Pakistan: The Winner Takes It All

Pakistan’s recently passed 27^th Constitutional Amendment is set to reinforce the military’s primacy over the country’s fragile democracy. The latest amendment gives unprecedented power and legal immunity to Field Marshal and Chief of Army Staff Syed Asim Munir. In effect, its passage would underline that the army has once again outmanoeuvred the nation, the civilian leadership, and undermined key democratic institutions, including the judiciary. It is another attempt to undo the 1973 Constitution and shift the balance of power in favour of the Army, with the civilian leadership playing second fiddle. The amendment encapsulates this power shift, making Munir virtually untouchable under the law and placing him above the heads of all other military branches.

The latest amendment gives unprecedented power and legal immunity to Field Marshal and Chief of Army Staff Syed Asim Munir.

Article 243 of Pakistan’s Constitution has been rewritten to create a new apex military post—the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF)—a role that the sitting Chief of Army Staff will automatically occupy. According to the amendment, the office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), which was meant to coordinate among the services, would stand abolished. On 27 November 2025, when the current CJCSC retires, Field Marshal Munir, as Army Chief, will also assume the role of CDF, formally subordinating all service branches under his command. The implications are clear: the army will dominate the entire military structure in a way never seen before in Pakistan’s history. This change risks placing the Air Force and Navy under an army-dominated structure, potentially fueling resentment and entrenching inter-service rivalry.

The amendment does not stop at reordering the military chain of command. It would also weaken the civilian oversight over the nation’s nuclear arsenal. A new post of Commander of the National Strategic Command (CNSC) will be created to oversee Pakistan’s nuclear forces. The Prime Minister of Pakistan would appoint CNSC from among the Army’s generals, in consultation with the Army chief/CDF. In practice, that means Munir and future Army Chiefs will handpick the officer in charge of Pakistan's nuclear forces, who will report through the Army’s chain of command. This could weaken the control of the National Command Authority (NCA), a body designed to include civilian leaders and all service chiefs in nuclear decision-making. In the current NCA system, strategic decisions, particularly concerning the use of nuclear weapons, require collective input and are chaired by the Prime Minister. The latest Amendment would place the nuclear command under a General selected by the Army, thereby providing firm control to the general headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi.

The implications are clear: the army will dominate the entire military structure in a way never seen before in Pakistan’s history.

Furthermore, it is worrying that, in an unprecedented move, not to hold leaders and officials accountable in a “democratic” country, grants sweeping personal privileges to top military leaders, effectively placing them above the law. It grants lifelong constitutional protection to any officer elevated to five-star rank – titles such as Field Marshal (Army), Marshal of the Air Force, or Admiral of the Fleet. These ranks have rarely been used in Pakistan, but Munir was hastily promoted to Field Marshal after a brief military confrontation with India in May 2025. The latest amendment is poised to enshrine that promotion in the Constitution and ensure Munir’s status for life. Under the provisions of the new Amendment, a five-star officer “shall retain the rank, privileges and remain in uniform for life” and can only be impeached. In simple terms, legally, Munir would be beyond reproach and untouchable, as no court or future civilian government could charge him with any crime or strip him of his rank without a two-thirds majority in parliament. In a similar vein, the Chief of the Navy and the Air Force, much like Field Marshal Munir, have also been given an SOP for their role in the May 2025 Operation Bunyan al Marsoos. They, too, will don their Khakis as four-star Generals for life and have immunity.

Equally alarming is the manner in which the Amendment undermines the independence of the judiciary in Pakistan, continuing a trend of eroding the courts’ autonomy that began under the current government. It establishes a new Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) to handle constitutional matters, effectively demoting the Supreme Court’s role as the highest authority on the Constitution. The Chief Justice of Pakistan would be junior in status to the Chief Justice of the new Constitutional Court, who will serve until the age of 68 (three years longer than the retirement age of a Supreme Court judge). This systemic erosion of the judiciary’s autonomy has been a notable accomplishment of Munir and the Shehbaz Sharif-led coalition government in Islamabad.

This concentration of power could result in hasty or unchecked decisions during a military crisis.

In 2024, the parliament passed the controversial 26^th Amendment, which altered the process of judicial appointments and removed the Supreme Court’s power to hear cases suo motu (action taken by a court of its own accord). With the proposed changes, Pakistan’s judiciary, which played a central role in removing General Musharraf from power in 2008, will become entirely politicised and placed under the thumb of the Executive, which in turn is under the heavy control of the Military Establishment. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has become a mere shadow of its former self. Fortunately, Chief Justice Yahya Afridi, in a concession, will continue to hold the title of Chief Justice of Pakistan until he demits office; thereafter, the senior of the two Chief Justices—the Federal Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan—will hold the position of Chief Justice of Pakistan.

The political leadership, for its part, has kowtowed by agreeing to these constitutional changes – a stark indicator of how weak and enfeebled democratic institutions have become over the past three years. The government introduced the amendment in the Senate in a climate of near silence from major political parties. It passed muster in the Senate with a two-thirds majority amid chaotic scenes of token protest. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), historically critics of military dominance at various times, were the architects of this amendment as part of the ruling coalition. They justified it with technical arguments and nationalist rhetoric, seemingly more focused on remaining in Munir’s good graces rather than considering the long-term damage to the country. Pakistan’s “hybrid” system has now devolved to the point that even the appearance of civilian input is barely of much consequence.

Munir’s unprecedented authoritarian streak can be compared to that of past military rulers, such as General Zia ul Haq in the 1980s and General Pervez Musharraf in the early 2000s. There are clear similarities: Zia and Musharraf both sidelined parliament and the courts, ruled by decree, and then engineered constitutional amendments to institutionalise their dominance (the Eighth Amendment under Zia, the Seventeenth under Musharraf). Akin to Munir, they concentrated power in their own hands for years. Yet, there are also some notable differences in Munir’s approach. Unlike his predecessors, Munir has not imposed outright martial law nor has he so far assumed a formal civilian office, such as the Presidency. Instead, he is exercising authority from behind the scenes while letting the civilian dispensation operate on the surface.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan has become a mere shadow of its former self.

Munir has leveraged this over a compliant government to pass laws that benefit the military, allowing him to accomplish his goals without facing international opprobrium that a coup would entail or the drudgery of day-to-day governance. He remains, at least nominally, within a constitutional framework – albeit one that he is reshaping to his will. More importantly, he would have created a status for himself, a Field Marshal for life, constitutionally and empowered with immunity, that neither Zia nor Musharraf enjoyed, at least not in such explicit terms. With brute force and by manipulating the government, Munir has checked every box in the past three years to consolidate his power: the political opposition, led by Imran Khan’s PTI, is neutralised, judicial independence is curtailed, the legislature is subservient, and his own tenure and legacy are guaranteed. It is a coup de grace by the Military Establishment, achieved without deploying tanks on the streets of Islamabad or activating the infamous 111^th Infantry Brigade.

Over the past three years, the democratic backsliding in Pakistan has reached an unprecedented level amidst the passage of controversial constitutional amendments, weakening of the judiciary, rampant human rights violations, rigged national elections, and the use of excessive force against civilians and political opposition. Nevertheless, the international reaction has remained interestingly subdued. The Western democracies, ordinarily vocal about support for democratic norms, have limited themselves to mild diplomatic murmurs in Pakistan’s case. On the contrary, there has been a growing acceptance of the Pakistani military in Western capitals, especially in Washington. President Donald Trump has openly praised Munir, referred to him as his “favorite Field Marshal,” and officially welcomed him to the White House. This acceptance has further strengthened Munir’s confidence to take bold domestic actions and adopt a more aggressive stance in the neighbourhood, particularly towards India and Afghanistan.

This amendment is a serious blow to Pakistan’s democratic credentials, with Munir’s dominance unrivalled as he continues to wear the epaulettes. The judiciary—once a beacon of resistance in the country—has been steadily silenced and constrained through legislation, undermining its duty to act as the final interpreter of the Constitution when its basic structure is subverted. It also underlines the dictum that the Parliament’s right to amend the Constitution is not absolute. The Parliament has compromised its integrity under pressure, making a mockery of parliamentary authority, while mainstream political parties have displayed immaturity by either willingly acquiescing or allowing themselves to be rendered impotent. The Establishment has used the symbiotic patron-client relationship between political and military elites through coercion and incentives to control and protect its privileged position.

The Pak Army is on a jingoistic high, particularly with the growing comfort between Washington and Rawalpindi.

 Although the Army’s victory over civilian institutions was an expected outcome, the move exposes the country to long-term instability on account of the over-centralisation of authority in one person and one institution. While Pakistan’s history has borne considerable evidence that when institutional balance is skewed, it eventually provokes some form of backlash, be it from within the military’s own ranks, the streets, or through unintended crises. For now, however, there appears to be no immediate challenge to Munir’s ascendency in an environment that lacks transparency and inclusiveness.

Overall, while the people have witnessed the decline in their democratic rights and a constitutional cover for martial law, the PMLN has ensured the continuity of its governments led by Maryam in Lahore and Shahbaz in Islamabad. The PPP has secured immunity for Zardari, hounded by a myriad of cases. Although Imran remains a popular pole in Pakistan’s polity, he and the PTI remain gagged with little leeway. The accretion of power by Munir unto himself is no longer a work in progress, but the goodwill and support across the board he had gained following Op. Bunyan al Marsoos, according to analysts, had dwindled.

From an Indian perspective, the further crystallisation of the Establishment’s overarching control over Pak polity, foreign policy, and strategic interests reduces the space in the much-strained Indo-Pak ties in the wake of the May 2025 conflict between the two neighbours. The Pak Army is on a jingoistic high, particularly with the growing comfort between Washington and Rawalpindi. Moreover, New Delhi is also unlikely to give up its hardline approach to Islamabad, where the Establishment reigns supreme, and it has shown reluctance to any opening to the men in Khaki. The recent Red Fort terror attack in Delhi on 12 November 2025, attributed to Kashmiri radical elements, has only deepened the mistrust, rendering an already fraught Indo–Pak equation even more volatile.

Rajiv Sinha is a former Special Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat and a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. He focuses on the Neighbourhood and security issues.

Sarral Sharma was formerly with the NSCS and is presently pursuing a PhD in Security Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi.

• International Affairs
• India
• Pakistan
• 27th Amendment pakistan
• 27th constitutional amendment Pakistan
• democracy in Pakistan
• military dominance in india
• military establishment in Pakistan
• military rule in pakistan
• pakistan constitution
• pakistan constitution amendments
• pakistan india military conflict

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