The recently released
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of the United States of America marks a significant shift in nuclear policy from the last review that was released in 2010 under the Obama administration. Among the main characteristics of the new NPR are: a reversal of the previous NPR’s policy to retire submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), the identification of Russia as the primary threat to be deterred, the reintroduction of low-yield ‘non-strategic’ (i.e. tactical) nuclear warheads, the lowering of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, and finally, a severe blow to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review marks a return to the Cold War arms race dynamics and though the document claims to be making the world a safer place, and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation order, it is clear that the document puts both at jeopardy.
The new Nuclear Posture Review clearly identifies Russia as the United States’ primary adversary.
Through multiple graphic representations of the comparison between Russian and US nuclear delivery development since 2010, and the skewed balance of non-strategic nuclear weapons between the two countries, the US seeks to justify an expansion in its nuclear estate. At the heart of this is a clear insecurity about a perceived non-strategic nuclear weapon ‘gap’. To address this, the NPR proposes the development of low-yield non-strategic nuclear warheads which will be subsequently deployed on submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Additionally, the US will also develop a new nuclear-capable SLCM. The 2018 NPR insists that “this is not intended to enable nor does it enable “nuclear war-fighting.” Nor will it lower the nuclear threshold.” Instead, the US is convinced that this will grant it flexibility in terms of responding to nuclear non-strategic attacks, as well as non-nuclear attacks. This, of course, is a familiar doctrine in South Asia. It is what Pakistan refers to as ‘full spectrum deterrence’, i.e. using low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear/conventional attacks. This lowers the threshold for nuclear use and is neither a logical nor a desirable step to take for any state, least of all, the United States, which already possesses a vast array of nuclear and conventional capabilities.
The 2018 NPR states that the “United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners. Extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks.”
An important question then is, would a conventional attack across the 38
th parallel from North Korea be met with a non-strategic (or tactical) nuclear weapon from the United States? Does such a policy preclude the possibility of a limited conventional war under the nuclear overhang? Would countries like Russia, China, and North Korea consider the promise of a disproportionate nuclear response to a conventional attack a credible threat? Furthermore, there is a cognitive dissonance between stating that the employment of nuclear weapons will only occur in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interest of the United States and then lowering the threshold of use of the same weapons.
For the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the 2018 NPR is a setback. While the 2010 NPR discussed nuclear modernisation, there was an emphasis on the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in the US’s national security and military strategy, and nuclear reductions below the New START levels.
The new Nuclear Posture Review, however, reverses this and commits to modernize, diversify, and add to the U.S. nuclear force structure. This is clearly vertical proliferation and renders any reiteration of the commitment to nuclear disarmament or non-proliferation hollow.
With the United States now emerging as the most proactive and financially well-endowed proliferator of nuclear weapons, more vertical proliferation from other nuclear states in conflict with it is bound to follow. For a document that is consistent in referring to the uncertain security environment, there is a surprising failure to acknowledge that it is possible that American actions, especially policy documents like these, make the international security environment more uncertain.
With nuclear reductions completely outside of the realm of possibility, there is no future for multilateral arms control negotiations in the near-term. In fact, in the aftermath of this Nuclear Posture Review and its grim treatment of Russia, the extension of the New START Treaty expiring in 2021 is likely to be in jeopardy as well.
Finally, the new Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty that has opened for signature at the United Nations finds mention in the 2018 NPR. It is no surprise that the reference is an uncharitable one. The treaty is accused of being “fueled by wholly unrealistic expectations” and polarizing the international community by injecting “disarmament issues into the non-proliferation fora, potentially damaging the non-proliferation regime.”
This is a curious statement given that Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) binds every signatory to the treaty (including the United States) to “pursue negotiations in good faith…on the cessation of the nuclear arms race…and to nuclear disarmament…” It is thus unclear how the injection of disarmament issues into the discussions of non-proliferation would ‘damage’ the latter. What is clear, however, is that this characterisation of disarmament indicates that Article VI is dead for the time being, and without any ostensible lifeline. Rarely do we come across a policy document that can potentially damage global security and stability in such a comprehensive manner. In that regard, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, is an unsurprising product of its times and of the current US government.
What are the implications of this Nuclear Posture Review for India? In short, it does not affect India immediately and directly. It does, however, affect India in three indirect ways.
First, the lowering of the nuclear threshold, the adoption of a nuclear posture that looks a lot like ‘full spectrum deterrence’, and the development of non-strategic/tactical nuclear weapons validates Pakistan’s nuclear posture, which is destabilising for South Asian strategic stability in the long run.
Second, in the context of the burgeoning defense and strategic cooperation between India and the United States, a renewed arms race between the US and Russia would pose a major problem for India. The latter has thus far been able balance both defense and strategic partnerships to its benefit. This may not be tenable in the medium to long term, forcing an eventual overt alignment with one side.
Finally, India’s long-standing commitment to achieving global nuclear disarmament will have to remain in limbo for the time being. While it is not in the immediate foreign policy agenda of the Indian government, in the light of this setback to the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda, it should consider what kind of leadership role India can provide in moving forward discussions in this regard.
The author is currently a Visiting Fellow at Observer Research Foundation and a PhD candidate at the Department of Government, Cornell University
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
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