Expert Speak War Fare
Published on Apr 22, 2021
As long as there are diverging interests, the larger goal of nuclear non-proliferation will struggle to be promoted.
Nuclear insecurity: How can we tame the proliferators? This article is part of the series — Raisina Files 2021.
Nuclear non-proliferation has remained one of the greatest challenges to international security since the 1960s, although the early fears of large-scale proliferation did not come to pass. This is partly because of concerted action by the great powers such as the US and the Soviet Union. However, in the last two decades, for a variety of reasons, the threat of proliferation has heightened. As the world moves towards a period of flux, with shifting power balances and unclear global responsibilities, there is growing danger that proliferation could accelerate. This is driven by the desire in some countries for greater security and also by the spread of nuclear technology that now makes the supply side of the problem even more difficult than it was in the early decades. It is important to acknowledge and address the two kind of proliferators that exist — countries that develop nuclear weapons to beef up their own sense of security and countries that supply nuclear technology for varied reasons, including financial and strategic. To address the challenge of nuclear non-proliferation, both the demand and supply side of the problem have to be attended to.

As the world moves towards a period of flux, with shifting power balances and unclear global responsibilities, there is growing danger that proliferation could accelerate.

The demand side

The demand side of the nuclear challenge has aggravated because of growing national insecurity at the regional and global levels. At the regional level, two Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) challengers — Iran and North Korea — stand out. The Iranian nuclear issue has remained a major challenge to the NPT. Tehran’s desire to become a nuclear weapons power is well known, despite Iran reiterating every so often that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons. The Iranian efforts to acquire and develop nuclear weapons originated in the 1970s when Tehran expressed its keenness to obtain sensitive technologies. The late Shah of Iran was interested in developing nuclear weapons, reportedly stating that “…if ever a country comes out and wants to acquire atomic weapons, Iran must also possess atomic bombs.” The Iranian nuclear programme continued after the 1979 Iranian Revolution but the weapons programme at least appeared to have halted in 2003, possibly as a consequence of the demonstration effect of the US war on Iraq. The weapons programme appears to have been shelved thereafter but clearly not abandoned. In 2014, Iran and the major powers agreed to a deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action where Tehran agreed to some restrictions on its nuclear programme in return for sanctions relief. The restrictions it accepted included the level of uranium enrichment, but Iran has refused to allow inspections of military sites or access to key nuclear scientists and is yet to account for all its past activities. In a sense, Iran remains a threshold nuclear state that can build its nuclear arsenal if a political decision is made in Tehran. As Israel’s successful covert operation in 2018 demonstrated, Iran has kept much of the knowledge that it gained in building nuclear weapons intact — and kept the fact that it had archived that knowledge secret from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

At the regional level, two Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) challengers — Iran and North Korea — stand out.

In a similar manner, the North Korean nuclear issue has continued to remain in a state of limbo with no clear solution in sight. North Korea became a party to the NPT in 1985, but never signed the IAEA Safeguard Agreements that would allow the agency to inspect its facilities. In 1992, after much pressure from the NPT regime and the South Korean admission that there were no US nuclear weapons on its territory, North Korea agreed to the IAEA Agreement. But the inspections that followed found several inconsistencies with the North Korean claim that it was not doing any reprocessing in any of its facilities. There were constant disagreements between North Korea, the IAEA and the US. Finally, Pyongyang withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and conducted six nuclear tests, sparking criticism from the region and beyond. The country has also been exhibiting new long-range missiles, which have heightened regional and global concerns, and the threat to even the US. International diplomacy, including the six-party talks and former US President Donald Trump’s personalised effort, brought few rewards. While it is unlikely that North Korea will ever give up its nuclear weapons, the international community’s primary focus has been to ensure that Pyongyang does not behave recklessly, either by threatening or using its nuclear weapons or transferring its nuclear technology to non-nuclear states. But diplomacy has become a lot more complicated due to the growing tension between China and others in the region. China’s role has been suspect from the very beginning because it has acted as a protector and defender of North Korea. China may continue to prevent international action against the North Korean regime, further emboldening the regime in Pyongyang.

Diplomacy has become a lot more complicated due to the growing tension between China and others in the region.

In addition to these problems, there is a possibility that growing regional insecurities, especially in the Indo-Pacific, could force other countries to rethink their positioning on nuclear weapons. There have been murmurs in this direction in Japan, South Korea and Australia. While these are faint for now, growing threats from a resurgent China coupled with concern about US willingness or capability to defend its allies in the region could make them louder. This could lead to a “potential tsunami of nuclear proliferation in Asia” by way of others in the region responding to North Korea’s nuclear weapons. This could potentially include Japan and South Korea gradually shifting their position on nuclear weapons. As long as the possibility of nuclear threats from China and North Korea continue, states like Japan are unlikely to be comfortable in fully foreswearing nuclear weapons, even if they are members of the NPT. Similarly, there have been more open calls for South Korea to explore the nuclear weapons option in the face of North Korea’s active and irresponsible nuclear shenanigans. Recent opinion polls and public surveys show that a large majority in the country are comfortable with the idea of nuclear armament — a 2017 Gallup poll, for instance, found that 60 percent of South Koreans favoured developing nuclear weapons and only 35 percent opposed it. While many feel that the US’s extended deterrence is the best solution, “a growing number are quietly contemplating the alternatives.” Former South Korean Foreign Minister Song Min-soon reflected this viewpoint, stating that South Korea is “taking its own measures to create a nuclear balance on the peninsula.” Similar concerns exist in the Gulf region as a consequence of Iran’s nuclear progress. If Iran does build a nuclear arsenal, there will be pressure on neighbours, especially Saudi Arabia, to build their own or to buy comparable capability. Considering Saudi Arabia has considerable wealth, the latter possibility cannot entirely be ruled out.

While these murmurs are faint for now, growing threats from a resurgent China coupled with concern about US willingness or capability to defend its allies in the region could make them louder.

The supply side

In addition to the demand side problem that has made proliferation possible, the supply side issue has been equally problematic, including in Iran and North Korea. After the Iranian Revolution, Russian and Chinese assistance enhanced the possibility of an Iranian nuclear bomb. China’s help in this regard is considered significant. It started technical training for Iranian atomic scientists in the 1980s and supplied Tehran with subcritical or zero yield nuclear reactors. More importantly, it helped Iran set up a primary nuclear research facility in Isfahan through a secret nuclear cooperation agreement. China and Iran entered into an agreement in 1985, which went on for the next 12 years. Reports indicate that between 1985 and 1996, China supplied Iran with a variety of critical nuclear technologies and machinery and extended its assistance in getting such technologies from others. During this period, Beijing also helped Tehran with uranium exploration and mining, and helped it gain mastery in using lasers for uranium enrichment. This cooperation came to a halt in 1997. While both countries were keen to continue their cooperation, China’s decision to find “a degree of accommodation” with the US to pursue its own economic development put a halt to the relationship with Iran. John Garver argues that China took the decision to stop nuclear assistance to Iran also because it wanted to evade global isolation that could negatively affect its economic advancements. Despite Chinese and Iranian claims, reports from the late 1990s noted that China was still extending nuclear assistance to Iran, especially in uranium enrichment and conversion facilities, including a uranium hexafluoride plant. While Iran is possibly at a stage where it no longer needs external assistance for its nuclear programme, the possibility that it could now become a source of such technologies or materials cannot entirely be ruled out.

With North Korea now a full-fledged nuclear power, a serious threat is of it becoming a source of further proliferation.

Much like Iran, the North Korean nuclear weapons programme has also benefitted from assistance by the by the former Soviet Union and China. Pyongyang has been building up its nuclear capability since the 1950s. The Soviet Union’s nuclear assistance in the early phase was extensive. China had refused to part with nuclear technology in the initial stages but Beijing’s assistance to Pyongyang was critical in constructing a 50-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon, and thereafter a secret processing unit in the mid-1980s. Experts also suggest that North Korea’s construction of a uranium enrichment facility around 2000 and its first nuclear weapons test in 2006 became possible with likely assistance from Pakistan’s AQ Khan and was “based on uranium enrichment and nuclear design plans originally obtained from China.” In an essay on the China-Pakistan-North Korea nuclear triangle, Julian Schofield has argued that while China pursued a conservative approach in developing its own nuclear arsenal, its “nuclear sharing policy is liberal.” He says that China’s interest in extending nuclear assistance to North Korea is driven by its desire to create a buffer zone, which also pushed it to not adopt any “confrontational or rollback policies against North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.” With North Korea now a full-fledged nuclear power, a serious threat is of it becoming a source of further proliferation. An important set of concerns has to do with direct proliferation of technologies from countries like North Korea, Iran or Pakistan to other states and possibly even non-state groups. One of the most consequential cases of such nuclear proliferation was that of Khan, who proliferated nuclear technology and know-how to a number of countries, including North Korea, Iran and Libya. In February 2004, the Pakistani scientist confessed on television about illegally proliferating nuclear weapons technology to these three countries although General Pervez Musharraf, then military dictator of the country, denied that the technology transferred by Khan had helped in the actual development of nuclear weapons by North Korea. While there is no conclusive evidence one way or the other that Khan engaged in proliferation of nuclear technology under the guidance of the Pakistani state authority, Pakistani nuclear physicist Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy stated that, “it is very hard to believe that AQ Khan single-handedly transferred all technology from Pakistan to North Korea, Libya and Iran as it was a high-security installation in Pakistan and guarded with very fearsome amount of policing and military intelligence surrounding it. Moreover, the centrifuge weighs half a ton each and it is not possible that these could have been smuggled out in a match box, so certainly there was complicity at a very high level.”

Nuclear security and nuclear terrorism have continued to be reminders of the grave challenges that can emanate from these materials falling into the wrong hands.

Such proliferation becomes a particular problem if it leads to the transfer of technology or material to non-state groups. Nuclear security and nuclear terrorism have continued to be reminders of the grave challenges that can emanate from these materials falling into the wrong hands. Nuclear security became a global issue after the end of the Cold War, rising from the fears of Soviet nuclear materials and know-how falling into the wrong hands. But the issue gained particular salience in the global security debates after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. There were legitimate fears that terrorists could get hold of nuclear and radiological materials, causing catastrophic terrorist attacks in the US and elsewhere, and led to a further tightening of the global rules to ensure that terrorists and other malevolent actors did not gain access to such critical materials. In the Indo-Pacific, there are considerable security threats from the possible misuse of nuclear and radiological materials. Several security flashpoints exist, particularly in South Asia. There are internal security issues, including insurgencies and terrorism in each South Asian country that make the region particularly vulnerable from a nuclear security perspective. Events such as the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 continue to be a stark reminder of the kind of threats that are prevalent in the region. The presence of sophisticated terrorist groups capable of engaging in commando-style attacks make the security of nuclear and radiological materials and atomic energy facilities a high priority for security managers.

There are internal security issues, including insurgencies and terrorism in each South Asian country that make the region particularly vulnerable from a nuclear security perspective.

Conclusion 

Sanctions and technology-aided penalties have had limited effects. In an over decade-old essay, Gregory Schulte wrote about the challenges posed by North Korea and Iran, making the case that the leaders of the two countries are “unmoved by international condemnation and pressure. To them, the prestige, security, and influence presumed to derive from nuclear weapons seem more compelling than the weak penalties and uncertain inducements of multilateral diplomacy. Another round of sanctions or talks is unlikely to change this calculus.” The key question is how to incentivise nuclear non-proliferation by tackling both the demand and supply side of the equation. A major problem is whether there is consensus among the great powers on such issues. For example, while China’s interests, at least on the surface, appear like that of the US and other regional powers, there are also important disagreements. The Chinese and American perceptions on the issue of stability in the Korean peninsula are quite different, for one. For the US and Japan, the major concern is North Korean possession of nuclear weapons. Japan, South Korea and the US would like to see the denuclearisation of North Korea. But Chinese interests seem to be to ensure that the regime survives because Beijing appears to fear that a North Korean collapse could prompt a large influx of refugees into China. Additionally, China would not want South Korea to take over the North after a collapse. Therefore, the Chinese interests are driven by narrower perceptions of North Korean stability.

Chinese interests seem to be to ensure that the regime survives because Beijing appears to fear that a North Korean collapse could prompt a large influx of refugees into China.

As long as there are such diverging interests, the larger goal of nuclear non-proliferation will struggle to be promoted. As conflict between China and the US and its allies intensifies, the common ground is likely to shrink, and with it, the prospects for concerted action on the issue by the great powers. In fact, we are potentially entering a new decade of uncertainty and insecurity arising from a failing consensus on nuclear non-proliferation.
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Author

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

Dr Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.  Dr ...

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