Lessons from Bhopal: Creating Coherence Between Chemical Safety and Security

Image Source: Getty

In January 2025, four decades after the Bhopal gas tragedy,  the Madhya Pradesh High Court finally ordered the removal of the hazardous waste left behind at the disaster site. The Bhopal gas tragedy occurred in December 1984 and has been recorded as one of the most prominent industrial disasters globally. A leak of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas from a pesticide plant owned by Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) exposed hundreds of thousands of people to a deadly cloud of toxic chemicals, resulting in the death of an estimated 3,787 people. The subsequent death of over 15,000 people across the next several years was also attributed to this gas leak. Furthermore, more than 500,000 individuals were exposed to the toxic gas, with long-term health-damaging effects on the respiratory tract, vision, neurological conditions, and reproduction.

At the time of the incident, Bhopal was ill-prepared to handle a disaster of this proportion. Its public health infrastructure was weak, with limited access to clean water and no sewage system. Major hospitals lacked trained physicians and beds, aggravated by an equally poor emergency response system. The principal challenge in the aftermath of the Bhopal disaster was the difficulty in executing mass decontamination. The continued contamination of the area has contributed to the illnesses and comorbidities experienced by its residents.

The principal challenge in the aftermath of the Bhopal disaster was the difficulty in executing mass decontamination.

In a settlement with the Indian judiciary, the UCC accepted moral responsibility for the disaster and agreed to pay US$470 million to the Indian government for distribution to claimants based on the death toll of 3,000 and the claim of 102,000 permanent disabilities. However, the compensation fell short of the damage in India and compared to reparations paid by UCC in other cases. The company never revealed the exact contents of the toxic cloud, and evidence suggests that cyanide poisoning, not just MIC, was involved, based on the temperatures of the tank that had leaked and the UCC’s primary recommendation of sodium thiosulfate, which is used to treat cyanide poisoning. Not only did the UCC evade legal action and fall short of compensating the victims, but it also ceased operations at the Bhopal plant and failed to clean the site thoroughly.

The event highlights the stark contrast between the lack of corporate responsibility and the enforcement of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. It invokes the need to strengthen such guidelines in case of future chemical disasters and intentional attacks.

Challenges in chemical disaster management

Outside of limited public health infrastructure and the difficulty of attributing accountability to private parties, the Bhopal disaster demonstrated the overwhelming scale and complexity of decontaminating large, exposed populations contaminated with toxic compounds. This also applies to the case of chemical weapons attacks, where identifying the affected population is as difficult as it is important. In such incidents, establishing containment areas to prevent further contamination is key.

Outside of limited public health infrastructure and the difficulty of attributing accountability to private parties, the Bhopal disaster demonstrated the overwhelming scale and complexity of decontaminating large, exposed populations contaminated with toxic compounds.

While the Indian government’s bandwidth and capacity to respond to disasters have improved in the last 40 years, several gaps remain in the country’s approach to disaster mitigation.

India’s focus on disaster management over prevention: The response to the Bhopal disaster highlights India’s tendency to react rather than participate in proactive prevention. Despite progress in disaster management, such as specialised medical countermeasures by institutions like the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), clearing the disaster site was still an elongated process. While there are provisions for preventive laws, as stated by the NDMA, and tester kits, as required by the DRDO, the implementation of these is voluntary and cannot be verified by a third party. Due to this lack of third-party audits and accountability measures for private parties, India still faces significant hurdles in implementing preventive measures.

The Bhopal disaster also highlighted notable weaknesses in India’s healthcare system, especially regarding handling large-scale chemical accidents, with many centres lacking established training for handling patients with chemical contamination, especially in large numbers.

Limited role of OPCW and NACWC: India is a member of the United Nations Office of Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR); however, the UNDRR was established only after the Bhopal disaster. Therefore, the response to the Bhopal accident, the continuing contamination challenges, and the lack of accountability held by the UCC highlighted that even these global forums and their domestic representations were limited.

To facilitate better compliance with international guidelines and conventions, the global parties that oversee chemical disasters must further their activities in India. This will include the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the National Authority for Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC), which is the Indian embodiment of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Act. The CWC and OPCW were enforced only in 1997, and the Indian CWC Act and NACWC were established in 2000, a decade after the Bhopal gas tragedy. While the NACWC does interact with other agencies, including the Indian Chemical Council (ICC), the National Academy of Customs Excise and Narcotics (NACEN), and even the Institute of Pesticide Formulation Technology (IPFT), its limited focus on the malicious use of scheduled chemicals has not aided India’s approach retroactively to addressing the Bhopal gas tragedy or preventing potential future disasters.

The CWC and OPCW were enforced only in 1997, and the Indian CWC Act and NACWC were established in 2000, a decade after the Bhopal gas tragedy.

Most chemical harm is caused in industry scenarios, including using non-scheduled or easily accessible industry-grade chemicals. Expanding the NACWC’s scope beyond chemical attacks by malicious actors will thus help address a broader scope of chemical contamination and hold private parties responsible for irresponsible behaviour that can have an impact akin to a chemical attack.

Extending lessons from Bhopal

Although the Indian government has taken steps in disaster management, especially for chemical storage, trade, transport, and application, precautionary measures, such as stringent safety checks and emergency drills, must be mandatory in industries that handle toxic chemicals. Considering the long time it took to clear the Bhopal gas tragedy site, routine revisions of the disaster and attack management approach are essential. Primarily, the NDMA and NACWC must work more closely to attempt the following:

• Enhance international preparedness and coordination: Learning from Bhopal is one of the most important lessons for developing the global capability to respond to chemical contamination, especially concerning chemical weapons. However, attribution is difficult with chemical contamination of any kind. Thus, the government should work closely with international organisations to strengthen training programmes, improve infrastructure, and foster coordination between international and national agencies and medical facilities.
• Adopt advanced detection and decontamination technologies:India must invest in advanced detection systems. While the DRDO is already investing in such devices for their approach to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defence, the nature of such attacks and leaks makes this not only a defence issue but also a disaster management and prevention issue, as both intentional and unintentional disasters cause the same harm. This would include suits for individual use needed to enter contaminated areas. It would also include hand-held sensors and drones equipped with detection capabilities to guarantee that affected zones and populations can be quickly identified and treated.
• Strengthen crisis management and multi-agency coordination: A major flaw in the response to the Bhopal disaster was the lack of coordination among various agencies involved in the relief efforts. India must establish an agency to help coordinate all required stakeholders, such as government agencies, military, emergency response teams, medical personnel, and non-governmental organisations, to prevent future chemical disaster response delays and poor efficiency. This framework should guarantee that each potentially involved party knows their role and that effective communication pathways exist during a crisis. Such an agency can be established for a short term during a disaster, but the framework and structure of such an authority should be prepared in advance and can be covered by the NDMA. This framework would also include contingency plans for chemical contamination that outline specific protocols for mobilising resources, personnel, and medical support. These plans should be reviewed and revised frequently to remain in use under evolving conditions. International parties must abide by third-party audits of critical infrastructure, including chemical and industrial plants, to ensure that processes are safe for domestic residents.
• Improve accountability and regulatory compliance: The Bhopal tragedy exposed and exacerbated shortcomings in pursuing private company liability for their actions, particularly in workplace chemical releases and industrial accidents. The law on industrial safety and chemical danger must be increased. India should enhance the enforcement of preventive legislation, and all companies should be held accountable for the safe management of hazardous substances. Collaborating globally is crucial to ensure private sector accountability, and collaboration with the World Customs Organisation, UNDRR, and OPCW is critical.
• Training and establishing public health experts and infrastructure: The Bhopal tragedy highlighted serious deficiencies in India’s public health above all else, particularly its limited capacity to control large-scale chemical contamination. India must fortify its public health infrastructure to effectively respond to chemical events of any size. This will include better equipment and resources for hospitals and health facilities for mass chemical exposure cases. Healthcare providers must also be trained to treat chemical contamination effectively. Additionally, medical personnel must be educated in the use of specialised treatments for chemical exposure and trained to recognise symptoms of chemical poisoning.

The law on industrial safety and chemical danger must be increased. India should enhance the enforcement of preventive legislation, and all companies should be held accountable for the safe management of hazardous substances.

The Bhopal gas tragedy exposed gaps in India’s ability to respond to chemical disasters. It highlighted the need to create coherence between chemical security and chemical safety for better preparedness, stronger regulatory frameworks, and enhanced coordination. Following these recommendations, India can develop a stronger and more proactive strategy for the control of chemical incidents caused by industrial accidents or chemical warfare.

Shravishtha Ajaykumar is Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.

• Domestic Politics and Governance
• Internal Security
• India
• bhopal gas leak
• bhopal gas tragedy
• bhopal gas tragedy waste removal
• chemical disaster management in india
• india's preparedness against chemical disasters
• union carbide corporation bhopal

The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.

PREV NEXT