Myanmar- US ties under Trump: Old Playbook, New Moves

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The return of Donald J. Trump to the White House in January 2025 has reintroduced a familiar mix of nationalist rhetoric and strategic unilateralism, now driven less by transactional logic and more by unpredictability. As global crises unfold, one that demands closer scrutiny under this renewed administration is the ongoing conflict in Myanmar—a nation still grappling with the aftermath of the 2021 military coup, civil war, and humanitarian collapse. The country has recently witnessed the removal of the emergency rule, although army dominance continues. A fresh election is slated to begin on 28 December.

During Trump's earlier term (2017–2021), Myanmar was peripheral primarily to US strategic interests. The response to both the Rohingya genocide and the subsequent democratic backsliding was tepid, delayed, and inconsistent. In contrast, President Joe Biden's administration (2021–2024) adopted a more value-based, and sometimes a hands-off approach, supporting pro-democracy movements, pursuing targeted sanctioning of military generals and junta-linked corporations, strengthening ties with regional democracies, and increasing reliance on the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) for assistance.

Trump's second term, however, has begun in a very different geopolitical environment—China's influence in Myanmar has grown, ASEAN has struggled to craft a consensus, and Western sanctions have failed to shift the junta's behaviour to the desired extent. Against this backdrop, Trump's Myanmar policy reveals more continuity than change: erratic signals, transactional impulses, and an ambivalence toward sanctions as leverage. While generals in Naypyidaw have tried to portray Trump's correspondence as diplomatic recognition, the reality of the stance Washington is taking and the responses from Myanmar need to be assessed.

Table: US Policy towards Myanmar under Trump

Source: Author's own creation

2.0: Recalibration or Opportunism?

To understand the trajectory of US policy under Trump 2.0, it is essential to revisit his earlier term. During the 2017 Rohingya crisis, the administration acted slowly, with limited sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act, never acknowledging the scale of the atrocities or designating them as genocide—a step the Biden administration later took in 2022. Humanitarian concerns were subordinated to broader geopolitical calculations, particularly the US-China rivalry. Even after the 2021 military coup, Trump, then out of office, made no public comment on the seizure of power or the pro-democracy resistance, reflecting a continued disinterest in Southeast Asian conflicts lacking direct strategic payoff.

Since returning to the Oval Office in 2025, Trump has remained active on the global stage—most visibly through high-profile interventions in the Ukraine–Russia and Iran–Israel conflicts—while showing little engagement with crises such as Myanmar. The conspicuous silence on the ongoing crisis in Myanmar, even as the civil war deepens, with widespread fighting between the junta, Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), and the People's Defence Forces (PDFs), is not without context.

On 11 July, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing reportedly sent Trump a letter praising his "strong leadership," drawing parallels between what the junta alleges was electoral fraud in Myanmar’s 2020 polls and the US election, while appealing for relief from tariffs and sanctions. Just two weeks later, on 24 July, the US Treasury quietly lifted sanctions on several individuals and companies tied to Myanmar's military, including KT Services & Logistics, the MCM Group, Suntac Technologies, and Tin Latt Min. While US officials insist the decision was part of routine administrative adjustments and not linked to the letter, the timing has stirred concern.

For Washington, Myanmar's deposits appear attractive as both a buffer against China's supply chain dominance and a strategic counterweight in Southeast Asia.

Engagements with the National Unity Government (NUG), the parallel civilian authority backed by pro-democracy forces, have been deprioritised, signalling a subtle recalibration of US posture rather than an outright softening of the US stance towards Myanmar's military junta.

Rare Earths

Complicating this picture is the role of Myanmar's rare earth resources. The Southeast Asian nation is one of the world's third-largest producers of heavy rare earths—essential for electric vehicles, wind turbines, and advanced defence technologies. Despite being the world's second-largest producer, the US remains dependent on China for nearly three-quarters of its rare earth imports, since Beijing controls over 85 percent of global processing—especially for heavy rare earths. This vulnerability has drawn Washington's attention to Myanmar's deposits. Indeed, by July 2025, rare earth access proposals were formally presented to the Trump administration, including pitches to work either with the junta or with the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), which controls much of the resource-rich mining belt in Kachin State.

For Washington, Myanmar's deposits appear attractive as both a buffer against China's supply chain dominance and a strategic counterweight in Southeast Asia. Yet the reality undercuts any expectation of easy access. All mining in Kachin flows into China, which shares a border with the state and also holds substantial control through its carrot and stick approach. Key reserves lie in contested areas of Chipwi and Momauk townships controlled by armed groups, and the junta itself is steadily losing ground, mainly confined to major cities. Overland routes to India lack transportation and refining infrastructure, making alternative supply chains impractical.

Betting on the junta—heavily reliant on China and Russia—is far less viable than engaging with resistance forces, which enjoy strong public support for US engagement and are more likely to challenge Chinese influence.

Analysts warn that even if Washington were tempted to ease sanctions in exchange for future rare earth access, such efforts would likely fail and could undermine long-term US strategic interests. Betting on the junta—heavily reliant on China and Russia—is far less viable than engaging with resistance forces, which enjoy strong public support for US engagement and are more likely to challenge Chinese influence. A lack of clarity in Washington's approach risks sending mixed signals—raising expectations in Myanmar while deepening doubts among US allies about its long-term commitment.

Myanmar's Response

For the junta, US measures have been reframed as opportunities to project strength and legitimacy rather than weakness. Following Washington's July decision to impose a 40 percent tariff on Myanmar's exports, the military regime presented the move not as economic pressure but as evidence of recognition from the West. In a letter laced with flattery to President Trump, Min Aung Hlaing requested a substantial reduction in duties—proposing a cut to 10–20 percent on exports and offering a 0–10 percent rate on US imports—while even suggesting the dispatch of a negotiating team to Washington. However, this has yet to materialise. State media amplified these overtures, portraying them as proof of economic resilience and a signal of continued diplomatic acknowledgement.

The tariff-relief overtures and lobbying manoeuvres illustrate how Myanmar's generals are working to turn punitive measures into opportunities for renewed engagement—however superficial or short-lived that recognition may prove to be.

The junta is making a conscious effort to reshape its image. For instance, on 8 August, Myanmar's Ministry of Information signed a US$3 million annual lobbying contract with the DCI Group, a firm tied to former Trump administration officials, to promote dialogue on trade, natural resources, and humanitarian outreach. This lobbying drive reflects a recognition in Naypyidaw that the Trump administration may be more transactional and interest-driven than its predecessors, and thus more open to engagement if framed around US economic interests. These efforts seem to be designed to frame the military regime as a potential partner in trade and to gain some stability. Taken together, the tariff-relief overtures and lobbying manoeuvres illustrate how Myanmar's generals are working to turn punitive measures into opportunities for renewed engagement—however superficial or short-lived that recognition may prove to be.

At the same time, the junta has used the suspension of nearly US$150 million in USAID funding across democracy, humanitarian, health, agriculture, and education programmes to bolster its sovereignty narrative. State media cast the loss as reducing foreign interference, while emphasising that Myanmar can compensate through deeper ties with India, China, and ASEAN. This dual messaging—courting Washington through lobbying yet redirecting reliance toward regional partners—shows how the generals seek to turn external pressure into political capital.

The Remaining Checks

Even in a politically polarised Washington, the Myanmar conflict has historically commanded bipartisan support in Congress. Laws such as the BURMA Act and annual appropriations for humanitarian assistance remain powerful levers for oversight and enforcement. Key lawmakers across party lines have already voiced concern over any move by the administration to normalise relations with the junta, ensuring that executive flexibility is balanced by legislative scrutiny.

US-based civil society organisations and Burmese diaspora networks continue to play a vital role in lobbying for accountability, advocating refugee protection, and keeping public attention on Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis.

Another emerging area of bipartisan convergence is the fight against transnational cybercrime. Syndicates operating from Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia have targeted populations worldwide—including within the United States—through online scams, cyber slavery, and digital fraud. This growing threat has sharpened US policymakers’ resolve, pushing cybercrime to the forefront of policy discussions and prompting stronger sanctions and enforcement mechanisms against networks linked to armed groups and military affiliates.

At the same time, US-based civil society organisations and Burmese diaspora networks continue to play a vital role in lobbying for accountability, advocating refugee protection, and keeping public attention on Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis. Their activism provides an essential counterweight to shifting executive priorities. As Washington’s focus oscillates between domestic politics and global crises, these networks will be critical in ensuring Myanmar does not fall off the policy radar.

Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• Neighbourhood
• USA and Canada
• burma act
• crisis in myanmar
• myanmar us ties
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• trump myanmar policy
• us myanmar relations
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• usaid for myanmar

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