Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Jun 17, 2022
Pockets of new resistance groups are emerging with the capability to wage a low-intensity insurgency against the Taliban
New anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan: Genesis of a low-intensity conflict? Although it has been 10 months since the Taliban’s return to power, many Afghans still do not accept the group’s legitimacy. Taliban 2.0 has proven to be not much different from its previous avatar in terms of harbouring an ultra-conservative ideology, policies, and practices. The Taliban is implementing policies to further consolidate their power, even though they undermine good governance and rule of law. Instead of starting a meaningful dialogue and providing security, the group’s hardliners have steered the government towards regulating the lives of their citizens, particularly women and girls. The Taliban’s repressive and mono-ethnic policies have worsened the country’s ethnic and sectarian divide. As a result, Afghanistan’s conflict is far from over and has evolved into a new form. As the Taliban transitions from a guerilla force into a legitimate government, resistance groups are making their presence noticed by mounting attacks against the former.

New anti-Taliban forces

Around half a dozen anti-Taliban groups made their presence known in March/April 2022 amidst the new fighting season. The announcements are indicative that they think that the situation on the ground is ripe to orchestrate a full-fledged offensive against the Taliban. Although, many groups announced their existence through short videos published on social media, and little is known about them and their kinetic power. Led by Ahmad Massoud, son of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) is the most prominent anti-Taliban insurgency claiming to have a few thousand armed fighters. The NRF has historically been the Taliban’s key opposition in the Panjshir and Andarab Valleys. The Panjshir valley has been a site of resistance for decades; first to Soviet forces in the 1980s and then to the Taliban in the 1990s. The NRF wants to project an image that they can replicate the same success that Massoud had against the Soviets in the 1990s, which was possible with a lot of external support. The group contends that they have made progress since the start of their resistance in 2021, by adopting an unconventional and guerilla-style warfare strategy of the 1990s. They assert that their spring offensive has been successful and boast having operations in 12 provinces including Baghlan, Parwan, Panjshir, Kabul, Kapisa, Badakhshan, and Takhar.

Led by Ahmad Massoud, son of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) is the most prominent anti-Taliban insurgency claiming to have a few thousand armed fighters.

The Afghanistan Freedom Front gained visibility in March 2022, when it announced its formation on social media. Although they have not unveiled their leader, reports suggest that General Yasin Zia, a former Defense Minister and Chief of General Staff is at the frontlines. The group has claimed responsibility for some attacks on the Taliban in provinces ranging from Badakhshan to Kandahar. The Afghanistan Islamic National & Liberation Movement, according to experts, is the only major Pashtun group. Led by Abdul Mateen Sulaimankhail, a former Afghan army special forces commander Sulaiman Khail, the group was formed in February 2022 in response to the Taliban’s alleged killings of former military soldiers. Other resistance groups that have made their presence known recently include the likes of Freedom and Democracy Front, Soldiers of Hazaristan, and Freedom Corps and Liberation Front of Afghanistan. However, not much is known about their leadership, modus operandi, and capabilities. Around 40 Afghan warlords and exiled politicians convened in Ankara and formed a High Council of National Resistance in Ankara in May 2022 to showcase that their anti-Taliban resistance has some diplomatic bearing. The members include former Balkh province governor Atta Mohammad Noor, NRF member Ahmad Wali Massoud, and Shia leader Mohammad Mohaqiq. They have urged the Taliban to learn from their past experiences that running a non-inclusive administration could morph the country into another civil war and called the group to start a genuine reconciliation process involving different stakeholders.

Key elements for a successful insurgency

Two factors will determine the success or failure of these anti-Taliban groups: the kind of support they receive from foreign actors and their ability to unite under one umbrella. Whilst in the 1990s, Russia, Iran, and India supported the Northern Alliance to fight the Taliban, these countries have not provided the same level of support this time. Tajikistan is the only Central Asian that has openly opposed the Taliban and provided a sanctuary to exiled Afghan leaders. However, it is unclear whether Dushanbe is providing financial and military assistance to these anti-Taliban forces, besides giving sanctuary and rhetorical support for their cause. Kabir Taneja, an Aghanistan expert, argues that little assistance from external actors can undermine an insurgency’s capability to mount a successful insurgent campaign (although lack of this type of support does not automatically lead to a complete failure). Moreover, it is difficult to independently verify to what extent these groups exist, whether these groups are falsely claiming responsibility for attacks, the extent of the fighting, and accuracy on casualty numbers. While the Taliban has been downplaying the casualty figures, the anti-Taliban forces may be exaggerating their capabilities as part of a propaganda campaign.

It is unclear whether Dushanbe is providing financial and military assistance to these anti-Taliban forces, besides giving sanctuary and rhetorical support for their cause.

Although, these groups share the same objective of ousting the Taliban, they lack a sense of unity and coordination under one umbrella. Many of these resistance groups are priding themselves as highly capable in terms of their induction of former security forces and scale of attacks against the Taliban. They are also projecting an image that they are leading the anti-Taliban resistance movement and end up dismissing statements issued by other groups. It remains to be seen whether these could bring their limited resources together to forge a broader anti-Taliban alliance that is both accepted and supported by the masses. At best, these anti-Taliban forces will pose a low-intensity threat to the better-armed and bigger Taliban in the short-to-medium term. They have the capability of ambushing and killing Taliban soldiers and there can be a surge in attacks in 2022. Their guerilla-style resistance could be similar to the Taliban’s before their power grab in 2021. Although these groups may act as roadblocks to the Taliban’s efforts on bringing peace and stability, they are unlikely to pose an existential threat to the Taliban’s governance. In the long-run, many factors could tip the scales in favour of these insurgent groups, including uniting under one umbrella, greater external support, bigger induction of fighters, and public support due to increasing resentment against the Taliban.

The Taliban is also facing resistance from the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), who seeks to establish a caliphate in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of Iran and India.

Conclusion

The Taliban’s second experiment in running the country is turning out to be as chaotic and difficult like their first stint due to challenges of gaining international and domestic legitimacy, worsening economic and humanitarian crises and opposition from different forces. The implementation of repressive policies including barring most female education, mandating almost all women to wear a burqa and urging them to stay home unless it is necessary would further increase public resentment. The Taliban is also facing resistance from the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), who seeks to establish a caliphate in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of Iran and India. On a bilateral level, relations between Kabul and Tajikistan may deteriorate over allegations that the latter continues to provide a sanctuary to some exiled Afghan politicians and members of the NRF. Dusbanbe was the only country in the region to publicly criticise the Taliban’s power grab and alleged human rights violations in the Panjshir Valley. Dushanbe’s vulnerabilities are out in the open given the risk of Tajik militants joining the ranks of the Taliban, or receiving training to mount attacks against the Tajik state. Moscow, playing the middleman, has urged the two sides to adopt measures that would resolve growing tensions along their shared border amid reports that both sides are building up troops. However, the Taliban cannot afford Moscow’s intervention in support of Tajikistan.
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Contributor

Roshni Kapur

Roshni Kapur

Roshni Kapur is an independent researcher based in Singapore specialising in geopolitics conflict resolution identity politics and energy transition in South Asia. She previously worked ...

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