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Türkiye’s push through the OTS underscores its bid to bridge Europe and Asia, but its expanding trade, energy, and defence footprint still faces limits
The 12th Summit of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) was held in Gabala, Azerbaijan, on 6-7 October, focusing on Regional Peace and Security. The OTS, headquartered in Istanbul, has Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan as member states with Hungary, Turkmenistan, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (recognised only by Türkiye) as observers.
The roots of OTS lie in the Pan-Turkism political ideology of the 19th and 20th centuries, which sought to foster the solidarity of Turkic peoples based on their shared ethnic, cultural, and linguistic heritage. Ankara is now utilising OTS to enhance its geostrategic influence over Central Asia and the South Caucasus, thereby making the region a more significant component of Turkish foreign policy. Since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, Türkiye has consciously increased economic, defence, and military cooperation across the region by leveraging cultural ties. Still, Central Asia remains more cautious about fully embracing Ankara’s growing influence amid complex geopolitical dynamics involving China, Russia, Iran, and the West.
Following the Russia-Ukraine war, Türkiye made diplomatic efforts through the OTS, fostering strategic partnerships and inking infrastructure projects to increase its influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Türkiye’s strategic and economic goals in Central Asia emphasise enhancing regional connectivity and economic integration through multilateral and bilateral cooperation. To improve connectivity, the Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR), links China to the European Union through Central Asian nations, including Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. Work on this fastest, safest, and most economical corridor began in 2013. By 2017, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway connecting Türkiye and Azerbaijan via Georgia had been modernised and opened. The development of Baku Port and Aktau Port on the Caspian Sea, along with improved connectivity via the Trans-Kazakhstan railway line, has strengthened trade between Türkiye and Central Asia, boosting the region’s economic integration with Ankara. While Türkiye led the modernisation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars line in 2024 to increase the Middle Corridor’s capacity from approximately 5.8 million tonnes to three times of that by 2030, it also enhanced the capacity of the Baku Port.
The Corridor will circumvent Russian and Iranian chokepoints, boosting Turkish influence in the region and helping Türkiye establish itself as a transit hub for trade and energy between Europe and Central Asia.
Türkiye’s Middle Corridor initiative received a boost with the recent United States (US)-backed peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. It will also benefit from the recently-launched Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which will inadvertently reshape the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. The TRIPP corridor, also known as the Zangezur Corridor, is a key route connecting Nakhchivan, the Azerbaijani enclave bordering Türkiye, through southern Armenia. However, its development remains dependent on the progress of the peace agreement between Baku and Yerevan. The Corridor will circumvent Russian and Iranian chokepoints, boosting Turkish influence in the region and helping Türkiye establish itself as a transit hub for trade and energy between Europe and Central Asia.
The estimated cost of the TRIPP corridor is between US$3 and 5 billion over the next 5 to 10 years. It could lead to logistic savings of roughly US$20-30 billion and has the potential to unlock approximately US$100 billion in trade by 2027. Türkiye is rapidly seizing opportunities created by the TRIPP corridor. In August, construction began on a rail line from the Turkish hub of Kars to Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave.
Türkiye is also working to diversify its energy sources by developing the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), the South Caucasus Pipeline, and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). These initiatives aim to transport gas from the Caspian Sea and Turkmenistan to Europe, thereby decreasing reliance on Iran and Russia. These infrastructure projects will strengthen Ankara’s bargaining position in trade talks with the European Union, given Turkiye’s geostrategic importance and its role in new supply chains.
Türkiye has further strengthened its trade and commercial ties in the region through Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Kazakhstan in 2016 and Uzbekistan in 2024, the latter elevating their relationship to a strategic partnership. Exports to OTS member states totalled US$36.6 billion between 2020 and 2024, while imports amounted to US$26 billion. In 2023, Türkiye’s trade with Kazakhstan reached US$6.4 billion and with Uzbekistan, approximately US$3 billion, indicating a significant increase compared to previous years. In recent years, Ankara has emerged as Turkmenistan's top exporter, surpassing China.
Türkiye has further strengthened its trade and commercial ties in the region through Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Kazakhstan in 2016 and Uzbekistan in 2024, the latter elevating their relationship to a strategic partnership.
Defence cooperation among OTS countries has also grown in Central Asia, primarily following Türkiye’s supply of defence equipment and drones to Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war and the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In 2022, Kazakhstan and Ankara agreed on joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) production and aerospace defence cooperation. Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan also began strengthening their defence ties. In 2024, Uzbekistan and Türkiye signed a military-technical cooperation agreement, focusing on training and defence manufacturing. In January 2025, Uzbek authorities announced plans to acquire Turkish UAVs. However, Türkiye encounters limitations in expanding its defence cooperation due to its NATO membership and since certain Central Asian nations, such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, are members of the Russia-led CSTO. The Central Asian countries are also largely dependent on Russia and, to a lesser extent, China, for defence procurements.
Türkiye used soft power to revive cultural elements, such as the Latin-based Turkic alphabet. It built mosques in the region to restore its cultural influence. Consequently, the OTS has become the primary platform for high-profile visits, religious guidance, educational initiatives, and scholarships for Central Asian students to pursue higher studies at Turkish universities. However, Central Asian countries show restraint towards some of Ankara’s demands due to the influence of powerful neighbours such as Russia, China, Iran, and others. They do not recognise or support Türkiye’s efforts to gain wider recognition for Northern Cyprus, which could lead to political and economic repercussions in the region, especially from Brussels.
The OTS has become the primary platform for high-profile visits, religious guidance, educational initiatives, and scholarships for Central Asian students to pursue higher studies at Turkish universities.
Similarly, Iran has been concerned about the TRIPP corridor and will resist any such plan. Russia is also displeased with recent defence deals between Ankara and Central Asian countries and views the growing cultural initiatives with suspicion. Although Western powers, including the US, endorse Türkiye, particularly regarding the TRIPP corridor, Central Asia, nonetheless, aims for a multi-vector foreign policy. OTS continues to offer the Turkic countries a shared platform during these fragile geopolitical times worldwide.
Türkiye’s assertive outreach through the OTS and projects like the Middle Corridor and TRIPP reflects its ambition to emerge as a bridge between Europe and Asia. Yet, Ankara’s expanding trade, energy, and defence footprint faces clear limits. Central Asia’s deep economic and security dependencies on Russia and China, the growing interest of the US in the region, coupled with Iran’s regional sensitivities, temper Türkiye’s aspirations. Ultimately, Türkiye’s influence in Central Asia will hinge less on shared cultural ties and more on its ability to offer credible alternatives in connectivity, commerce, and security without disturbing the region’s delicate geopolitical equilibrium.
Ayjaz Wani is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Ayjaz Wani (Phd) is a Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme at ORF. Based out of Mumbai, he tracks China’s relations with Central Asia, Pakistan and ...
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