As fertility rates drop and ageing accelerates, countries from Russia to the United States are reviving pronatalist policies in a bid to reclaim demographic power.
Image Source: Bob Riha Jr/via Getty Image
In a bid to arrest population decline, authorities in at least 10 Russian regions have begun paying pregnant schoolgirls over 100,000 roubles (about £900) to encourage them to give birth and raise children. It is an extraordinary policy that has divided public opinion; in one recent survey, 43 percent of Russians approve, while 40 percent disapprove, raising a host of ethical concerns. Nonetheless, this move underscores how urgently the Kremlin views its demographic crisis. President Vladimir Putin has made population growth a national priority, explicitly equating a larger population with national power, as fundamental to Russia’s strength as its military or territory. Ironically, the very war Putin launched in Ukraine has worsened Russia’s demographic outlook. According to some estimates, nearly 250,000 Russian soldiers have already been killed, whereas hundreds of thousands of young men, several potential future fathers, have fled abroad to avoid conscription. The nation’s birth rate has now slumped to its lowest in a quarter-century, a trend the Kremlin openly calls ‘catastrophic for the future of the nation’. Thus, from cash bonuses for teen mothers to bans on ‘child-free’ ideology, Russia is mounting a full-court pronatalist press, an extreme case of a broader global resurgence of pronatalism.
President Vladimir Putin has made population growth a national priority, explicitly equating a larger population with national power, as fundamental to Russia’s strength as its military or territory.
Moscow’s new demographic offensive represents a pivot. For years following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Russia’s population decline was met with concern but limited action beyond small maternity capital payments. In 2025, amid war and sanctions, the government is now panicking over population loss. The State Duma outlawed ‘propaganda of childlessness’ in late 2024, effectively banning media or messaging that encourages a child-free lifestyle.
This cultural crackdown is also accompanied by tangible incentives. The one-time payments to school-age mothers are a startling measure, reviving a Soviet-era notion of valuing motherhood at all costs. Putin has also revived the Stalin-era ‘Motherhood Medal’ for women bearing 10 or more children—an honour last seen in the 1940s. With Russia’s fertility rate at 1.41 births per woman in 2024—which is far below the approximately 2.1 required for a stable population—the state is intervening ever more boldly.
In the United States (US), a nascent ‘pro-natal’ movement has gained influence in conservative policy circles, arguing that America’s declining birth rate (around 1.6 per woman) is a threat to its economic future and cultural vitality. Perhaps surprisingly, this idea has reached the highest levels of politics. The US President Donald Trump has floated a proposal for a US$5,000 ‘baby bonus’ to be paid to new mothers after delivery. It is a concept borrowed, in part, from international examples—such as Hungary’s subsidies for large families, Poland’s child allowance, and from a growing chorus on the right that includes tech billionaires and ‘family values’ traditionalists alike. Both camps share a belief that ‘more babies = a stronger future’. Some have even suggested non-monetary incentives such as reserved scholarships for students who are already parents, or a ‘National Medal of Motherhood’ for women with six or more kids (a proposal echoing Putin’s revived motherhood medal).
Why this renewed global emphasis on making more babies? A key driver could be the looming spectre of ageing populations. Many advanced economies and even middle-income countries are experiencing a historic shift. While people are living longer and birth rates have declined, the proportion of elderly individuals is rising even as the share of working-age adults decreases. Politicians fear that this ageing syndrome will sap economic growth, overtax pension funds, and inundate health care facilities. In nations with rich social programmes or universal health care (UHC), fewer payers per retiree are the death knell to funding those benefits. Russia's ruling elite fear that a shrinking next generation will translate into fewer soldiers and workers; American conservatives fear a demographic deficit that will erode US clout against adversaries such as China. These are not unfounded concerns: Japan and certain European nations are already experiencing labour shortages and out-of-control pension costs.
Politicians fear that this ageing syndrome will sap economic growth, overtax pension funds, and inundate health care facilities.
Another idea endorsed by economists is that societies can learn to cope with ageing, even turn it into a ‘silver dividend’—an idea that an ageing society could be economically and socially rewarded if older people become active participants. Longer, healthier lifespans could translate into working lives extending further, a surplus of experienced mentors, and a ‘silver economy’ focused on older people. Nevertheless, this dividend warrants high investment in health, adult literacy, and age-friendly infrastructure. Elder-care policies, such as in Japan, where the older generations are integrated into community roles and part-time work, with fully established pension systems, can neutralise the economic "dependency ratio" problem, independent of a youth boom.
Several western countries also offset low birth rates through immigration; for example, Italy and Germany would have seen their populations decline if not for the influx of migrants between 2000 and 2020. In India, a different form of demographic balancing occurs via internal labour migration: states such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh send millions of workers to low-fertility regions such as Kerala, helping ease regional demographic pressures.
Once notorious for its booming population, India spent decades with an official policy of population containment, epitomised by the 1970s slogan ‘Hum Do, Humare Do’ (we are two, we have two), urging parents to stop conceiving after two children. Family planning programmes—some infamously coercive—drove fertility down from over 5 births per woman in the 1960s to about 3 by the 1990s. According to the latest National Family Health Survey, the total fertility rate has fallen to around 2.0 children per woman, marking a significant decrease from 3.4 in the early 1990s.
Many southern and coastal states have European-level fertility (around or below 1.7), while a few northern states, such as Bihar, still have rates around 3.0. Notably, the most striking case is the tiny mountain state of Sikkim in India’s northeast.
However, this national picture conceals an immensely prevalent regional variation. Many southern and coastal states have European-level fertility (around or below 1.7), while a few northern states, such as Bihar, still have rates around 3.0. Notably, the most striking case is the tiny mountain state of Sikkim in India’s northeast. With fewer than 700,000 people, Sikkim has the country’s lowest fertility rate, about 1.1 births per woman, comparable to Japan and well below the replacement benchmark. In an unprecedented move in India’s modern history, the state government is actively encouraging families to have more children. Sikkim’s Chief Minister has urged couples to have three kids, overturning the old mantra of stopping at two. To back this up, the state has announced a slew of pronatalist incentives: a full year of paid maternity leave for women, a month of paternity leave for men, and financial support for those undergoing IVF (In-vitro Fertilisation) fertility treatments.
According to economist Jean Drèze, there is no immediate risk of national population decline, and there remains ample time to reap the benefits of India’s youthful age structure before worrying about an aging society. India is currently enjoying its ‘demographic dividend’, with a working-age majority that, if well-employed, can fuel economic growth for years to come.
Pronatalism often comes wrapped in visions of a certain kind of society that leaders wish to promote. Frequently, it is a socially conservative vision: a return to traditional gender roles, heterosexual marriage, and a higher birth rate among the ‘right’ sort of citizens. Furthermore, pronatalism traditionally accompanies policies which limit reproductive freedoms, implying that the aim is to control women's choices/agency. This can be observed in Russia's mandated limitations on the mention of childlessness or restricting abortion.
Pregnant, adolescent girls, such as in Russia's cash-for-schoolgirls scheme, raise caveats/red flags for doctors. Adolescent pregnancies are at greater risk of complications in pregnancy, leading to more dire outcomes for the baby.
The second problem is the health and well-being of teenagers and females. Pregnant, adolescent girls, such as in Russia's cash-for-schoolgirls scheme, raise caveats/red flags for doctors. Adolescent pregnancies are at greater risk of complications in pregnancy, leading to more dire outcomes for the baby.
The other impediment is to gender equality and women's rights. When pronatalist policy is combined with a conservative cultural trend, it tends to devolve into controlling women's decisions. In the US, the pronatalist renaissance is linked to the reversal of reproductive freedom following the end of Roe v. Wade. The outcome could be a society in which women are largely only valued as child bearers, a step back from decades of gender equality gains in expanding women's roles in society.
Pronatalist policies may indeed yield a temporary blip in birth rates or appease certain political constituencies, but they seldom alter long-term demographic trajectories in a meaningful way. They can also distract us from the hard work of adjusting to demographic change: pension system reform, improved healthcare, embracing immigrants, and empowering women (not enlisting them in birthing roles). The pronatalist logic—that strength lies in numbers—offers a visceral appeal, particularly to nationalist politicians. Yet, quantity means little without quality.
The true measure of a nation’s future lies in creating conditions where people want to bring children into the world and can raise them with security and dignity. In this sense, ‘more babies, more power’ is at best a partial truth. Only by strengthening the foundations for family life and valuing women and men as more than just reproductive instruments can societies hope to thrive in the face of demographic headwinds.
K. S. Uplabdh Gopal is an Associate Fellow with the Health Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Dr. K. S. Uplabdh Gopal is an Associate Fellow with the Health Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation. He writes and researches on how India’s ...
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