LCA Tejas Rises as IAF Faces Fighter Crunch

On 25 September 2025, the Indian Air Force (IAF) officially placed orders for the 97 additional Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas (Mark 1A) at an estimated value of INR 62,370 crores. This was the fourth follow-on order (See Table 1 for more details) for the Tejas, which is indicative of the growing footprint of indigenously developed defence platforms in the Indian military arsenal. In the coming years, as the LCA Tejas is gradually inducted into the Indian Air Force, it is expected to become the backbone of India’s air power. A total of 220 aircraft will be introduced, making it the second-largest inventory after the Sukhoi-30 MKI.

Table 1: Staggered Order Pattern of the LCA

Source: Data Collected by Authors from multiple sources.

Embracing the LCA Tejas

In the early 1980s, the LCA programme emerged as a potential replacement for the MiG-21 aircraft series and the Ajeet fighter. After a long development and induction journey, the aircraft has now emerged as a panacea for the Indian Air Force’s depleting squadron strength. Over time, the IAF’s approach to the Tejas has shifted. While the IAF’s initial approach appeared reluctant towards LCA, owing to the aircraft’s inability to meet air staff requirements (ASR), in 2021, the approach witnessed a paradigm shift when the IAF placed the first massive order for the 83 LCA Tejas Mark 1A aircraft at INR 48,000 crores, marking a watershed event in the history of India’s defence aerospace sector.

Induction of the LCA Tejas in large numbers is therefore an inevitable decision that the IAF/MoD leadership had to make to plug the gap while exploring the purchase of new aircraft through imports and domestic sources.

In addition to the growing acceptability of the Tejas since its induction, the IAF must also shore up its combat aircraft strength, which has fallen from its sanctioned squadron strength of 42 to around 29 squadrons (after factoring in the recent retirement of the entire MiG-21 fleet). Induction of the LCA Tejas in large numbers is therefore an inevitable decision that the IAF/MoD leadership had to make to plug the gap while exploring the purchase of new aircraft through imports and domestic sources.

Is Purchasing Foreign Fighter Aircraft a ‘Real’ Option?

A primary reason for the serious depletion of the IAF’s fighter aircraft squadron strength is the complete failure of the two-decade-long Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) tender to induct even one out of the 100+ modern combat aircraft into the IAF. Notwithstanding the induction of 36 Rafale aircraft in a government-to-government deal in 2016, the IAF’s fighter stream has gradually dwindled over the past two decades. Latest media reports indicate that the IAF has submitted a proposal to the Ministry of Defence for the acquisition of 114 Rafale aircraft under a government-to-government deal rather than the planned open tender procedure.

A primary reason for the serious depletion of the IAF’s fighter aircraft squadron strength is the complete failure of the two-decade-long Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) tender to induct even one out of the 100+ modern combat aircraft into the IAF.

While this proposal may make sense given the failure of the MMRCA tender, questions remain over its viability. Table 2 below looks at some of the key contenders in the MMRCA 2.0 tender. All the major manufacturers have a large order book, with the Rafale having the largest number of orders.

Table 2: Order Book of the Key Contenders of the MMRCA 2.0

Source: Data Collected by Authors from multiple sources.

Considering the current order book and Dassault Aviation’s production capacity, it would take at least a decade for the IAF to receive any potential orders, with the first fighter being manufactured domestically and inducted into service. Given the order books of the global original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), the timelines are likely to be similar, if not longer. The IAF, therefore, finds itself in a bind, largely made of India’s glacial defence procurement process.

The IAF, therefore, finds itself in a bind, largely made of India’s glacial defence procurement process.

An alternative route has been procuring additional Sukhoi-30 MKIs. However, the IAF is primarily looking for medium-weight class aircraft to ensure minimal operating costs and maximum operational readiness; the Sukhoi-30 MKI does not fit the bill.

Conclusion

In the past two decades, IAF witnessed the phasing out of several combat aircraft without new inductions. After the Sukhoi-30 MKI, the IAF has not received any new aircraft in large volumes. Under the MMRCA, it was envisaged to induct 100+ aircraft, which have been stuck in the bureaucratic defence procurement labyrinth for the past two decades. Though the GE engine supply chain remains a worrying bottleneck, the LCA Tejas seems to be the only near-term solution before the IAF to shore up the worrying depletion of its squadron strength with attendant benefits to the country’s capability and capacity building in the defence aerospace sector.

Rahul Manohar Yelwe is a PhD candidate at the Department of Security Studies, School of National Security Studies, Central University of Gujarat.

Arun Vishwanathan is Professor & Head of the Department of Security Studies, School of National Security Studies, Central University of Gujarat.

• Defence and Security
• Indian Defence
• India
• lca fighter fleet iaf
• lca tejas
• lca tejas mark 1a
• light combat aircraft
• medium multi role combat aircraft
• mig 21 retirement iaf
• tejas induction in iaf

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