Lessons from the Ukraine-Russia conflict

The first anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is an apt occasion to reflect on the changing nature of 21st-century warfare. The war in Europe demonstrates that while the fundamental nature of war does not change, warfare as a dynamic interaction between opponents is always evolving. That is so because “war” in its essential state remains irrational and unrestrained, and although the laws of combat are immutable, belligerents locked in conflict are continually seeking new ways to defeat and destroy the adversary. Even if one side does not succeed in overwhelming the other, it must, for the sake of its own survival, think of ways to bog the opponent down in a war of attrition.

Battlefield lessons

From an analytical viewpoint, there are two distinct sets of lessons to be drawn from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. One set of lessons pertains to battlefield tactics, while the other is about strategic war lessons. Let us begin with the lessons learnt on the battlefield, as these are more revealing of the changing nature of modern warfare. The first takeaway for military observers is that capital assets are no longer capable of dominating the battlefront in the ways they once did. The war in Ukraine has shown that big warfighting platforms such as tanks, warships, and fighter aircraft are more vulnerable than ever to low-cost defensive systems. Consider this. The Ukrainian forces used US Stinger and Javelin missiles to attack Russian forces with devastating effect; the Russian flagship, Moskva, was sunk with just two hits of the Neptune anti-ship cruise missile.

The war in Ukraine has shown that big warfighting platforms such as tanks, warships, and fighter aircraft are more vulnerable than ever to low-cost defensive systems.

It is relevant that the old-fashioned battle tank is waning in prowess. Indeed, a vast majority of Russian tanks attacked in the initial phase of the war were destroyed by cheap shoulder-fired Ukrainian missiles and drones. Beyond the obvious lack of armour and mobility, Russia’s tank offensive was also undermined by the military leadership’s failure to use tanks in combined arms operations alongside artillery, air support, reconnaissance, and artillery. The second tactical lesson from the war is that, while artillery remains an important component of warfare, it is only more lethal when precision-guided munitions are used in well-planned attacks. It is instructive that Russian artillery bombardments failed to penetrate Ukrainian defences. Even when command-and-control centres or logistics facilities were hit, the damage was minimal, and the facilities were quickly restored. In contrast, NATO's High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, which fires GPS-guided projectiles up to 50 miles, repeatedly destroyed Russian ammunition dumps, command posts, and key bridges. Ukraine was able to carry out attacks from a safe distance, avoiding Russian counterfire. The third lesson of the Ukraine war is that drone warfare is a potential game-changer with the ability to permanently alter battlefield dynamics. Large drones, such as the Turkish Bayraktar, have been extremely effective in striking large targets in Ukraine, and even smaller drones have played an important role in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. On multiple occasions, small Ukrainian drones snuck into Russian battle formations, attacking long convoys, disrupting supply lines, and targeting ammunition dumps. The war also showed that airpower in an unprotected military environment is highly vulnerable. In nearly a year of warfighting, Russia failed to establish air superiority and control the skies over Ukraine. In contrast, a much smaller Ukrainian air force was able to survive and even launch effective attacks on enemy positions.

Large drones, such as the Turkish Bayraktar, have been extremely effective in striking large targets in Ukraine, and even smaller drones have played an important role in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.

The effects of modern technology on the war in Ukraine are even more salient. The ability to see and locate enemy positions using satellite imagery effectively rendered the Ukraine war transparent. Data from both expensive, capable geostationary military satellites and low-cost, commercial low-Earth orbit satellites and drones significantly improved targeting. Because of the combination of space-based capability and pervasive open-source data, military forces found it difficult to move around undetected. The fact that the Russian invasion was closely monitored since its beginning and continues to be so says something about the shifting characteristics of modern wars.

Strategic lessons

There are also strategic lessons to learn from the conflict. The first is that regardless of the geopolitical and operational imperatives, war should never be started in haste. President Putin's  assumptions about Russian power and anti-Western zeal drove him to launch a seemingly impulsive invasion of Ukraine. The Russian President's fears were undoubtedly fueled by NATO's expansionist policies, but there was never a sense that the war effort had been thoroughly deliberated. The importance of adaptability in modern warfare is another vital lesson. While belligerents strive to act quickly and decisively, uncertainty is a constant feature of military operations. A belligerent must adapt to changing conditions such as new technologies, novel tactics, and new ways of using older war assets to outthink and outflank the enemy. Ukraine demonstrated its adaptiveness during an October 2022 attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, when Ukrainian forces used unmanned surface vessels (USV) as suicide drones to target naval combatants.

The Russian President's fears were undoubtedly fueled by NATO's expansionist policies, but there was never a sense that the war effort had been thoroughly deliberated.

The third strategic lesson is that in today's world, a “short war” is a comforting myth. The Ukraine war is an instructive example of how any war effort that begins with one side assuming the other's impending collapse is doomed to falter. Russian overconfidence was a major contributor to the Russian military's failure to meet its war objectives. The Kremlin's overoptimism about securing a favourable outcome in Ukraine resulted in a series of mistakes. Russian troops arrived in Ukraine unprepared, relying on outdated maps and inaccurate intelligence. Their initial attacks were launched in a haphazard manner, with Ukrainian air defences remaining intact and ready to strike counter-blows. Other signs of a lack of planning were evident. The Russian military was improperly briefed about the war, and many Russian soldiers were unaware of why they were fighting. Somewere careless enough to , call home on cell phones thus revealing their locations. It enabled the Ukrainian military to track and kill them in large numbers. Even so, Russia refused to adapt or innovate; despite battlefield losses, the country's military machinery remained unwieldy. The Russian military only got its act together in eastern Ukraine in the latter half of 2022, but it also erred by seizing more territory than it could defend. It was left to untrained and ill-equipped fighters to defend vast swaths of land. Many were conscripts with outdated weapons and little professional fighting experience. To make matters worse, Ukraine's civilian areas were regularly bombarded, further hardening Ukrainian resolve. The involvement of irregulars is not new to Russian warcraft, but it highlights the hybrid nature of modern wars. What is notable from an awareness standpoint, however, is that the presence of non-state actors on the battlefield and the use of nonlinear warfare tactics adds a layer of complication, deepening the fog of war on the battle-front.

The Ukrainians remained one step ahead, upgrading their own logistics and reserves and successfully counterattacking Russian forces.

Another important lesson is that long-term victory in modern-day warfare is dependent on maintaining logistical lines and ordinance sustainment. In combat, logistics are critical, especially for an occupying power. After months of stalemate in Western Ukraine, the Russians learnt their lesson. The Russian Army moderated its unrealistic goals, centralising combat operations and concentrating resources in eastern Ukraine, where success was more likely. Despite this, the Ukrainians remained one step ahead, upgrading their own logistics and reserves and successfully counterattacking Russian forces. Importantly, Kyiv continues to rely on European allies and the United States (US) for munitions to support the war effort.

A cautionary tale

The final strategic lesson is that inasmuch as war is about power and its effective application, victory, and defeat are contingent on the nature of power, which is ever-changing. When two states compete in today's interdependent world, the one with more robust relationships has an inherent advantage, even in the face of capability imbalances. The ability of Ukraine to withstand the Russian offensive is proof that with the backing of capable allies, the power deficit between unevenly matched combatants can be remedied to some degree. Notably, modern wars have an outsized element of coercion and compellence—where one side gets the other to abandon its political ambitions and submit to its demands. In such a war, a minimalist strategy is often better than a maximalist approach that tends to provoke more resistance from the adversary. In that sense, the conflict in Ukraine is a cautionary tale and a sobering study for military observers and strategic thinkers alike.

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