Sanae Takaichi must navigate constitutional constraints, alliance expectations, and China’s rise to redefine Tokyo’s strategic role in the Indo-Pacific
Japan’s first woman Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, embodies statecraft meeting strength — but difficult challenges await her. And they are structural. Beijing seeks to build a Sino-centric East Asian order, deepening alignment with Moscow and Pyongyang. At the same time, the gradual dilution of US primacy in the region complicates the strategic equilibrium. There is growing recognition in Tokyo that the post-war strategic bargain of maintaining an exclusively defensive posture under Article 9’s constitutional pacifism while outsourcing security to Article 5 of the US-Japan Treaty is no longer sufficient. Moreover, as Trump 2.0 emphasises the homeland and the Western Hemisphere, equitable burden-sharing is no longer an afterthought. American power and alliances today are increasingly conditional and transactional, while China’s rise is significantly reshaping the strategic landscape.
There is growing recognition in Tokyo that the post-war strategic bargain of maintaining an exclusively defensive posture under Article 9’s constitutional pacifism while outsourcing security to Article 5 of the US-Japan Treaty is no longer sufficient.
As Japan navigates the unfolding structural shifts in the regional order, the LDP’s historic supermajority in the Lower House does more than just give Prime Minister Takaichi political latitude. It presents a pivotal moment for Tokyo to demonstrate determination in assuming greater responsibility for deterrence and to provide Washington with clear assurances on regional burden-sharing. It also gives Takaichi the opportunity to decisively reposition Japan in international politics by balancing military capability, industrial strength, and economic security while navigating the pressures of alliance management and regional competition. How Takaichi manages this moment will define Japan’s strategic trajectory in the coming decades.
As Washington seeks strategic stability and to reduce the risk of miscalculation with China, Takaichi will need to have a clear grasp of strategic realities, grounded in the fundamentals of power, credibility, geography, and resources. As she leads the domestic debate on revising Japan’s core strategic documents, including the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), the priority will be to balance Tokyo’s double bind with Trump, Beijing, and beyond. How Tokyo can align more effectively with the Trump administration’s doctrine of “Peace Through Strength” will remain front and centre. Balancing deterrence and dependence, her focus will be on empowering Japan to impose costs on China’s assertiveness effectively while insulating itself from potential economic coercion.
Washington’s current statecraft is markedly more demanding than what Tokyo has historically navigated. Stepping up as a credible model ally now entails Japan committing roughly 3.5 percent of GDP to defence despite severe fiscal stress and demographic challenges, together with a rapid expansion of industrial and defence production capacity. Tokyo’s defence budget has long remained capped at 1 percent of GDP, and it was only recently, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, that the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) codified plans to scale up defence spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2027. While Takaichi is ambitious about accelerating the timeline, sustaining — and potentially expanding — the target amid Japan’s national debt, resistance to tax increases, a rising cost of living and inflation, a weaker yen, and low productivity will complicate her policy choices.
The debate on amending the constitution is an old one, but substantive attempts often get caught in the procedural requirements of Article 96 — namely, a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament followed by a national referendum.
In the Indo-Pacific, the US National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) rest on deterrence by denial along the First Island Chain, highlighting the imperative of maintaining modernised force postures across Japan, the Philippines, the Korean Peninsula, and other key regional nodes. As the US seeks a stable equilibrium with China, a favourable balance of power requires, in the words of Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby, allies with real military strength and potent industrial capacity, coupled with a sense of shared resolve and responsibility rather than dependency. To this end, Takaichi has a formidable agenda — from difficult debates on constitutional revision to the establishment of a maiden National Intelligence Agency and the expansion of defence industrial capacity.
Navigating the tension between economic security and exposure to Trump’s tariffs will be a tightrope walk for Takaichi. Marshalling the US$550 billion investment pledge is not without its fair share of challenges. Washington retains the authority to raise tariff ceilings should Tokyo be deemed non-compliant — a point made explicit when President Trump offered allies a 15 percent ceiling while tying their investments directly to rebuilding America’s manufacturing and defence industrial base, stimulating job creation, and establishing new production bases.
With a decisive mandate in a democratic election, Takaichi has brought the conversation on revising the constitution back to the centre stage. Following her victory, Takaichi categorically stated: “The constitution expresses the ideal form of our nation. With a clear vision of Japan’s future, we will also advance the challenge toward amending the constitution…..A nation must defend itself with its own hands. No one will come to the aid of a country that lacks such determination. We will steadfastly protect our nation's peace and independence—its territory, territorial waters, and airspace—and the lives and safety of all our citizens. A country that does not take on challenges has no future.”
The debate on amending the constitution is an old one, but substantive attempts often get caught in the procedural requirements of Article 96 — namely, a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament followed by a national referendum. Amending the constitution remains a founding principle of the LDP. Yet it proved challenging even for Takaichi’s mentor, the late prime minister Shinzo Abe. He did manage to incrementally expand the scope of the right to collective self-defence under Article 9 through a Cabinet reinterpretation in 2014, but not through a formal constitutional amendment. Following the election, the LDP secured chairship of the Commission on the Constitution in the Lower House, previously held by the opposition.
Coupled with the Global Combat Air Programme with the UK and Italy, and the pursuit of joint production of Mogami-class frigates with Australia, the defence industry is emerging as a new frontier for growth through allied cooperation.
Whether constitutional revision finally materialises remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is a substantive revision of Japan’s strategic outlook, beginning with the three strategic documents by the end of this year. Discussion concerning next-generation nuclear-powered submarines — despite the challenges of cost and compliance with Japan’s Atomic Energy Basic Act — also remains a priority. Takaichi’s strategy explicitly identifies the defence industry as a growth sector. As Japan moves to formulate its maiden defence industry strategy, attention is increasingly turning to the potential easing of restrictions on defence equipment transfers beyond the five designated categories of rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. Coupled with the Global Combat Air Programme with the UK and Italy, and the pursuit of joint production of Mogami-class frigates with Australia, the defence industry is emerging as a new frontier for growth through allied cooperation. Additionally, deliberations on the three non-nuclear principles are also likely, given that Takaichi has previously expressed reservations about the third principle in her writings.
As a former economic security minister, Takaichi understands the importance of pursuing strategic autonomy and strategic indispensability in critical supply chains. Managing economic security concerns vis-à-vis China, and rebuilding high-tech supply chains for strategic materials and technologies — such as rare earths and semiconductors — will be central to Takaichi’s efforts. As Beijing tightens its export controls amid tense Sino-Japanese relations following her comments on Taiwan, Takaichi is doubling down on positioning Tokyo as a strategic industrial partner, including in the critical minerals supply chain resilience initiatives forged with the EU and the US, and the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) initiative. Taiwan’s TSMC’s plan to produce 3-nanometre semiconductors in Kumamoto is expected to be a game-changer. Moreover, capitalising on non-Chinese sources of rare earths in Australia and Namibia, together with the recent deep-sea rare earth breakthrough near Minamitorishima, is poised to reshape Japan’s options.
The political consolidation of Takaichi in domestic politics will touch a nerve in China. Takaichi’s decisiveness in upholding her comments on a Taiwan contingency as a survival-threatening situation — while emphasising that this did not alter Japan’s official policy — allowed her to weather Beijing’s coercive economic pressure and disinformation campaigns, and in doing so reap significant political dividends, as evident in the supermajority mandate. The Takaichi wave in Japan and the historic election sweep have demonstrated the limits of Chinese coercive economics. Despite China’s travel warnings, seafood bans, and export controls on dual-use goods, Takaichi’s approval ratings remained remarkably high in the run-up to the elections, and many observers argued that she was emboldened by Beijing’s pressure. Hence, escalation may not always yield the desired outcome for China.
As old China hands within the LDP — including Toshihiro Nikai — and former coalition partner Komeito, who historically helped ease tensions through backchannels, fade from the scene, Sino-Japanese relations are likely to remain strained in the near term.
Takaichi is not shy about asserting her principled positions on contentious issues. She has reportedly floated the idea of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, framing any such decision as contingent on securing prior understanding from the US and regional neighbours. As old China hands within the LDP — including Toshihiro Nikai — and former coalition partner Komeito, who historically helped ease tensions through backchannels, fade from the scene, Sino-Japanese relations are likely to remain strained in the near term. This is notwithstanding Takaichi’s October 2025 policy speech, in which she argued for comprehensively promoting “a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests through continued candid dialogue”, echoing the line of her predecessors.
With Takaichi in the lead, Japan’s regional leadership is likely to take on greater strategic boldness. In the immediate term, as she heads to the US ahead of President Trump’s much-touted visit to China for a trade deal, her priority will be to keep Japan’s strategic message clear and focused. Xi Jinping is expected to maintain a hard-line stance toward Takaichi, Tokyo, and Taiwan. How Takaichi coordinates with Washington and communicates Japan’s resolve to work alongside the US for regional peace — without compromising on Taiwan — while also stabilising relations with Beijing will be her first major test. The aim will be to ensure that any US-China agreement, while welcome, does not undermine Japan’s national security interests.
Titli Basu is an Associate Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU).
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Dr. Basu is an Associate Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). Previously she was a Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).In ...
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