Recognising that strategic intentions may evolve faster than military capabilities, New Delhi should ensure that its defence preparedness keeps pace
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In a quest to mend strained ties with Beijing following its aggression in Ladakh in April-May 2020, the Modi government is moving to normalise relations between the two countries. There is a partial withdrawal from the friction points where the Chinese crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and occupied territory. Limited patrolling has been restored. Yet, immediately adjacent to these areas that China occupied in 2020, a large number of Indian and Chinese forces are still deployed. In fact, as of today, the Indian Army (IA) has roughly 10 regiments deployed in Eastern Ladakh and in one of its latest decisions it has raised a division dubbed the “72 Infantry Division” for permanent deployment in Eastern Ladakh. There are additional forces deployed along the central and eastern sectors of the contested boundary. In any case, Prime Minister Modi’s statement in an interview a few weeks ago made clear that he wants to see the pre-April 2020 status quo restored along the Sino-Indian boundary, which would involve a comprehensive climbdown by the Xi Jinping regime. It is unclear how New Delhi will be able to do that along with the normalisation of bilateral ties that involve more intensive bilateral exchanges across the spectrum of areas covering trade, investment and resumption of direct flights between the two countries.
The Indian Army (IA) has roughly 10 regiments deployed in Eastern Ladakh and in one of its latest decisions it has raised a division dubbed the “72 Infantry Division” for permanent deployment in Eastern Ladakh.
Even if there is a diplomatic and salutary denouement to the ongoing LAC crisis between India and China with a return to the pre-April 2020 status quo, considerable challenges remain. The late K. Subrahmanyam had incisively observed that “Irrespective of the state of relationship at any particular time," he contended, "India and China will constitute mutual challenges to each other” as a result of their massive size, geographic proximity, perceptions as civilisational great states and an ambitious global agenda. As a consequence, New Delhi as Subrahmanyam had prescribed must "…adopt a policy of directly befriending China and, at the same time," balancing China's power through “an Asian and global balance of power system”.
To secure more Chinese investments and rejuvenate the Indian economy, New Delhi cannot ignore the imperative and the absolute indispensability of building up the military capabilities of the armed forces against the PRC. Military power forms the foundation of the balance of power. Indian governments have tended to place a higher premium on responding to actual threats that manifest themselves, especially during a crisis than on anticipating threats or quickly reacting to the development of capabilities initiated by India’s adversaries. The ongoing crisis at the contested Sino-Indian frontier perfectly exemplifies what is problematic with India’s approach to the development of military capabilities especially vis-à-vis the PRC. Take the development of light tanks, the PRC announced the development of its Type-15 Light Battle Tank (LBT) in the early 2010s and its prototype or variant was first showcased at the 2016 Zhuhai Air Show in 2016. It was finally displayed during the 2019 National Day Parade by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Indeed, the 2019 Defence White Paper released by the PRC—the first of its kind from the Communist Regime—made a pointed reference to the integration of the Type-15 into the PLA’s Order of Battle (ORBAT).
India has moved post-haste to develop a native light tank with some of its key components imported such as engines and the turret system for the Zorawar LBT.
Built by China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO), the Type-15 LBT, evidence of the development of the tank was visible to Indian decision-makers, but it took more than a year after the outbreak of the current boundary crisis deliberately precipitated by the PRC, which has only slightly eased, that New Delhi announced the purchase of the Russian-built Sprut-SDM1 light tank. Although the government proceeded subsequently to announce the development of a native light tank dubbed the ‘Zorawar’—which has undergone preliminary trials, further testing is required before the native variant goes into production and is commissioned into the IA. Today, India has moved post-haste to develop a native light tank with some of its key components imported such as engines and the turret system for the Zorawar LBT. Almost the same pattern was seen with other capabilities such as airborne and spaceborne Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. It took the PLA intrusion at Yangtse in Arunachal Pradesh in December 2022 that led to the government taking steps to acquire ISR capabilities in the form of the 31 MQ-9Bs last year for all three Indian armed services, which will give the IA and the Indian Air Force (IAF) variants of the MQ-9s better 24-hour surveillance capability along the LAC. It revealed the inadequacy, prompting Indian officials, to concede that New Delhi just did not have Earth Observation (EO) spacecraft and airborne capabilities dedicated to Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) to prevent the PLA intrusion like the one that occurred at Yangtse. While airborne ISR in the form of the MQ-9s are necessary, they are insufficient, because the Indian armed forces need Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites for EO missions. Indeed, as the author recommended in 2020, India’s forces need a dedicated Small Satellite (SmSat) constellation for Command, Control, Computers, Communications, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR).
The capabilities listed above that India is accumulating represent only a small fragment that New Delhi needs to acquire against the PRC. They are being acquired with urgency not because of a need or commitment to balancing Chinese military power vigorously, but because of crisis and the immediacy of the military threat along the LAC. Building capabilities only after a crisis breaks out makes India too reactive and it might be ineffective because third parties are unlikely to always assist New Delhi if war breaks out. Ultimately, New Delhi will have to recognise a distinctive yet recurring element in international politics is that intentions can change faster than capabilities which India painfully discovered with the PRC launching their military aggression across the LAC in Ladakh in 2020.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Kartik is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. He is currently working on issues related to land warfare and armies, especially the India ...
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