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The spiralling violence along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and beyond is slowly but surely sucking Pakistan into the Afghan vortex. The diplomatic ploys, as well as the military moves and countermoves by both the Taliban and Pakistan against each other, are only complicating an already complex and increasingly bitter relationship. While the two sides are sending out both conciliatory and combative signals, the latter is receiving greater traction because of the pervasive sense of insecurity, insincerity and insidiousness that has come to define the bilateral relationship. Domestic political compulsions to stand up to and not give in to the other side, coupled with traditional Punjabi versus Pashtun animus coming to the fore, have made the situation even more intractable.
The diplomatic ploys, as well as the military moves and countermoves by both the Taliban and Pakistan against each other, are only complicating an already complex and increasingly bitter relationship.
Since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been going downhill. This is in large part due to two insurgencies—by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Pashtun areas of Balochistan, and by the Baloch separatists in the Baloch belt—that have escalated significantly. The Pakistanis have tried everything but haven’t managed to contain the violence. In the last three and half years, Pakistan has attempted to resolve this situation through multiple avenues: diplomatic engagement through talks with the TTP facilitated by the Taliban, using the influence of top Deobandi clerics, driving an economic squeeze by blocking and restricting Afghan transit trade, forcing the repatriation of Afghan refugees, allegedly orchestrating assassinations of militant commanders, and even engaging in undeclared air and drone strikes and cross border raids. Yet, nothing has worked to curb the rising tide of militancy that has plagued Pakistan.
Comparison of Overall Incidents of Violence & Casualties (2017-24)

Source: Pakistan Security Report, 2024, Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS)
Demonstration of force
In December last year, after the TTP stormed a security checkpost in South Waziristan killing at least 16 soldiers, the Pakistan Army was forced to shift gears for both its tactics and strategy in Afghanistan. The immediate response was to launch air strikes on the Barmal district of the Paktika province against alleged TTP camps and a media centre, in which the Pakistanis claimed that over 70 TTP militants were killed. However, damage assessment reports from the Taliban claimed that most of the casualties were civilians, and their militant Islamic movement did not suffer any serious loss. Although Pakistan had carried out cross-border air strikes earlier, what was different this time was that it was highly publicised on non-official channels, with not only the concurrence but also the active encouragement of the Pakistani military establishment. The fact that the strikes took place while the Pakistan special envoy was in Kabul to restart the stalled diplomatic engagements with the Taliban raised many eyebrows.
Questions over the Pakistani airstrikes were raised by the United Nations (UN) Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which called for an investigation to ensure accountability for the reported deaths of dozens of civilians, including women and children.
Unlike in the past, the Afghans for their part did not downplay the Pakistani action. Not only did they react quite strongly vowing revenge, but they also targeted Pakistani border posts. Although the border clashes ended after both sides made a show of force, there was a diplomatic fallout that perhaps took Pakistan by surprise. Questions over the Pakistani airstrikes were raised by the United Nations (UN) Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which called for an investigation to ensure accountability for the reported deaths of dozens of civilians, including women and children. As if it wasn’t already bad enough for Pakistan, India also issued a statement condemning the attack on civilians, and called out Pakistan for its proclivity “to blame its neighbours for its own internal failures”. Pakistan, however, doubled down on its aggressive approach towards the Taliban regime. It went on a diplomatic offensive, accompanied by a psychological offensive aimed at undermining the Taliban regime.
Diplomacy and psy-war
On international forums, Pakistani diplomats have been framing the Islamic Emirate as the new epicentre of terrorism and an emerging global threat. The Pakistanis also organised a conference on girls’ education—a move that seeks to diplomatically embarrass the Taliban regime. Additionally, Pakistan appears to be signalling that it is ready to up the ante. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief, Muhammad Asim Malik, visited Tajikistan, where he engaged the Tajik authorities on security issues, i.e., the situation in Afghanistan. Pakistani media handles, believed to be acting as mouthpieces of the Pakistan Army, declared that the ISI was now engaging rag-tag Afghan resistance groups based in Tajikistan, like the National Resistance Front (NRF). They pointed to the sudden increase in activity of the NRF and other anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan, hinting that this was, in part, because Pakistan had started backing these groups as payback for the Taliban backing the TTP. Suspected Pakistan-linked gunmen also targeted an employee of the now-defunct Indian consulate in Jalalabad to send out a signal that people associated with India are in their crosshairs. A direct attack on Indian officials in Kabul would certainly have been a grave provocation for India and the Taliban, who have both ensured security to Indian personnel in the Kabul embassy. However, targeting a local employee was a message below the threshold of tolerance, which would serve the purpose of delivering a warning without running the risk of a conflagration.
The Pakistanis also organised a conference on girls’ education—a move that seeks to diplomatically embarrass the Taliban regime.
Around the time of the visit of the ISI Director General (DG) to Dushanbe, Pakistani social media was flush with stories and reports of a major Pakistani military action in the Wakhan corridor, where Taliban access had been cut off and its control ended. The Taliban refuted these claims and even shared footage of Defence Minister Mullah Yaqoob visiting Wakhan, where he declared that the Taliban will never allow anyone else to take control of Wakhan from Afghanistan. Still, Pakistani media continued to spread stories about confabulations between China and Pakistan to take the Wakhan Corridor on lease from Afghanistan, and about how Pakistan was all set to link up with Tajikistan, cutting out Afghanistan, and creating a direct connection to Central Asia. In all likelihood, this was more a psy-war than anything else. Cutting off the Wakhan by Pakistan would be tantamount to a declaration of war, something that Pakistan would like to threaten but never exercise, because it would set the entire border with Afghanistan on fire. It was, however, a strong message: Pakistan had options to take the war into Afghanistan and exact a heavy price from the Taliban for their continuing support and tolerance of TTP and Baloch separatists, allegedly operating from Afghan soil.
No good options
As it seems to be unfolding, Pakistani policy will henceforth operate on a parallel carrot and stick track: on one hand, is the carrot of diplomatic, economic and political engagement; and on the other is the stick of an aggressive, muscular approach, involving kinetic retaliation in response to militant attacks in Pakistani territory. This is somewhat similar to Pakistan's policy towards India: seek economic and diplomatic engagement on one track and in parallel, continue with its export of terrorism. While it looks clever on paper, this twin-track approach risks falling between two stools.
Pakistan doesn’t have enough carrots to buy peace and change ideological orientations and commitments, or sever the organic links that bind the TTP with the Afghan Taliban. The carrot approach has been tried in the past and has little to show for itself. This is precisely why the stick approach had to be used. However, the kinetic actions are more performative than anything else. It is, in many ways, nothing more than a bluff. At best, it will buy some time—a few days, perhaps a few weeks—during which attacks by militants will come down before they restart once again. Domestically, it helps the deeply unpopular military regime with a civilian façade in Pakistan play to the gallery, especially in the Punjab province, and win back some of its political support. That said, there is a higher chance that large-scale military operations will alienate the Pashtun population, which is facing the brunt of the sharply deteriorating law and order situation in the western half of Pakistan.
The Pakistan military is, however, convinced that its show of force can deliver a salutary message to the Taliban. The way the Pakistanis see it, for now, they have only targeted border regions in Afghanistan. However, they can always extend the intensity and range of their attacks deep inside Afghanistan. Given that the Taliban are no longer hiding in the hills and caves, but rather, are living in plain sight in cities and towns, makes them an easy target for Pakistan. What Pakistan has not factored in is that the other side will also retaliate, which would mean an escalation spiral that Pakistan will not be able to afford. Even less so in the present moment, given the parlous state of its economy, the fractious nature of its polity, and the reported divisions within the military establishment. The United States (US) and before them, the erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) carried out thousands of air strikes and ground raids on Afghanistan. Despite having boots on the ground, both had to cut and run from the nation.
There is also a real danger that if the Taliban push the TTP too much, they could turn their guns on their own fraternal cousins, or worse, join hands with anti-Taliban Islamist forces like the Islamic State Khorasan (ISK).
Both superpowers had enormous resources, military strength, financial muscle and technological superiority at their command, much more than Pakistan could muster, and they were still forced to abandon Afghanistan. If the US and the USSR couldn’t sustain in Afghanistan, how can Pakistan? Unlike the Pakistan Army, the Taliban don’t need a large standing army with all the paraphernalia that goes with it. They are a light infantry which needs good rifles, rocket launchers, some heavy guns, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and of course, human bombs, all of which are abundantly available to them.
A strategy based on hoping that the message gets delivered collapses if the other side refuses to recognise the message being sent, as is likely in the case of the Islamic Emirate. Since they grabbed power in 2021, the Taliban have demonstrated that they are not amenable to any compromise on what they see as their core ideology. No pressure, no entreaties and no opprobrium affect them. Therefore, the chances of them succumbing to Pakistan's pressure are very slim. They might make some temporary tactical adjustments but are unlikely to give in to Pakistan on any substantive issues. Perhaps some people in Pakistan understand this, but Islamabad cannot afford not to be seen doing something to stop the flow of militancy. The dilemma is that if Pakistan doesn’t take action to crush the TTP, the Islamists will grab ever more space and undermine the Pakistani state; if Pakistan takes kinetic action, then it gets sucked into the Afghan vortex, which will also undermine the stability and security of the Pakistani state.
On their part, the Taliban, too, are facing a problem. They cannot afford to be acting against their ideological and ethnic fraternity, which not only backed them against the most powerful military force in the world—the US and its allies—but also serves as their leverage against the treacherous and unreliable Pakistanis, who want to dictate terms to them and treat them with racist contempt. There is also a real danger that if the Taliban push the TTP too much, they could turn their guns on their own fraternal cousins, or worse, join hands with anti-Taliban Islamist forces like the Islamic State Khorasan (ISK).
Pakistan's inability to improve relations with its other neighbours, particularly with India, leaves no incentive for them to cut any slack. Other countries will engage the Taliban to secure their own interests, and the more this happens, the more difficult it will become for Pakistan to manage the fallout of its ill-thought-out Afghan policy, which now poses an existential threat to the Pakistani state.
Sushant Sareen is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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