If the PABS negotiations yield a system where biological resources flow freely but benefits remain contingent, then the Pandemic Agreement will have codified inequity rather than corrected it
The negotiations for a Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing (PABS) system under the WHO Pandemic Agreement (PA) are at a crossroads. Nearly four years of negotiations (three prior to adoption of the PA and one thereafter) have failed to yield consensus on core issues, including access, benefit-sharing, accountability, transparency, governance, and legal certainty. The PABS system is envisaged as a multilateral mechanism to facilitate, for the purposes of research and development, access to pathogens with pandemic potential and the sequence information derived from them, as well as the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from such research — in particular, equitable access to vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics (VTDs).
Based on the consensus reflected in Article 12 of the PA, the operational aspects of this system are to be developed in an Annex. An Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG) was accordingly mandated to elaborate these operational elements. The PA can only be opened for signature and ratification after the adoption of the Annex, as per Chapter III of the agreement. Despite this, current negotiations are diverging from Article 12, placing both equitable benefit-sharing and effective pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response at risk.
At the conclusion of the sixth IGWG meeting in March 2026, certain developed economies proposed a dual-track design for PABS to accommodate the views of emerging economies. Last week, the European Union (EU) put forward the same proposal under a specific name: the "blended model". Under this model, one track allows Free and unconditional transfer of pathogens and access to sequence information without benefit-sharing or other obligations, while another requires user registration and contractual arrangements for the transfer of pathogens, access to sequence information, and sharing of benefits. This approach is inconsistent with Article 12, as it provides no legal certainty of access — entities receiving samples and sequence information under the unconditional track would have no obligation to make these available to other participants in the system — nor any certainty of benefit-sharing, since not all recipients would be subject to benefit-sharing obligations.
With negotiations now agreed to continue beyond the 79th Session of the World Health Assembly, the choices ahead are consequential. The outcome will determine whether PABS advances equity or instead produces a system of unaccountable access and uncertain benefits — deepening existing inequities in global health governance.
When adopting the PA, Member States envisaged a PABS system that would be multilateral (Art. 12, Para 1) and operational (Art. 12, Para 2) at the time of entry into force, with legal certainty (Art. 12, Para 5) regarding the rules governing access to pathogens and sequence information and the sharing of resulting benefits. The current negotiations risk departing from this understanding. Instead of finalising the operational dimensions of the system, there are increasing attempts to defer key elements — such as benefit-sharing obligations and contractual terms and conditions — to future processes. The IGWG Bureau even circulated a draft resolution promoting such an agenda to Member States and stakeholders on 16 March 2026.
This shift — from certainty to uncertainty, and from a multilateral to a bilateral approach — represents a backtracking from Article 12 that entrenches obstacles to consensus at precisely the moment when convergence is needed.
Further, current proposals from developed countries — which also find backing in IGWG Bureau texts — call for benefit-sharing obligations to be negotiated bilaterally between WHO and recipients of PABS resources. This would virtually eliminate the efficiency gains that a multilateral mechanism for access and benefit-sharing is designed to deliver. Such proposals would effectively transfer authority over benefit-seeking away from competent national authorities to the WHO Secretariat, with no predictable benefits accruing to WHO Member States. This shift — from certainty to uncertainty, and from a multilateral to a bilateral approach — represents a backtracking from Article 12 that entrenches obstacles to consensus at precisely the moment when convergence is needed.
The most contentious issue in the negotiations concerns the timing of benefit-sharing obligations. Developing countries have consistently argued that benefit-sharing commitments must be undertaken at the point of access to pathogen materials and sequence data. The demand is not for upfront payment, but for PABS participants to first agree to share benefits, then access and use biological resources, and finally share benefits when they materialise.
Developed countries, by contrast, are pushing for a model where benefit-sharing is negotiated later — as reflected in Norway's statement during the IGWG opening plenary — possibly only at the point of commercialisation. This effectively delinks access from obligations, creating a system where biological materials and information flow freely while benefits remain uncertain. From a policy perspective, this approach is difficult to justify. Without upfront commitments, there is no incentive for users to voluntarily assume obligations at a later stage. Moreover, the negotiating leverage of resource providers and the WHO is strongest at the point of access; once resources have been utilised, that leverage diminishes significantly.
Without upfront commitments, there is no incentive for users to voluntarily assume obligations at a later stage. Moreover, the negotiating leverage of resource providers and the WHO is strongest at the point of access; once resources have been utilised, that leverage diminishes significantly.
Delinking access from benefit-sharing is often framed as "open science" and "open access," but in practice it narrows benefit-sharing to uncertain, end-of-supply-chain financial contributions. This sidelines non-monetary obligations — such as research partnerships, technology and knowledge transfer, and joint ventures — that promote local science and industry in provider countries. Greater non-monetary benefit-sharing involves greater transparency and participation of provider countries in research, product development, manufacturing, and commercialisation. Delinking eliminates such possibilities and seeks to exempt non-commercial users from benefit-sharing obligations. Similar efforts to financialise benefit-sharing have surfaced across WHO, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) processes. Notably, experience with the Cali Fund and the Seed Treaty bears this out — where contracts are absent or poorly governed, the flow of benefits has been significantly constrained.
While there is broad agreement that benefits should be shared, there is little consensus on which benefits matter most and when they should be delivered. The PA provides for a limited set-aside of VTDs — 10 percent donation — during pandemic emergencies, with a further expectation (non-binding) that up to another 10 percent would be reserved for WHO at an affordable price. However, PABS Annex negotiations have not secured comparable commitments for earlier stages of outbreaks, such as Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEICs), despite the commitment in Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 12 to include such benefits in the Annex. Preventing pandemic emergencies and PHEICs depends on early access to VTDs, not delayed distribution.
The vision that brought the "world together" to negotiate the PA was that if another emergency disease outbreak were to occur, developing countries should not be left behind in accessing life-saving medical products. Without guaranteed access to VTDs during the initial stages of an outbreak, the system risks becoming reactive rather than preventive.
Equally important are non-monetary benefits — particularly the sharing of knowledge outcomes and licensing of technologies to diversify VTD manufacturing in the event of supply shortages. There is no consensus to make these standard obligations. Both gaps undermine the pandemic prevention and preparedness plans of developing countries. The vision that brought the "world together" to negotiate the PA was that if another emergency disease outbreak were to occur, developing countries should not be left behind in accessing life-saving medical products. Without guaranteed access to VTDs during the initial stages of an outbreak, the system risks becoming reactive rather than preventive.
The EU, at the most recent IGWG meeting in Geneva, expressed willingness to consider setting aside VTDs for use during PHEICs as a benefit, reversing its earlier opposition to such a provision. Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Japan, however, continue to oppose fixed percentages in any such provision. The Africa Group and other developing country delegations, while welcoming the EU's change in position, argued that this benefit cannot be realised unless the EU also withdraws its proposal to delink access from benefit-sharing.
One of the most contested issues is the meaning of open access. For developed countries and some scientific networks, open access means "free and unrestricted (anonymous) access" to sequence information through external databases — not linked to ABS regimes — regardless of whether equal access is guaranteed to researchers. For developing countries, however, open access means "guaranteed access" to researchers and scientists "without discrimination" — access that is oriented toward generating "collective benefits" — as per the UNESCO Recommendation on Open Science of 2021.
The push for a dual-track system that accepts both anonymous and registered access reinforces a narrative — at odds with UNESCO Recommendations — in which user identification and benefit-sharing obligations are cast as contrary to open access and open science.
Developing countries, therefore, demand that databases serving PABS remain answerable to the Parties to the PA — guaranteeing access and facilitating benefit-sharing obligations arising from the use of such information. Their proposals include straightforward traceability measures such as user registration, identity verification, and data access agreements, which are essential to ensuring benefit-sharing and preventing misuse. Evidence from the widespread and growing use of GISAID (Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data) suggests that user registration and traceability measures do not hinder research; rather, they can enhance both trust and the pace of data-sharing, notwithstanding ongoing criticism of GISAID's governance. Such criticism, alongside concerns about other sequence databases, also underscores the need for multilateral accountability mechanisms.
The push for a dual-track system that accepts both anonymous and registered access reinforces a narrative — at odds with UNESCO Recommendations — in which user identification and benefit-sharing obligations are cast as contrary to open access and open science. It also undermines the objectives of the CBD, which requires that access to genetic resources take into account "all rights" over such resources.
The PABS negotiations present a clear choice. One path leads to a system that promotes equitable access to VTDs, strengthens global health emergency preparedness, and reduces the risk of PHEICs and pandemic emergencies. The other defers benefit-sharing, enabling the extraction of biological resources from developing countries while concentrating pandemic preparedness and prevention capacity among developed countries, making equity a distant reality.
For countries like India, the stakes are high: the issue is not only access to life-saving products, but also access to biological resources for local research and development, and licensing arrangements for the manufacturing of VTDs. A credible PABS system requires binding benefit-sharing commitments undertaken through standardised contracts, traceability measures, and accountable WHO-led governance.
Nithin Ramakrishan is a Senior Researcher with the Third World Network.
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Nithin Ramakrishan is a postgraduate in international law, currently working with Third World Network as a Senior Researcher. He observes negotiations on access to genetic ...
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