Pakistan joins Trump’s Board of Peace, seeking legitimacy and leverage on Kashmir, but India’s strength and US priorities limit its gains
The decision to join the United States (US) President Donald Trump’s much-trumpeted ‘Board of Peace’ (BOP) was a no-brainer for the Shehbaz Sharif-led and Asim Munir-controlled hybrid regime in Pakistan. Although the initial euphoria over theinvitation was somewhat dampened when one was also extended to India, and another 50-odd countries, nevertheless, the regime was happy to jump on the empty BOP bandwagon. The decision sought to secure a modicum of acceptability and respectability after some Arab and Muslim states— Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Türkiye, to name a few—also decided to become members of the BOP.
The criticism back home was dismissed as noise by members of the regime. The ruling cabal deployed its drumbeaters to justify the move withself-serving, disingenuous arguments. A few reasons were given to rationalise joining the BOP. It was argued that Pakistan couldn’t afford to attract the ire of a highly unpredictable US administration under s Donald Trump. Pakistan was very vulnerable—economically, militarily, and diplomatically. Trump had recently extended a warm reception to Pakistan and was heaping encomiums on the newly minted Field Marshal and Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif. Pakistan was expecting a renewed American engagement in the field of mining and cryptocurrency and hoped for major investments to flow into the country. If Trump flipped and took offence to Pakistan's refusal, it could have significant implications. The International Monetary Fund could tighten the screws. New tariffs could be imposed on Pakistan. Financial flows could be adversely affected. Given the fragility of the Pakistani state, it couldn’t afford to say no to Trump, even less so, because the regime lacks domestic legitimacy, is desperately seeking to demonstrate its acceptability abroad, something which is a pretty standard operating procedure for unpopular regimes in Pakistan
Other considerations also played a role. It was argued that Pakistan would get a seat in the room, if not the table, and could use it to present its viewpoint and influence decisions taken by BOP, especially on Gaza. That Trump isn't exactly inclined to hear alternative views that go against his own, and that he exercises a complete veto in the BOP, was downplayed by the advocates of the regime. Even so, Pakistan would rather be in than out of the room. Members of the regime also insisted that joining the BOP did not mean that Pakistan would deploy troops in Gaza, even less that it would be involved in the disarmament of Hamas terrorists in that territory. As for the US$1 billion membership fee, Pakistan are clear that this doesn't need to be paid immediately, and they can bide their time for at least three years and decide on whether to pay this subscription fee later. Pakistan also hopes to gain some benefits in the form of building contracts or the supply of labour in the reconstruction of Gaza. It won't be far-fetched to predict that Pakistan will continue voicing outrage over Gaza in public while happily partaking in the benefits that flow their way. Add the prospect of embedding itself in the region by providing guard duties for Arab and Muslim states.
There is another factor at play that is exciting the Pakistanis with the potential possibilities it portends. The charter of BOP is not limited to Gaza. In fact, Gaza is not even mentioned. But the BOP “seeks to promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict. The Board of Peace shall undertake such peace-building functions in accordance with international law and as may be approved in accordance with this Charter…”. The Pakistanis are anticipating the prospect that the BOP could turn its gaze to Kashmir once it settles Gaza. With the backing of anti-India countries like Türkiye in BOP, Pakistan feels it has an opportunity to push for Kashmir to be included in its agenda. Similar fears expressed by some Indian analysts have only enthused the Pakistanis.
From Pakistan’s perspective, Trump has blown up the US strategic relationship with India. His targeting of India and siding with Pakistan signalsthat Trump has no use for India, nor does he see it as a strategic partner, much less an ally. India's strategic utility has diminished considerably is clear from the National Defense Strategy published recently, which no longer labels China as an enemy, thereby obviating the need to recruit India as a partner in the US’ strategy to contain China. India, in any case, has rubbed Trump the wrong way by not succumbing to his threats or appearing compliant. Pakistan, on the other hand, has actively sought to cultivate goodwill with him, offer him incentives in the form of lucrative crypto and mining deals, and show readiness to back the American adventurism by sending in troops in the service of the US. The USwould still like to engage the Indian market. But this they achieve using tariffs as a tool, and no longer need to provide strategic concessions to India. The Pakistanis are hoping that, given the growing estrangementin US-India relations, it will nottake much to convince Trump to interfere and intervene to solve the “Kashmir issue”. The Pakistanis are once again presentingKashmir as a “nuclear flashpoint”, something that Trump seems to have bought when he alludes to saving millions of lives in the Operation Sindoor conflict last May, which he claims could have escalated to a nuclear conflict. They believe they can get Trump to intercede on their behalf and use the BOP to pressure India to agree to a dialogue on Kashmir and perhaps even get Trump to push for a solution of Pakistan's liking on the issue. Some Pakistanis have argued that Trump could employ tariffs and other economic measures to encourage India to reconsider its position on Kashmir. Trump’s obsession with the Nobel Prize and his stated view of himself as a peacemaker who stopped eight wars, along with his frequent reference to the conflict between India and Pakistan, have raised expectations in Pakistan that they can convince Trump to grab this opportunity and prevent another conflict in the subcontinent.
Pakistan's tendency to overestimate its strategic leverage prevents it from carefully analysing Trump’s claims and his reported interventions to stop wars. If the Pakistanis were to review the conflicts Trump has claimed to have ‘stopped’, they would observe that Trump has generally supportedeither the status quo or the party with the stronger position in any conflict — for example, Russia-Ukraine, Armenia-Azerbaijan, and Cambodia-Thailand. At best, interventions often involve establishing dialogue mechanisms or mediation bodies rather than resolving the underlying disputes. Unless Pakistan is the stronger party in a given conflict — which it was not in its recent engagements with India — Trump is likely to support either the status quo, i.e., the Line of Control as the border, or the stronger party, in this case India. A transactional Trump has more to gain from a rising economy like India than from a weaker economy like Pakistan, even if he has no strategic interest in getting India into his corner.
India, therefore, does not need to worry about Trump trying to interfere in Kashmir. He attempted to do so in 2019 but was effectively stonewalled by India. He could try again, but the outcome would likely be similar. The danger is, however, in so much from Trump as it is from the alternate reality that the Pakistani quasi-military regime operates in. The regime has convinced itself that the situation is ripe to bring the international spotlight back on Kashmir, so they will want to orchestrate a situation that will focus Trump’s attention and force him to try to interfere and intervene. The Pakistanis will be tempted to carry out another major terrorist attack and provoke a massive response from India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has statedthat Operation Sindoor is currently on a pause, which implies that India would respond if a major terrorist attack occurs. In the event, India would likely target both terrorist infrastructure and associated support networks, including elements linked to the Pakistani military. To be sure, this will escalate the situation and force the US to intervene, first to secure a ceasefire, which in turn will be a perfect segue to a more involved role for dispute resolution. That is at least how the Pakistani assessment appears to proceed.
Trump’s engagement withPakistan has increased the threat of conflict in the subcontinent by emboldening and encouraging Pakistan's problematic behaviour. India needs to remain vigilantand maintain the capability to respond swiftly to Pakistan, in a matter of hours, not days or weeks.
Sushant Sareen is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sushant Sareen is Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation. His published works include: Balochistan: Forgotten War, Forsaken People (Monograph, 2017) Corridor Calculus: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor & China’s comprador ...
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