The Maduro operation epitomises Trump’s multilateralism: legal engineering, selective engagement, and indifference to norms
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Every few years, unilateral military actions by the United States (US) trigger a worldwide discussion on the violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity alongside renewed scrutiny of the United Nations (UN) and its inability to prevent such violations. It is no secret that, even prior to the recent US military operation to capture the Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro Moros and his wife, Cilia Flores, there have been several such violations of the United Nations (UN) Charter without a UNSC mandate, such as Iraq, Syria, amongst others. However, one particular case stands out: the capture of Panama’s leader, Manuel Noriega, in 1989 by the George H.W. Bush administration—a precedent invoked for its action in Venezuela. Unlike the broader military goals in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria, the Noriega and Maduro cases were uniquely framed by the US as law enforcement actions, wherein the US sought criminal indictments of state leaders under its federal laws to designate them ‘criminal fugitives’, thereby justifying military entry into foreign territory. The key differences between the two operations lie in their execution and political framing. In Noriega’s case, it involved a full-scale invasion to capture a de facto leader with subsequent regime change. In contrast, the Maduro operation was a ‘targeted’ military action to capture a sitting head of state while maintaining continuity of the government. This was a conscious approach to avoid the label of a pro-democratic regime change operation.
The Maduro operation was a ‘targeted’ military action to capture a sitting head of state while maintaining continuity of the government.
The legal justification set out in the memorandum dated 23 December 2025 (Gaiser Memo) to the US Department of Justice for the Maduro operation is a case of legal engineering driven by a risk-reward calculus. By framing it as a ‘judicial extraction’ of a criminal fugitive under US indictment (in 2020), the action was presented as a limited, targeted law enforcement mission, even with military presence and the use of kinetic force (with any collateral damage framed as proportionate and necessary). The memo further relies on the Noriega case and domestic legal doctrine to justify that the manner of capture does not bar prosecution of Maduro by the US federal courts.
The US Navy and Air Forces carried out a series of kinetic strikes in 2025 against vessels linked to drug cartels in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, raising questions on the violation of international law and the need for congressional approval under US war powers. Subsequently, Trump declared that the US was in a ‘non-international armed conflict’ (NIAC) with drug cartels in the region. This was followed by the release of the new National Security Strategy (“Donroe Doctrine”—a Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine) in December 2025, treating the Western Hemisphere as a US security zone on grounds of narco-terrorism and strategic relevance, thereby justifying the use of ‘lethal force’ against drug cartels. On 16 November 2025, Maduro and his inner circle were accused of running the drug cartel Cartel de los Soles, which was designated as a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organization’. This action effectively labelled Maduro as a ‘narco-terrorist’, stripping him of any diplomatic status. By framing the Maduro operation as a ‘judicial extraction’ and Maduro as a ‘criminal fugitive’, the US avoided Maduro being treated as a ‘prisoner of war’ under the Third Geneva Convention (applicable in case of NIAC), which would grant him combatant immunity. By stripping both his diplomatic immunity given to the head of state under customary international law and combatant immunity as a ‘prisoner of war’, this strategic legal dualism was to render Maduro prosecutable before a New York federal court. By invoking proportionality for any collateral damage in the Gaiser Memo, the Trump administration was essentially signalling compliance with the principle of proportionality (level of incidental harm to civilian lives and objects must not be excessive relative to the specific military objective) under International Humanitarian Law applicable to armed conflicts, while treating the capture of Maduro exclusively as a ‘judicial extraction’. However, Venezuelan accounts differ sharply. At least 83 people were killed in the operation, and widespread bombing of infrastructure and air defences in Venezuela was involved, raising serious doubts about the proportionality. Actual figures, especially civilian deaths, remain unclear.
The US Navy and Air Forces carried out a series of kinetic strikes in 2025 against vessels linked to drug cartels in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, raising questions on the violation of international law and the need for congressional approval under US war powers.
The Gaiser Memo mainly builds a case for domestic legal justification, and while it acknowledges international law concerns around sovereignty and the use of force in the ‘judicial extraction’ operation, it subordinates these concerns due to limited enforceability risk. By being inconclusive on international law while acknowledging it, the Gaiser Memo reflects the US constitutional position that treaties to which the US is a party are treated on par with domestic law, even though their enforceability in US courts varies. The memo also recognises the operation’s high risks of possible retaliation, regional instability, civilian casualties and potential collapse of the Venezuelan government. However, by swearing-in Venezuela’s Vice President, Delcy Rodríguez soon thereafter, it ensured continuity of government, thereby enabling more stable bilateral ties without Maduro, and by closing a 30-50 million barrel oil deal a few days later (to redirect the oil sales away from China), the US effectively externalised the risks identified in the memorandum. The recent ‘return’ of US$500 million from the first Venezuelan oil sale orchestrated by the US further enables Washington to line up alternative buyers and offer substitutes to Russian oil, which the US views as sustaining the Russia-Ukraine war serving the dual objectives of decoupling Venezuela from China and Russia and decoupling Russian oil purchasers from Russia. The buy-in of the Rodríguez government, the oil deal and the ‘return’ of oil revenues together attempt to create a fait accompli against international condemnation and possible legal challenges.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. There are two exceptions to this in the UN Charter: (i) Article 51, where states can defend themselves in case of an ‘armed attack’, and (ii) Article 42, where the UNSC can authorise all necessary means to maintain or restore international peace and security. As there was no armed attack or even a threat of an armed attack from Venezuela, the US couldn’t have sought a viable legal defense under Article 51 as it did in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. And it goes without saying that seeking a UNSC mandate to claim defence under Article 42 would have been impossible.
In fractured global governance systems where major powers are locked in power contests, middle powers continue to posture themselves as the ‘voice of reason’, while small, vulnerable states are left with representation but little agency, merely reduced to subject matter. Same systems, different purposes.
China and Russia strongly condemned US actions in the emergency UNSC meeting held the same day as violations of the UN Charter and international law. However, it was South Africa (a non-permanent member) that articulated the violations by the US, under Article 2(4) (sovereignty and territorial integrity) and Article 2(7) (non-intervention in the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of another state). The US, as expected, pushed back on grounds of self-defence, national security and Maduro’s criminal indictment as highlighted in the Gaiser Memo. While South Africa’s arguments at the UNSC may be legally relevant, they are functionally ineffective. Yet, once again, it managed to position itself as the ‘voice of reason’ in matters of international law, much like it did in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict. In fractured global governance systems where major powers are locked in power contests, middle powers continue to posture themselves as the ‘voice of reason’, while small, vulnerable states are left with representation but little agency, merely reduced to subject matter. Same systems, different purposes.
Even if the Venezuelan government had managed to file a state-to-state complaint before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), it would likely have proved ineffective, as the US withdrew from ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1986 following Nicaragua v. United States, in which the ICJ ruled against the US for its use of force and military action to violate the territorial sovereignty of Nicaragua. If Venezuela were to pursue an approach like Ukraine’s, by bringing a case before the ICJ under a common treaty subject to ICJ jurisdiction (as Ukraine did under the 1948 Genocide Convention), the US would simply reject the application due to lack of jurisdiction. Despite this, even if Venezuela managed to obtain a favourable judgement or order against the US like Ukraine did against Russia, it would require recourse to the UNSC under Article 94 of the UN Charter to force compliance, where the US would simply exercise its veto - effectively acting as both defendant and judge, much like Russia did when Ukraine pursued this route. The international governance system is structurally flawed because it is not built for accountability. And any loss of ‘moral impetus’ for the US to challenge the Russian invasion of Ukraine is irrelevant, because the US is not primarily relying on the UN or international law to address it in any case.
The lack of consistency and coherence in the Trump administration’s approach is not a glitch in the system; it is the system.
The Maduro operation is the most distilled expression of the Trump administration’s engagement with global governance systems. The same logic of legal engineering, selective institutional engagement and calculated indifference to accepted international norms (due to enforceability constraints) that structured the Maduro operation underpins the administration’s broad approach to multilateralism. The continued engagement in select global governance institutions is based merely on utility maximisation—where perceived rewards outweigh costs. The lack of consistency and coherence in the Trump administration’s approach is not a glitch in the system; it is the system. Rather than searching for coherence in Trump and his administration’s strategies and communications to discern the intended objectives on contentious issues, countries may be better off examining the design of the deliberate disorder in specific domains and identifying the systemic loopholes and asymmetries being exploited to infer the desired outcomes as well as interpret communications accordingly. Whether one views this as an approach peculiar to Trump and his administration or part of a broader shift in US strategy in dealing with global governance issues, the impact of the disruptions caused by this administration will outlast its term.
Lavanya Mani is a Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Lavanya Mani is a Fellow at ORF, where she plays a key role on the curatorial team, shaping the thematic direction and programming of ORF’s ...
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