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Published on Jan 28, 2025

Despite the Pakistani military’s military successes against TTP, it has been unable to curb the TTP’s propaganda on digital platforms, which uses state failures and ideological voids to radicalise minority citizens

Pakistan Taliban’s evolving social media propaganda

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In November 2024, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) released a 17-page document that outlined the so-called “Islamic method” for the execution and beheading of the “enemies of Islam” in war. Issued by Central Dar-ul-Ifta, TTP’s fatwa committee, the document is heavily grounded in selective religious references and asks the group’s cadres to avoid “un-Islamic” methods of killing. The document was circulated by TTP’s media arm Umar Media, on the file and media sharing website, Internet Archive. These latest guidelines from the TTP are another example of the group’s media-savvy approach, exemplifying its increasing sophistication in propaganda dissemination and its ability to exploit digital platforms to amplify its narrative.

The document was circulated by TTP’s media arm Umar Media, on the file and media sharing website, Internet Archive.

The TTP, in its relentless pursuit to destabilise the Pakistani state, has weaponised social media and cyberspace as critical tools for psychological warfare and inciting violence. This article examines the TTP’s digital propaganda strategy and argues that the group is gradually using social media as a potent tool to spread its propaganda, manipulating the religious sentiments of citizens to fulfil its ideological objectives and destabilise the state. Pakistani security forces’ kinetic measures have disrupted TTP’s physical strongholds, but the group’s ability to adapt and weaponise the digital space remains largely unchecked.

TTP’s resurgent anti-state campaign

The TTP has been targeting the Pakistani government and its agencies since the early 2000s. However, the Afghan Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021 provided the TTP with ideological inspiration and a cross-border sanctuary, enabling a resurgence in the latter’s activities. This coincided with Pakistan’s intensified counter-terrorism operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and tribal regions, where military actions disrupted the group’s networks but also caused collateral damage and displacement. The TTP leadership capitalised on these grievances to gain local support, particularly among the Pashtun communities that accused the government of neglect and heavy-handed tactics.

The Afghan Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021 provided the TTP with ideological inspiration and a cross-border sanctuary, enabling a resurgence in the latter’s activities.

The collapse of the 2022 ceasefire agreement exacerbated hostilities between the Pakistani state and the TTP. In response, the group resumed targeted attacks on police stations, military installations and intelligence agencies. Pakistan’s worsening economic crisis and ongoing political instability further weakened the state’s capacity to respond, which the TTP exploited to frame itself as an alternative to a “corrupt and unjust” system. These developments collectively fuelled its recent campaign against the Pakistani state, with the group leveraging ideological rhetoric and grievances to delegitimise state authority. Consequently, in 2024, Pakistan witnessed a 40-percent surge in attacks by the TTP as compared to 2023.

Sophisticated propaganda strategy

TTP’s media strategy, spearheaded by Umar Media, demonstrates an organised and systematic effort to craft emotionally charged content targeting diverse audiences. Its online magazine, Taliban, alongside carefully produced videos, seeks to shape public perception, glorify violence, and incite anger against the Pakistani state and law enforcement agencies. By presenting the Pakistani military and police forces as corrupt and anti-Islamic, the group reinforces its rhetoric of victimhood and martyrdom, seeking to undermine the security forces’ morale and aggravate public discontent.

Post-August 2021, Umar Media has been revamped, and it now operates with a professional and centralised structure. This has improved TTP’s content frequency, consistency and quality, facilitated by experienced media propagandists like those formerly associated with al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent.

Its online magazine, Taliban, alongside carefully produced videos, seeks to shape public perception, glorify violence, and incite anger against the Pakistani state and law enforcement agencies.

The group distributes videos, documents, and speeches using mainstream and encrypted digital platforms like Telegram and WhatsApp, as well as file and media-sharing sites like the Internet Archive. Using proxy accounts and encrypted tools, the TTP ensures that its content reaches a global audience while evading detection and shutdowns from Pakistani authorities. The content is tailored to target diverse audiences, incorporating themes of religious legitimacy, anti-state rhetoric, and adventure-driven narratives to appeal to marginalised youth, particularly from the Pashtun belt and Muslim diaspora communities.

The TTP frames its struggle as a divine jihad against an un-Islamic Pakistani state, portraying security forces as corrupt, apostate agents of Western powers. Their videos often combine Quranic recitations, battle visuals, and glorified depictions of suicide bombers (fidayeen), presenting martyrdom as the ultimate achievement. Furthermore, the use of psychological warfare, such as execution videos and exaggerated claims of military victory, seek to erode the morale of Pakistan’s security establishment while fostering fear among the public.

This coordinated and professional propaganda machine capitalises on local grievances, particularly among Pashtun communities, amplifying narratives of injustice, displacement, and government neglect. The TTP’s strategy highlights its adaptability to technological advancements and ability to exploit socio-political instability.

Psychological impact on the Pakistani security forces

The psychological impact of the TTP’s propaganda on Pakistan’s military and police forces is profound, as it directly targets their morale and identity. By labelling security forces as “murtads” (apostates) and mercenaries serving foreign interests, the group’s messaging creates an identity crisis for security forces personnel who often hold strong religious beliefs. This framing portrays their profession as a betrayal of Islam, fostering cognitive dissonance that can erode their resolve and, in extreme cases, lead to defections. Coupled with this is the concept of “mortality salience”, which involves the TTP glorifying suicide bombers as martyrs and presenting death in jihad as a divine triumph. This narrative amplifies existential fears among frontline personnel, especially as the group continues to disseminate violent imagery, execution videos, and battlefield successes to instil dread and sap the confidence of their military opponents.

The psychological burden is further compounded by the TTP’s amplification of Pakistani security forces’ operational failures. Videos purportedly showcasing ambushes, targeted attacks, and claims of victory against the Pakistani military and police forces are designed to undermine public trust in the state’s ability to maintain security. These portrayals project the TTP as dominant, creating the perception of an elusive and invincible enemy, which weighs heavily on the mental fortitude of security personnel tasked with countering this festering insurgency.

By systematically targeting the morale of military personnel and police forces, the group leverages emotional and religious rhetoric to sow doubt, fear, and disillusionment among frontline fighters.

Conclusion

The continued use of social media by the TTP remains a potent and evolving menace for Pakistani security forces, amplifying the psychological and operational challenges they face. By systematically targeting the morale of military personnel and police forces, the group leverages emotional and religious rhetoric to sow doubt, fear, and disillusionment among frontline fighters. Despite military campaigns, Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy has struggled to combat TTP’s propaganda war effectively.

The absence of a robust counter-narrative has allowed extremist messaging to thrive unchallenged, as the state has failed to provide a coherent ideological rebuttal rooted in Islamic teachings that exposes the contradictions in the TTP’s violent interpretations of Islam. Compounding this is the lack of adequate cyber monitoring by Pakistani authorities, where encrypted platforms like Telegram and WhatsApp remain fertile grounds for extremist recruitment and the dissemination of propaganda. For Pakistan’s security forces, this digital menace exacerbates an already complex fight, as every operational failure and counter-narrative void strengthens an agile and ideologically driven adversary.


Sameer Patil is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.

Soumya Awasthi is a Fellow with the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.

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Authors

Sameer Patil

Sameer Patil

Dr Sameer Patil is Director, Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.  His work focuses on the intersection of technology and national ...

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Soumya Awasthi

Soumya Awasthi

Dr Soumya Awasthi is Fellow, Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation. Her work focuses on the intersection of technology and national ...

Read More +