Driven by youth unrest and reform expectations, Nepal’s elections will determine not only the country’s domestic trajectory but also how it manages competing external pressures in a rapidly evolving geopolitical environment
Nepal is currently in a state of election frenzy. The much-anticipated 5 March elections are around the corner — the first since the 8-9 September protests that brought the country to a standstill in 2025. Parties are knee-deep in campaigning, championing the viability of their manifestos over those of their rivals. Unlike previous elections, there is much less talk of pre-poll alliances, with reports indicating a tacit shift away from preoccupations with party lines and ideologies towards concerns about service delivery and development. While much is at stake domestically in this election, whichever political dispensation assumes power in a few weeks will have to contend with the perennial question of how it intends to manage the country’s external relationships and maintain its balanced foreign policy.
Almost all commentary on the election centres on the extent to which, and whether at all, Nepal’s political leaders will alter their ways of working and usher in a new era of reform and development. Speculation about what such reform would entail, and whether it would occur within the existing framework or lead to the envisioning of a completely new political system, is also widespread.
While much is at stake domestically in this election, whichever political dispensation assumes power in a few weeks will have to contend with the perennial question of how it intends to manage the country’s external relationships and maintain its balanced foreign policy.
When close to 30,000 protestors took to the streets of Kathmandu on 8 September, they were not just perturbed by the social media ban imposed by then Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli, who was leading a CPN (UML)-Nepali Congress (NC) coalition government. Their actions reflected long-accumulating anger and frustration over how the country was being governed. Grievances related to corruption, favouritism, cronyism, and political instability have characterised Nepal’s political trajectory since its transition into a federal democratic republic in 2008. Irrespective of claims and counter-claims regarding the role of foreign actors in the protests or the alleged infiltration of groups with vested interests seeking to destabilise the Oli-led government, there is broad acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the demands raised by Gen Z protestors. There is also an expectation that political parties and their leaders will place the aspirations and concerns of Generation Z at the centre of their politics.
As per the Election Commission of Nepal (ECN), parties were expected to release their manifestos a day before campaigning began. However, 37 of the 68 parties flouted the ECN’s directive and failed to release their election plans on time. The documents of all major political parties broadly address the core issues plaguing the country — corruption, out-migration, and the lack of jobs in productive sectors. They also outline plans to capitalise on Nepal’s hydropower potential to drive economic development and growth, increase digitalisation, introduce health sector reforms, promote financial inclusion, expand tourism, bridge infrastructure gaps, reform the education system, and enable overall economic transformation.
Relatively new political forces such as the RSP have portrayed themselves as politically neutral actors, calling for the removal of partisan affiliations of teachers on university campuses and abolishing party-based unions within the bureaucracy, while focusing on expediting service delivery and digitising governance more broadly. This emphasis on preventing ideology from constraining performance has emerged as the party’s unique marker in comparison to established parties. This action-oriented, technocratic approach was also reflected in the tenure of Balendra Shah as the Mayor of Kathmandu, a role he assumed as an independent and is now the RSP’s prime ministerial candidate. The Ujyaalo National Party (UNP) has similarly described a result-oriented approach, signalling a shift away from ideological considerations.
All major parties speak of arresting the rise in the number of youth leaving the country and working towards creating opportunities at home. The NC has added a provision for mental health support for those who migrate abroad, while the UML has committed to reducing the need to take loans to migrate abroad. The NCP has emphasised the elimination of middlemen who exploit prospective migrants.
All major parties also mention asset investigations of high-profile candidates, while the NCP additionally calls for the formation of a commission for this task. Efforts to increase tourism, improve air safety, and make the civil aviation authority more efficient are also priorities highlighted by major parties such as the RSP, the NC, the CPN (UML), and the NCP.
While the foreign policy objectives of the contesting parties have not deviated significantly from how they were articulated in previous elections, their domestic promises are loud and evocative but lack concrete plans of action.
The economic commitments made by the parties are equally ambitious — the UML speaks of building a NPR 10 trillion economy within five years, while the RSP calls for the creation of 1.2 million jobs and an increase in per capita income. While the RSP focuses more on service delivery, the NCP and UML place greater emphasis on domestic production and industrial capacity. The question of hydropower expansion receives the most detailed treatment in the UNP’s manifesto. The RPP’s election manifesto, unlike in previous years, does not mention the appointment of a directly elected Prime Minister.
Owing to its strategic location between India and China, Nepal has traditionally adopted a balanced approach towards external powers. For the forthcoming elections, most parties have outlined foreign policy priorities similar to those of previous years, calling for a balanced, non-aligned foreign policy and the protection of Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The RSP’s document highlights its intention to change Nepal’s position as a ‘buffer state’ between India and China to that of a ‘vibrant bridge’, whereas the NC has called for expanding cooperation for mutual benefit. Even smaller parties have emphasised the importance of economic diplomacy, anti-imperialism, and opposition to any form of foreign presence within the country.
Given that South Asia is an important arena of contestation between China and the United States, as well as between China and India, the geostrategic importance of countries such as Nepal has increased in the foreign policy considerations of both Washington and Beijing. On February 13, in a testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, Paul Kapur, underscored Washington’s imperative of preventing any single power from dominating South Asia. Referring to smaller countries in the region, such as Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka — all of which have witnessed popular movements in recent years — he highlighted their susceptibility to coercion through debt diplomacy, an implicit critique of China’s growing engagement in South Asia. He also stated Washington’s willingness to work with whichever government comes to power in Nepal.
For India as well, the utmost priority at present is the successful conduct of the elections and a smooth transition to a democratically elected government. New Delhi was prompt in extending its support to the Gen Z protests as well as to the formation of the interim government, and has so far sent three tranches of aid to assist in the conduct of the elections. On the other hand, China initiated engagement with interim prime minister Sushila Karki soon after she assumed power last year, but Beijing’s response has remained relatively sceptical and cautious. On 20 February, China sent US$4 million in aid to Kathmandu, but with strict conditions stipulating how it should be utilised. Reports also indicate Beijing’s reluctance to provide additional in-kind aid, citing discontent over allegations of corruption in the construction of Pokhara Airport and calls for a fresh tender for 5G installations for Nepal Telecom. The heightened anti-incumbency sentiment at present further makes the return of a communist government unlikely, much to China’s dismay. Even during campaigning, the omission of a BRI-linked project from the RSP’s manifesto triggered political controversy in the Jhapa-5 constituency, where Balendra Shah is contesting against ousted prime minister K.P. Sharma Oli.
Owing to the nature of the election, as well as patterns observed in previous cycles, there remains a high likelihood of a hung parliament and the consequent revolving-door politics of coalition formation. In such a scenario, the possibility of these larger-than-life policy commitments being pushed to the back seat cannot be ruled out.
While the foreign policy objectives of the contesting parties have not deviated significantly from how they were articulated in previous elections, their domestic promises are loud and evocative but lack concrete plans of action. Parties have also omitted any direct reference to how they intend to build on the momentum generated by last year’s protests. Owing to the nature of the election, as well as patterns observed in previous cycles, there remains a high likelihood of a hung parliament and the consequent revolving-door politics of coalition formation. In such a scenario, the possibility of these larger-than-life policy commitments being pushed to the back seat cannot be ruled out.
The compulsion of balancing ties with both India and China, alongside navigating a more volatile Trump presidency, will also pose a challenge. While the established parties have offered some indication of how they may respond to the region’s geopolitical undercurrents vis-à-vis their relations with neighbouring countries, far less is known about how emerging actors might respond if they assume power.
Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. Her research focuses primarily on India’s neighbourhood- particularly tracking the security, political and economic ...
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