Trump’s Board of Peace, framed as a solution to the UN’s limitations in conflict resolution, signals an executive-led conflict governance model, raising concerns over its mandate and legitimacy
Expanding its ambit beyond the Gaza Peace Plan, US President Donald Trump pivoted towards turning the Board of Peace (BoP) into a ‘membership-driven’ institutional entity for resolving global conflicts. The United States (US) also hosted a signing ceremony for the ‘Charter’ on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos on 22 January 2026, with nearly 18 states joining him publicly as initial signatories. Framed as a nimble collective to the perceived failures of the United Nations (UN)-led peace efforts, the board’s objective is to build peace through rapid action. While the advent of alternative global initiatives is not new, the creation of a US-led, institutionally ambiguous conflict-resolution ‘board’ raises fundamental concerns regarding consensus-based decision-making, legitimacy, and representation in the emerging global order.
While the advent of alternative global initiatives is not new, the creation of a US-led, institutionally ambiguous conflict-resolution ‘board’ raises fundamental concerns regarding consensus-based decision-making, legitimacy, and representation in the emerging global order.
Endorsed in late 2025 by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2803 drafted by the US, the board was mandated to support stabilisation, demilitarisation, and reconstruction efforts in Gaza through 2027. Its stated purpose was to promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict. However, the Board’s charter does not explicitly define its mandate or mention Gaza, leaving significant scope for both functional and geographic interpretation.
Just days before the gathering in Davos, the US extended invitations to around 60 countries to join the initiative. Around 35 countries, including major regional players in the Middle East – Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar – signed up for the board. Other notable signatories included Azerbaijan, Morocco, Kosovo, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Israel also agreed to join the Board of Peace, despite reservations over a Gaza-specific panel and the involvement of Türkiye and Qatar in the Gaza peace process.
The Board’s charter does not explicitly define its mandate or mention Gaza, leaving significant scope for both functional and geographic interpretation.
On the other hand, the traditional US allies have shown stoic reluctance to join the ‘undefined’ board, with Trump disinviting Canada following Prime Minister Mark Carney’s pushback speech at Davos. Several states, such as Norway, Sweden, and France, opted out, citing misalignment with UN processes. Paris has, in turn, been threatened with punitive trade measures, including 200 percent tariffs on French wine and champagne. Russia and China had abstained from the initial UN resolution authorising the board and have joined several other middle powers that remain on the fence about participation.
While the driving force behind the Board was to bypass the limitations of the UN system, particularly regarding building peace in Gaza, the current structure resembles that of an executive club rather than a global collective for fostering international cooperation. With conventional diplomacy at the UN being paralysed by veto politics and institutional inertia, a fast-acting peace mechanism carries intuitive appeal. However, the UN's legitimacy stemmed from the inclusive post-war negotiations that led to the adoption of its Charter, signed by almost 50 states at the San Francisco conference in 1945, a sharp contrast to Trump’s Board, where the charter was drafted through a US-led process and could enter into force after securing the consent of only three states.
Moreover, President Trump will serve as the Board’s chair and oversee the member countries he nominates for a three-year term. Member states, regardless of their position or capabilities, would be able to purchase a permanent seat in exchange for a US$ 1 billion investment. Further, an Executive Board – appointed by the Chair – would be tasked with implementing decisions, and country-specific boards will constitute the lowest tier of the structure. In operational terms, President Trump launched Phase Two of his 20-Point Peace Plan by setting up the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) in January 2026. However, as of early 2026, no major state has formally committed to contributing the required US$ 1 billion.
The charter vests extraordinary powers in the chairman – currently President Trump – including a veto over all decisions, final interpretive control over the charter, unilateral rights to invite or remove members (subject only to a two-thirds override), and authority over the creation or dissolution of subsidiary bodies.
While the informality of ‘executive-led’ decision-making may accelerate action, within multilateral governance, it dilutes collective ownership and legitimacy. The most consequential feature of the Board of Peace lies in the distribution of authority within its institutional design. The charter vests extraordinary powers in the chairman – currently President Trump – including a veto over all decisions, final interpretive control over the charter, unilateral rights to invite or remove members (subject only to a two-thirds override), and authority over the creation or dissolution of subsidiary bodies. Even the board’s continuation is contingent on the Chair’s consent, with renewal or dissolution decisions scheduled for odd-numbered years unless extended. Unlike UN peace operations, the board is not subjected to Security Council oversight beyond its current mandate in Gaza, which expires in 2027.
While the US administration maintains that it does not seek to dismantle the UN, the formal institutionalisation of an alternative board suggests a broader objective of reshaping – if not replacing – the existing international architecture. The UN has faced persistent limitations. It has reflected enduring Western influence often constrained by decision-making deadlock, and is in clear need of structural reform, particularly in the realm of conflict resolution. In the short term, the board could act as a coordination platform for funding peacebuilding efforts, provide logistical support, and back-channel diplomacy in a fragmented landscape. However, the new ‘executive’ peace governance with unchecked scope for expansion and the absence of clear mandates is not a sustainable model for conflict resolution over the long term.
The new ‘executive’ peace governance with unchecked scope for expansion and the absence of clear mandates is not a sustainable model for conflict resolution over the long term.
Steve Witkoff, Trump’s peace envoy and member of the group’s executive board, listed Russia, Ukraine, Iran, Sudan, and Syria as the probable cases requiring the board’s intervention in the future. Any such intervention aimed at conflict resolution, unless categorically mandated by the parties or the UNSC, will be resisted by most countries – especially the middle powers – in the interest of upholding their strategic autonomy and sovereignty. Moreover, a randomised selection based on geopolitical considerations rather than the urgency of humanitarian needs or peacebuilding will merely replace the existing lopsided order with a deeply centralised one. More states might join the board eventually; however, there exists no guarantee that these members would ratify the charter, invest in operations, or simply disregard the board’s decisions – the very pitfalls of absence of institutionalised legitimacy and accountability. The executive-led model of conflict resolution might be the reality of the Trump-led US today; however, it carries a significant risk of becoming another feeble grouping in the absence of a clear long-term strategy.
Heena Makhija is an Associate Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation.
Sandra Thachirickal Prathap is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Dr. Makhija is an Associate Fellow at ORF and specializes in the study of Multilateralism, International Organizations, Global Norms, India at UN, Multilateral Negotiations, and ...
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Sandra Thachirickal Prathap is a Research Assistant with the Observer Research Foundation’s (ORF) Strategic Studies Programme (SSP). Her research examines the geopolitical dynamics of the Global ...
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