The political temperature in Pakistan went up a few notches after the 11-party opposition conglomerate, Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), decided that all elected legislators will hand in their
resignations from the national and provincial assemblies to their party leaders by 31 December. Although the resignation card is now very much on the table, there is as yet no decision on how and when it will be played, if at all. Even so, the threat of mass resignations from the assemblies has clearly signalled the hardening of the position of the opposition. The intention to disrupt, degrade and demolish the current hybrid political system—a civilian façade which is run from behind the scenes by the military establishment—is now very apparent. The way the PDM sees it, the only way to achieve its objective is to plunge into a headlong confrontation with the ruling dispensation, and create so much pressure that the hybrid regime becomes completely untenable.
For its part, the ‘selected’ government is trying to appear
nonchalant, even daring the opposition to go ahead with its threat. Prime Minister Imran Khan has
declared that if the opposition resigned en masse, by-elections would be held on the vacant seats and his party would win a comfortable majority. But no one is buying into the bravado just yet. The fact is that after the PDM announced the resignations, Imran Khan has on—at least two occasions—offered a dialogue to the opposition. He has even discovered the virtues of parliament, a place he hardly ever condescends to visit, and pontificated about Parliament as the best place for a
political dialogue. This is being seen as a sign that either his handlers have forced him to offer an olive branch to the opposition, or he is rattled enough to start climbing down some from his high horse. The PDM, meanwhile, has
contemptuously rejected any dialogue with Imran Khan saying he is “not worthy enough to hold talks with”. At the same time, the opposition has still not completely shut the door on a dialogue with the
military establishment that has installed and is still backing Imran Khan.
The PDM, meanwhile, has contemptuously rejected any dialogue with Imran Khan saying he is “not worthy enough to hold talks with”. At the same time, the opposition has still not completely shut the door on a dialogue with the military establishment that has installed and is still backing Imran Khan
Clearly, the trajectory of politics is gravitating towards an all-or-nothing kind of clash. But even as things head towards their denouement, it is difficult to say how the political cookie will crumble. Will the PDM manage to force the government out? Or will the opposition unity breakdown, partly because of state repression and partly because of contradictions within the opposition conglomerate and clashing interests of its constituents? And if neither happens, i.e., the government manages to cling on to office, but the opposition gathers even more strength on the streets—rendering the government powerless and making governance impossible—then the prospect of Pakistan staring at a political and economic meltdown will become very real. In any case, prolonged political instability and uncertainty is something that the military can neither afford nor wants.
For the PDM, the resignation card is the political equivalent of the nuclear option. It is clearly a high-risk play in which one side is going for broke one final gamble. If it succeeds, the PDM will emerge victorious, even if the victory turns out to be pyrrhic; if it fails to achieve its objective, then the resignations could mean a total implosion of not just the PDM but also the parties constituting it. Simply put, if at all they are to be used, resignations should be the final act, if you will the last testament, before the storming of the fort. Because if this fizzles out, the setback will be virtually insurmountable. As a statement of intention, depositing resignations of all legislators with their party leaders is all very well. But once these resignations become real, there is no turning back. It is either a resounding political victory or an ignominious political death.
The assumption of the PDM leaders is that the resignations will prove to be the final nail in the government’s coffin. PDM chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman believes that once the opposition benches in the various assemblies empty out, it will rob the government of all legitimacy. He is rooting for
breaking the electoral college for Senate elections due March next, which will push things over the edge. While there is no doubt that if the entire opposition resigns, it will cause a huge political turmoil, but whether this will be enough to pull down the government and force new general elections is debatable. Much will depend on how much the opposition can stick together and not cut side deals. Beyond unity, the opposition’s ability to maintain the tempo of protests will also be critical in determining its success.
The assumption of the PDM leaders is that the resignations will prove to be the final nail in the government’s coffin. PDM chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman believes that once the opposition benches in the various assemblies empty out, it will rob the government of all legitimacy
Imran Khan is, however, adamant that he won’t quit. Instead, he will hold by-elections on the vacant seats.
Constitutionally, opposition resignations will not affect the electoral college for Senate polls. Imran could also resort to the subterfuge of ensuring that the resignations aren’t accepted until after the Senate polls. This is exactly what happened after Imran Khan’s party submitted their resignations from the National Assembly in 2014. If the resignations aren’t accepted, technically there will be no vacancies and it will be seen as the opposition abstaining/boycotting the polls. Although the legitimacy of the Senate elections will be highly questionable, legitimacy, or the lack of it, has never really mattered in Pakistan. Imran Khan will, of course, get a majority in the Senate, which will allow him to mutilate Pakistan's legal and constitutional to his heart’s content. But there will also be serious repercussions. The political temperature will rise to breaking point and will burn whatever bridges remain between the army and the opposition.
Holding by-elections will also be a double-edged sword for both the opposition as well as the government. If the opposition boycotts, it will give a walkover to the ruling party and could even end up ceding political space in a host of constituencies. On the other hand, if the opposition decides to contest these elections, it will have to win virtually all the seats back to make its point. Even a few losses could take the wind out of the opposition’s sails. But if the opposition contests, then perceptually it will appear things are back to square one. On the side of the government, while at one level it will certainly think it is in a sweet spot with the opposition tying itself up in knots, at another level holding elections in nearly half of the constituencies will create unbearable and untenable pressure on the political system. At a time when the economy is reeling, Pakistan's relations aren’t exactly very good with the Arabs, situation with India remains hostile, Afghanistan remains in a flux, massive domestic political turmoil could force the hand of the military establishment.
For the last two years and more, the army has had to bear the burden of keeping Imran Khan in office. How long will they continue to bear this burden which is now giving the military a bad name and image? For reasons of self-preservation, the top army leadership (read Army Chief Gen Qamar Bajwa and the ISI chief Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed) could still decide to persist with Imran Khan no matter what. But this won’t solve the problem of feckless and clueless governance, political mismanagement and disarray, and diplomatic disasters, something that is causing a fair amount of disquiet in the rank and file of the army.
For the last two years and more, the army has had to bear the burden of keeping Imran Khan in office. How long will they continue to bear this burden which is now giving the military a bad name and image?
Clearly, the way things are heading, something’s got to give, more so if the opposition ramps up its protests to a point where instability and uncertainty become the order of the day. A heavy-handed crackdown by the military might buy temporary peace, but will almost certainly boomerang badly in the not too distant a future. But the mother of all questions dogging the military establishment is: what is the alternative to Imran Khan? As things stand, the options are as follows:
Minus-One formula: Imran Khan is ousted and someone from within PTI replaces him under the current political arrangement. The replacement eases pressure on the opposition and the current dispensation stumbles across the finish line in 2023. The problem is that PTI is a cult party. Removing Imran Khan means the party will split and the current coalition won’t have the numbers in Parliament. The other bigger problem is that minus-one will eventually mean minus-three because once Imran goes, Bajwa and Hameed’s position will become extremely untenable under a new political dispensation. Will the army ease out both of them, if not immediately then in a couple of months (or a respectable time period)? What will be the future implications of such a move on part of the army? Will it not open floodgates for similar pressure in the future when other popular political figures target the military brass by name?
National Government: Imran Khan is ousted and a national government comprising representation from all parties within the current Parliament is forged for a limited time and with a common minimum agenda. Numerically this is possible, but politically it will be difficult to run.
Fresh elections: The assemblies are dissolved and fresh elections are called. The problem is that it will mean a temporary relief, if even that. A caretaker government will be just a holding operation and that too at a very critical time. After elections, the loser (by all accounts Imran Khan) will once again
take to the streets within a few months and the entire sordid cycle will repeat itself. What is more, the winner – most likely Nawaz Sharif’s PMLN – will hardly be palatable for the military, certainly not for the duo of Bajwa and Hameed.
Military takeover: This is the least desirable option but one which is never off the table. The problem is that it will once again put Pakistan in the international dog-house. At a time when the economy is already on the ropes, this is the last thing Pakistan can afford. China will of course back a military regime, but without the West, Pakistan will find it difficult to stay afloat. Add to this the domestic pressures that will need to be handled. But there is always Afghanistan to the rescue. It is possible that Pakistan might cut some deals to please the new Biden administration on Afghanistan, and in return the US might look the other way, as it has done so many times in the past.
Regardless of the option chosen – sticking to Imran for as long as possible or one of the four outlined above – it will be a band-aid solution to the current crisis, and will not address the fundamental problem – civil-military relations. Even if the military retreats for now, there is absolutely no guarantee that the current political mood will lead to a complete overhaul in the civil-military equation. Without this, it will only be a matter of time before the military makes a comeback and the whole cycle repeats itself.
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