against missiles, fighter jets, and drones across all altitudes. Taipei, therefore, seeks to acquire precision artillery, long-range strike, air-defence, anti-ballistic, and anti-armour systems; drones and counter-drone systems; as well as AI-powered systems and weapons, all of which feature notably in the latest US arms package.
A series of large-scale drills in recent years—namely, Joint Sword, Strait Thunder, and now Justice Mission—are intended to signal China’s capability and resolve to engage with pro-independence forces, while also deterring the United States, which Beijing accuses of providing “political weapons”.
China slammed the arms package as evidence of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s collusion with external forces, especially the US, to provoke Beijing and advance its separatist agenda. Beijing argued that Lai’s arms buildup was transforming Taiwan into a powder keg, and the porcupine strategy was pushing the island and its population closer to conflict. Therefore, China issued warnings and deterrents to Taiwan’s independence forces and their external supporters, signalling its position clearly. A series of large-scale drills in recent years—namely, Joint Sword, Strait Thunder, and now Justice Mission—are intended to signal China’s capability and resolve to engage with pro-independence forces, while also deterring the United States, which Beijing accuses of providing “political weapons”.
The Justice Mission drills functioned as a testing ground for the PLA’s integrated joint operations capability. The PLA Army and Rocket Force conducted multi-wave simulated strikes against high-value targets, while naval vessels and combat aircraft amassed around Taiwan from multiple axes. Cross-service units rehearsed coordinated assaults; the island’s energy facilities, major ports, and military bases were treated as targets; and the PLA demonstrated a three-sided encirclement aimed at establishing air and sea control over key zones. The operational priority was clear: move fast enough to capture or paralyse Taiwan’s power centres before external intervention could be mobilised.
The messaging and psychological war were arguably the most crucial elements. China’s state media carried stark, war-waging imagery and language, framing the drills as a precursor to war. The released images were a deliberate effort to intimidate, signal resolve, and shape public perception, as shown in the images below:
Image 1: Chain of Justice
Source: Ministry of National Defense
Image 1 suggests that reports of strangulation, encirclement, or coercion overlook Beijing’s intended messaging. Beijing intends to convey that these exercises are far from a bluff and that reunification is inevitable. Image 2, released by China’s Coast Guard, reinforces the narrative that Taiwan is already under China’s guardianship, patrolled by white cutters symbolising China’s state authority.
Image 2: China’s Guardianship Over Taiwan
Source: Ministry of National Defense
Image 3: Hammering Taiwan’s Ports and Shipping Routes
Source: Ministry of National Defense
However, when reviewed against the series of previous military drills, the latest two-day exercise appeared intense but on expected lines. As Images 4, 5, and 6 demonstrate, the area of operations and number of assets involved have remained approximately constant. PLA actions appear close to what Hal Brands labels as the ‘Anaconda Strategy’: Beijing believes that progressive isolation and demoralisation will prove more effective for reunification than a risky amphibious operation, the outcome of which remains uncertain. Therefore, the drills showcased three capabilities prominently: live-fire rockets were launched into the waters around Taiwan, the interdiction of two major shipping routes and blockades of crucial ports were simulated, as depicted in Image 3, and several joint air-sea battles were rehearsed.
PLA actions appear close to what Hal Brands labels as the ‘Anaconda Strategy’: Beijing believes that progressive isolation and demoralisation will prove more effective for reunification than a risky amphibious operation, the outcome of which remains uncertain.
Image 4: Locating PLA Drills Around Taiwan
Source: K Tristen Tang
Image 5: Number of Assets Used in Successive PLA Exercises
Source: Institute for the Study of War
Image 6: PLA Exercises around Taiwan on December 29, 2025
Source: Focus Taiwan
The drills created a significant impact on Taiwan and its partners. Japan officially conveyed serious concern to China over the drills, which had increased tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Tokyo expected a peaceful resolution through dialogue and said it would continue to monitor the situation. The EU, similarly, stated that it considered the drills as endangering international peace and security, opposed unilateral actions that may change the status quo, and called for restraint and dialogue. Australia also raised concerns with China through official channels and described the exercises as deeply concerning and destabilising. Germany, France, Britain, New Zealand, and the Philippines also issued similar statements. US President Donald Trump, however, downplayed the drills and their impact, arguing that China had been conducting similar, if not larger, exercises against Taiwan for the last two decades. He suggested that, based on his personal relations with President Xi Jinping, Beijing was only posturing rather than preparing to act. The government of Taiwan thanked all its partners for their support, while China responded by stating that it “rejects the wrongful statements from these countries and institutions and has lodged serious protests.”
By responding with calibrated military exercises to every major development affecting cross-Strait relations—whether then-Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, US arms sales, or statements by leaders such as Japanese PM Sanae Takaichi—Beijing is establishing a baseline pattern of military response to deter Taipei’s partners.
For Xi Jinping, the Taiwan issue is a core interest that he appears determined to resolve to cement his legacy. As his succession comes up for discussion in 2027, pressure on Taipei to concede would intensify. By responding with calibrated military exercises to every major development affecting cross-Strait relations—whether then-Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, US arms sales, or statements by leaders such as Japanese PM Sanae Takaichi—Beijing is establishing a baseline pattern of military response to deter Taipei’s partners. The signal is clear: any external support for Taiwan will provoke an immediate Chinese reaction, with potential implications for the political, diplomatic, and economic relations between that external power and China.
However, the oft-hyped idea of China preparing to invade or forcibly “reunify” Taiwan in 2027 appears unlikely. Beijing has already cemented substantial incremental gains in cross-Strait dynamics by moving ever closer to Taiwan through grey-zone operations and military drills. The PLA now appears to be nearing the limits of below-threshold armed coercion, reflected in the reduced scale of deployed assets compared to previous years. A full-scale invasion would jeopardise these achievements while exposing China to highly uncertain outcomes. The drills are therefore significant but costly displays of strategic signalling, especially when Taiwan has been preparing to delay and disrupt any assault for at least a month until external partners can intervene.
The drills are therefore significant but costly displays of strategic signalling, especially when Taiwan has been preparing to delay and disrupt any assault for at least a month until external partners can intervene.
Beijing’s actions, however, are resulting in growing unease across the region, as reflected in recent remarks by Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Under the Biden administration, the US invested heavily in the Indo-Pacific, renovating and strengthening bases, and forging stronger partnerships with regional allies such as the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea. Although Trump has shifted his security focus toward the Western Hemisphere, the potential political cost of losing Taiwan to China could still compel US intervention. For now, Trump appears cautious, prioritising his upcoming trip to Beijing—but how far Washington is willing to compromise on Taiwan remains uncertain. Already, elements within the administration are signalling their reservations about Trump’s public posture.
The Justice Mission 2025, therefore, could be followed by other future military exercises near Taiwan, on multiple pretexts. The increasing Chinese focus on the eastern front, however, could compel Beijing to maintain calm and stability on its southwest underbelly with India. New Delhi should accelerate its border infrastructure build-up and fast-track military capability enhancement during this period of relative bilateral stability. Capabilities matter, as intentions and the regional security environment can shift at any moment.
Atul Kumar is a Fellow – National Security and China Studies with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Atul Kumar is a Fellow in Strategic Studies Programme at ORF. His research focuses on national security issues in Asia, China's expeditionary military capabilities, military ...
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