Myanmar’s managed elections consolidate military rule, risk escalating armed resistance, and create complex strategic and diplomatic challenges for India
As Myanmar’s military regime marks five years since its February 2021 coup that overthrew the democratically elected government, the country remains mired in political instability and conflict. The three-phased elections, concluded on 25 January 2026 and widely regarded as a managed exercise, are unlikely to restore legitimacy or calm, highlighting the continuing challenges to stability.
The military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) has won the elections, securing 232 of the 263 seats in the lower Pyithu Hluttaw and 109 of the 157 seats announced so far in the upper Amyotha Hluttaw, according to results released on 29 and 30 January 2026.
Myanmar’s parliament is expected to convene in March to elect a president, with a new government set to take over in April. The elections are unlikely to mark the end of the coup, and instead represent an effort by the military regime to normalise and legitimise its post-coup rule.
In the immediate aftermath of the coup in February 2021, the people initially began remonstrating through silent protest; ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) were divided in their approaches and were unwilling to fight the military regime. However, as the days went by, politicians from the banned National League for Democracy (NLD), along with civilians inclined to fight the military, formed the National Unity Government (NUG) as an organisation to contest the military’s control.
The elections are unlikely to mark the end of the coup, and instead represent an effort by the military regime to normalise and legitimise its post-coup rule.
Over time, the EAOs also began coordinating more closely, culminating in the launch of Operation 1027 in October 2023, aimed at overthrowing the junta. People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) increasingly aligned themselves with EAOs, further transforming the conflict into a nationwide movement.
The junta’s long-standing strategy of divide and rule — periodically striking strategic arrangements with select EAOs — began to loosen as resistance groups launched direct assaults on military bases across multiple regions. As a result, the territorial landscape shifted, with resistance forces capturing large swathes of land that had previously remained under military dominance.
As of December 2025, 91 townships were entirely under the control of resistance forces, with 144 partially under their control. The military remains partially in control of the areas where the elections took place. Not only is military strength depleted, but morale also remains relatively low. The military regime has reinitiated air strikes to regain control over northern Shan State and areas surrounding the capital. Major strategic towns regained in 2025 included Lashio — retaken in July through Chinese mediation that pressured the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) — along with Naunghkio, Hsipaw, and Kyaukme. This helped restore control over key trade routes to China. Nevertheless, large parts of the country, including Rakhine State, remain under resistance control.
Although Chinese backing has given the junta some breathing space, it has managed to retake only seven towns. At the same time, resistance groups captured another three in 2025—Falam, Indaw, and Banmauk—while continuing to fight for control of Bhamo, Hpasawng, and Wawlay Myaing. As a result, the conflict landscape is unlikely to change and may instead become more volatile, despite the military’s managed electoral outcome.
The military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) has won a majority in an electoral space so tightly controlled that the outcome appears effectively predetermined. Since the coup, the junta has systematically banned dozens of political parties and detained more than 30,000 political prisoners. In January 2026, the regime initiated legal action against more than 400 individuals under an “election protection” law passed in July 2025. The law criminalises virtually all forms of criticism of the electoral process, outlawing speech, organising, or protest deemed to disrupt any aspect of voting, making the entire exercise a clear example of pervasive surveillance.
While the election represents a desperate attempt to regain legitimacy and recognition at both the national and international levels, it also provides the military with institutional cover to continue branding those resisting its control as terrorists. This, in turn, enables sustained airstrikes and the pursuit of strategic arrangements, particularly with China, to secure external support for the functioning of the state.
During the election period, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing restructured several senior military positions, appointing trusted personnel to key roles in air security, force preparedness, and operational support. These moves were aimed at securing his elevation to the presidency from his current role as acting president and military chief. Early in January 2026, Quartermaster General Lt Gen Zaw Hein was reassigned as adjutant general and replaced by Lt Gen Zaw Myo Tin, who had recently been recalled from his role as Karenni (Kayah) State chief minister. Min Aung Hlaing counts both men as trusted, loyal associates, with Zaw Hein having served as his personal aide.
While the election represents a desperate attempt to regain legitimacy and recognition at both the national and international levels, it also provides the military with institutional cover to continue branding those resisting its control as terrorists. This, in turn, enables sustained airstrikes and the pursuit of strategic arrangements, particularly with China, to secure external support for the functioning of the state. China is important in this respect, as Beijing retains leverage over some EAOs within Myanmar. It is speculated that Beijing helped launch Operation 1027, before later brokering agreements that led to territory being ceded back to the military.
Many important connectivity projects are being developed under the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), and Beijing needs to ensure that Myanmar remains at least relatively stable for work on these projects to proceed. The extent of Beijing’s involvement is evident in its recent execution of 11 members of the notorious Ming family on 29 January. The mafia group runs scam compounds in Myanmar, and some of its members were captured by the MNDAA and handed over to China following Operation 1027. This episode underscores China’s complex role in Myanmar’s evolving political landscape, regardless of who is in power.
For India, Myanmar is a strategically important neighbour. Sharing a 1,643-km border with four of India’s northeastern states, it is central to New Delhi’s Act East Policy, which seeks to deepen connectivity, security cooperation, and economic integration with Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific. Within this framework, Myanmar is viewed as critical to strengthening India’s Northeast and positioning it as a gateway to Southeast Asia.
New Delhi is likely to view the junta-led elections less as a step toward stability and more as an exercise in managed legitimacy.
India has consistently advocated a fair, transparent, and inclusive electoral process in Myanmar. New Delhi is likely to view the junta-led elections less as a step toward stability and more as an exercise in managed legitimacy. Given the controlled and exclusionary nature of the process, the elections do little to alter realities on the ground. They neither resolve Myanmar’s internal crisis nor offer a credible pathway to long-term stability. At the same time, they complicate India’s diplomatic engagement by introducing a formal — yet deeply contested — political order.
India-backed connectivity projects — namely the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project and the Trilateral Highway — while extremely crucial, are likely to remain operationally fragile in the near term. Persistent insecurity in Rakhine and Chin states, weak local governance, and uncertainty over political authority continue to stall progress. Ultimately, the projects’ viability now hinges not only on infrastructure completion but also on the trajectory of the conflict and India’s ability to sustain diplomatic outreach and coordination with multiple stakeholders on the ground.
India is cautiously broadening its engagement, including informal contacts with non-junta stakeholders, particularly in border regions. However, this reflects a tactical adjustment rather than a fundamental policy shift. In the near term, much of India’s engagement is likely to remain in a “wait-and-watch” mode, focusing on the regime in power while also maintaining limited engagement with other stakeholders to preserve flexibility.
With Western countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a bloc openly dismissing the elections as lacking credibility and refusing to recognise their outcome, the evolving diplomatic landscape will require close monitoring.
India is cautiously broadening its engagement, including informal contacts with non-junta stakeholders, particularly in border regions. However, this reflects a tactical adjustment rather than a fundamental policy shift.
ASEAN, despite its non-interventionist principles and internal divisions, is expected to continue engaging Myanmar to promote adherence to the Five-Point Consensus. Meanwhile, since 16 January, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been hearing the junta’s defence in the genocide case concerning the Rohingya population, with Myanmar’s representatives rejecting the allegations as “unsubstantiated”. While the ICJ's final ruling—expected by the end of 2026—lacks direct enforceability due to jurisdictional constraints and its reliance on political will, it is nevertheless likely to generate diplomatic pressure from the international community.
With a new Myanmar parliament expected to form in March–April, the coming months are likely to be critical as political, diplomatic, and regional dynamics continue to unfold.
Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme. Her work focuses on the geopolitical and strategic affairs concerning two Southeast Asian countries, namely ...
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