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New redlines, old rivalries—India’s deterrence doctrine walks a fine line between resolve, restraint, and reputational risk.
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The DGMO-level call between India and Pakistan on 10 May 2025 brought Operation Sindoor to a halt. Launched in the early hours of 7 May 2025 in response to the Pahalgam terror attack, India’s well-calibrated, non-escalatory kinetic action initially targeted nine terror facilities in Pakistan. Having achieved its initial political objective, India offered an off-ramp to Pakistan. However, Pakistan’s initial refusal to de-escalate—likely in a face-saving bid—led to multiple rounds of missile and drone attacks and counterattacks on both civilian areas and military installations, along with artillery shelling along the Line of Control (LoC). Driven largely by the success of India’s air defence platforms and the failure of Pakistan’s counterpart systems, the aerial standoff finally halted on 10 May. At this juncture, evaluating the implications of this stand-off for the future trajectory of Indo-Pak strategic dynamics has become imperative.
The successive rounds of aerial strikes on Pakistan’s military installations, the enunciation of India’s new counter-terrorism redlines in the media, and their subsequent affirmation in Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi’s speech herald an evolutionary shift in India’s approach.
The successive rounds of aerial strikes on Pakistan’s military installations, the enunciation of India’s new counter-terrorism redlines in the media, and their subsequent affirmation in Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi’s speech herald an evolutionary shift in India’s approach. The limited goal of this new approach is to prevent the damage caused by Pakistan’s sub-conventional strategy of sponsoring terror attacks on Indian soil. This objective is primarily—though not exclusively—pursued through deterrence by punishment. The punishment strategy aims to deter unwarranted Pakistani behaviour by threatening to inflict unacceptable damage through conventional means.
Admittedly, deterrence against an ideologically motivated, revisionist, and resolute adversary is difficult to achieve. The success of deterrence depends less on the actions taken by the deterrer and more on their psychological impact on the aggressor’s cost-benefit calculations. Nevertheless, for deterrence to be effective, it helps if threats are proportionally calibrated to appear credible in the eyes of the adversary. Concurrently, in a punishment strategy, the deterring state must demonstrate the requisite capability to inflict punishment and clearly signal its willingness to take risks and absorb losses.
During the Indo-Pak crisis, media reports citing Indian officials framed the new policy as treating terror attacks as acts of war. PM Modi’s speech avoided the exact formulation of the new Indian modus operandi, instead leaving some room for manoeuvre with the phrasing ‘on our terms and in our way’.
The prospects of India’s punishment strategy, first and foremost, depend on demonstrating its capability to inflict costs on the adversary. What do Operation Sindoor and the subsequent military stand-off reveal about India's relative capability advantage? While full details are yet to emerge, several tentative conclusions can reasonably be drawn. India succeeded in striking the targeted terror sites from a distance; its layered air defence system effectively intercepted waves of incoming drones and missiles; in later phases of the conflict, Indian air power suppressed the adversary’s air defence; and finally, its missile prowess was evident in precise hits on Pakistani air bases. However, India's Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan, confirmed the loss of an unspecified number of fighter jets on the first day of the conflict. Overall, bolstered by Indian naval supremacy, the current round of aerial contest should leave Pakistani planners in no doubt about India’s ability to inflict punitive damage.
Furthermore, India’s new counter-terror redlines were reinforced by PM Modi’s address on 12 May. As James D Fearon has hypothesised, democratic leaders incur higher audience costs for backing down during crises. Since voters can punish the executive leadership for foreign policy failures, these costs tend to be relatively higher for democracies, making leaders less inclined to bluff or initiate limited probes. Consequently, public declarations of red lines by democratic leaders are more likely to be perceived by adversaries as credible signals of their intent.
During the Indo-Pak crisis, media reports citing Indian officials framed the new policy as treating terror attacks as acts of war. PM Modi’s speech avoided the exact formulation of the new Indian modus operandi, instead leaving some room for manoeuvre with the phrasing ‘on our terms and in our way’. Nonetheless, past military responses are likely to shape Indian public expectations for retribution in the future. At the same time, this declared counter-terrorism approach constrains the options available to future foreign policy executives in handling terror attacks.
Contrary to Fearon, later empirical research suggests that leaders may not face audience costs in cases of empty threats. If accurate, this could cast doubts on the credibility of India’s new redlines in the eyes of its adversaries. However, the domestic headwind faced by the Modi government—over both the abrupt end to military operations and Trump’s unsavoury mediation claims—indicates that audience costs are indeed operative in the Indian context.
Admittedly, adopting a default kinetic response to terror attacks limits India’s flexibility in future crises. It narrows the range of policy options and brings reputational costs tied to the commitment trap, along with potential domestic fallout from unmet public expectations. Paradoxically, however, by signalling the Indian executive’s willingness to shoulder these considerable risks, India’s new redlines reinforce a robust deterrence posture against Rawalpindi’s provocations.
Ultimately, the efficacy of India’s deterrence posture rests on its psychological impact on Pakistani generals and their strategic calculations. Both Pakistan’s ideological basis of self-identity as a nation and the institutional incentives of its military establishment encourage a revisionist, aggressive stance toward India. These twin helixes also raise Pakistan’s threshold for enduring losses. Ironically, the recent crisis may have helped the army escape internal political troubles. In sum, Pakistan’s tendency to use military force for non-security goals, including prestige, could undermine deterrence.
Still, there is a plausible causal pathway by which the punishment strategy could work in India’s favour. Since the Uri attack, the Indo-Pak crisis dynamics appear to have settled into a recurring pattern. The cycle begins with Pakistan-sponsored terror attacks, to which India responds with kinetic measures. In turn, Pakistan deploys its conventional weapons in a graded escalation move. The tit-for-tat reprisals continue until the crisis de-escalates—often through third-party mediation—each claiming victory. In a protracted rivalry, such iterative equilibrium may ultimately favour India, despite Pakistan’s high resolve. The key variable here is Pakistan’s weak economic foundation. A country beset with economic crises and periodically reliant on international loan bailouts can only endure limited pain from military adventurism. Barring an irrational willingness to sacrifice strategic and domestic economic stability, Pakistani strategists may eventually see the futility of sponsoring terror, even if intermittently.
Military force is just one of the many tools of statecraft that nations use to pursue political goals. Operation Sindoor reinforces the lesson for India to pair military measures with diplomacy and effective information management on the international stage in its pursuit of security against Pakistan.
The abrupt end to India’s operation disappointed some in the strategic community who saw an opportunity to damage Pakistan’s air power capabilities. However, this decision reflects the complexity of India’s strategic calculus.
In the military domain, India’s future deterrence success depends on recognising the interactive and dialectical logic of strategy—where adversaries learn from the defeat and adapt for the next round. Pakistan’s military establishment is not impervious to this logic of strategy. Indian planners must anticipate shifts in the Pakistani military strategy and devise effective countermeasures to sustain escalation dominance. A useful starting point is a meticulous analysis of future trends in weapons acquisition and changes in Pakistan’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
Using force in a nuclear environment requires India to balance several considerations: graduated escalation, regional stability, credible signalling, calculated risk taking, and avoiding the commitment trap. The abrupt end to India’s operation disappointed some in the strategic community who saw an opportunity to damage Pakistan’s air power capabilities. However, this decision reflects the complexity of India’s strategic calculus. For a punishment strategy to be effective, India must also demonstrate restraint—signalling that punishment will be withheld if Pakistan refrains from altering the status quo. The calibrated strikes were likely designed to establish that reputation.
Further underscoring the complexity of India’s juggling act, the challenge of countering Pakistan must be viewed in the context of India’s focus on economic development and the growing threat posed by China. Managing this delicate geopolitical and security environment demands the highest degree of statecraft and a vibrant epistemic community of informed strategists.
Sanjeet Kashyap is a PhD candidate in International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has also interned with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
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Sanjeet Kashyap is a PhD candidate in International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has also interned with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer ...
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