Mapping IORA’s Maritime Security Agenda

India has assumed the chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the only pan-Indian Ocean regional forum, in late 2025. At a time when complex geopolitics and maritime security challenges are increasingly shaping the strategic calculus of the Indian Ocean region, it is incumbent on New Delhi to strike a careful balance in shaping its agenda—leading efforts to deepen cooperation within the grouping and advance a comprehensive security outlook. This raises the question of which maritime security challenges necessitate stronger regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean. While China’s growing footprint across the Indian Ocean, manifested in the continued presence of research and survey vessels with dual-use capabilities, poses a critical threat to the maritime security balance, the economic interdependencies of various countries with Beijing complicate the nature and extent of the perceived China threat. Consequently, efforts to craft a holistic regional strategy to mitigate the systemic challenge posed by China’s expanding presence remain fragmented.

From Strategic Competition to Shared Vulnerabilities

Non-traditional maritime security threats such as climate change-induced challenges, piracy, and illegal drug trafficking have increasingly shaped regional priorities in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This has elevated Maritime Safety and Security as a priority area in the IORA Action Plan 2022–2027. A ‘triple threat’ comprising piracy and armed robbery, IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing, and the trafficking of drugs and humans represents some of the region’s most pressing maritime security concerns. As these challenges disregard defined maritime zones, they make it functionally necessary for IORA to develop a cooperative framework to strengthen maritime governance across the region.

Efforts to craft a holistic regional strategy to mitigate the systemic challenge posed by China’s expanding presence remain fragmented.

IORA focuses on transboundary maritime issues affecting much of the littoral space across the Indian Ocean region. These challenges directly affect trade flows, economic stability, food security, and human safety across the region. By prioritising such issues, IORA positions itself around shared interests rather than contested strategic agendas.

The geography of the Indian Ocean further reinforces this logic. Critical chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca and Bab el-Mandeb amplify exposure to non-state threats, making cooperation on surveillance, information-sharing, and rapid response both practical and necessary. This underscores that non-traditional security challenges are not merely secondary concerns, but bind together a diverse set of littoral states with varying degrees of economic dependency on extra-regional powers.

Institutionalising Maritime Safety and Security

A key development in institutionalising this perspective was the adoption of the IORA Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (IOIP) in 2023, during Bangladesh’s chairmanship (2021–2023). By spearheading the IOIP, IORA articulated a vision of the Indo-Pacific that remained inclusive, rules-based, and focused on sustainable development rather than venturing into zero-sum security dynamics. The IOIP reinforced IORA’s priority areas, specifically placing Maritime Safety and Security at the forefront of the Association’s Action Plan 2022–2027.

The Working Group on Maritime Safety and Security (WGMSS) has driven institutional implementation by translating the IORA Action Plan (2022–2027) into technical work plans that standardise regional protocols for Search and Rescue (SAR) and information-sharing. Key examples of this operationalisation include the Maritime Information Sharing Workshop (MISW 2025) hosted by the IFC-IOR, which utilises the MANTRA software for real-time coordination, and the IORA-Singapore customised programme on Maritime Safety and Port Management. To address transnational challenges, IORA has implemented frameworks such as the IORA Principal Guidelines on Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing (adopted in May 2025), alongside capacity-building workshops.

This underscores that non-traditional security challenges are not merely secondary concerns, but bind together a diverse set of littoral states with varying degrees of economic dependency on extra-regional powers.

Furthermore, IORA has sought to enhance its effectiveness through partnerships. Its integration into the wider security architecture is evident from growing synergy with broader arrangements, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The Quad has expressed support for IORA’s leadership in the Indian Ocean region. In joint statements issued by the Quad Foreign Ministers, the grouping has emphasised its commitment to working with IORA and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) to address shared challenges. This collaborative approach extends to specialised mechanisms such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) and its Jeddah Amendment, which focus on countering illicit maritime activity in the Western Indian Ocean. The Quad’s focus on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) complements IORA’s objectives by providing the technological and information-sharing backbone necessary to monitor both traditional naval movements, such as China’s survey vessels, and non-traditional threats such as IUU fishing.

Capability Gaps and the Policy–Practice Divide

While IORA’s NTS agenda has advantages, its practical impact remains limited. The naval, technological and surveillance capabilities of member states vary significantly. Several small island developing states control vast maritime zones but have limited fiscal capacity to sustain monitoring or enforcement. These disparities complicate cooperation and shape differing perceptions of which threats warrant priority.

At an institutional level, IORA remains predominantly reliant on dialogue-driven mechanisms. The persistent gap between its formal mandates and their practical implementation risks undermining its effectiveness and constraining its capacity for autonomous action.

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) offers the clearest test of whether IORA’s non-traditional security agenda can move beyond symbolism. It is central to effective monitoring, issuing timely alerts, coordinating responses, and enabling informed decision-making. Without a shared understanding of maritime activities and patterns, cooperation on piracy, trafficking, and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing remains fragmented.

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) offers the clearest test of whether IORA’s non-traditional security agenda can move beyond symbolism.

In conclusion, the future of the Indian Ocean region will be shaped by the enduring centrality of non-traditional maritime threats to the regional agenda. While China presents a significant traditional challenge through its expanding footprint and economic leverage, shared vulnerability to non-traditional security (NTS) threats offers the most viable basis for collective action within the Indian Ocean Rim Association. The adoption of the IORA Outlook on the Indo-Pacific marked a turning point, signalling a shift towards an inclusive, rules-based regional order. By deepening cooperation with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and specialised frameworks such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct, IORA can convert diplomatic consensus into operational resilience. Ultimately, India’s leadership within IORA must prioritise bridging the gap between policy and practice, ensuring that the NTS agenda remains the principal vehicle for sustaining a free, open, and secure Indian Ocean for all littoral states.

Sayantan Haldar is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Saanch Maheshwari is a Research Intern with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

• Indian Ocean
• Maritime Security
• India
• The Pacific
• indian ocean region
• indian ocean rim association
• iora action plan
• maritime domain awareness
• maritime security threats
• maritime security threats indian ocean

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