Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Sep 11, 2017
The inching of the Kurds towards total independence in Iraq might have little to cheer about immediately.
Kurdish independence in Iraq: Not much to cheer about

In an article I penned a year ago, the looming split of Iraq as a nation was explored while I had received brickbats and adulation in equal measure. At a talk, the applause to my analysis of the same was delicate, and guarded.

Today, we're staring at the drumroll of the first formal schism into the sovereignty and singularity of Iraq as a composite nation. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is expected to hold a referendum on independence from Iraq on 25 September. This northern/northeastern region of Iraq has long declared partial autonomy, in terms of complete absence of administrative control from Baghdad and has self-determined political/military steering (from within the political outfits in the region).

Many westerners look at the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) as a microcosm of their utopian vision for a future Middle East. Less restive, more pluralistic, multicultural, ethnically diverse and reformist in spirit. The KRI comes under the political control of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the military forces of which, the Peshmerga have received global acclaim in their large contributions towards the almost total annihilation of ISIS in Iraq.

In a region as devastated by war, with borders so awash with blood, there still are temporary hope beacons which manifest themselves in the form of opportunities such as those with the current dispensation in Kurdistan. Whether this split from Iraq actually results in the creation of a conclave defying the aftermath bitterness of a long civil war and creation of strong institutions which stand the test of time or further accentuates regional rivalries in this ethnically diverse and complex geography is only for time to tell.

In a region as devastated by war, with borders so awash with blood, there still are temporary hope beacons which manifest themselves in the form of opportunities such as those with the current dispensation in Kurdistan.

As closely watched as it is by the world, this inching of the Kurds towards total independence in Iraq might have little to cheer about immediately. I foresee four clear issues pitfall in the road ahead and Iraqi Kurdistan's future can be a toss-up in these troubled times.

First, the extent of area under consideration. The KRG's definition of the area under its 'official control' is vehemently denied by the Iraqi Federal Government in Baghdad. The mutually agreed upon three governorates of Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah are predominantly Kurdish, and there is little disagreement between the Kurds and Baghdad on this. However, the KRG, in the last three years has substantially expanded its control over disputed territories (ISIS vacated areas included), largely in the Kirkuk and the Nineveh Governorate. Extending permanent Kurdish rule here would be complex as Baghdad would we unwilling to allow for such geographical compromises. Last week, Kurdish authorities moved to include Kirkuk in the upcoming referendum, against the wishes of many non-Kurdish residents. Given the city's importance and the region's hydrocarbons, no side is likely to relinquish its claim soon.

Source: Lloyd Lyall of the Aleph Policy Initiative

Second, the political manoeuvrings, dynastic politics, nepotism and infighting within the Iraqi Kurdish ranks. Though appreciably united now, it is important to note that the Kurdish Civil War, a military conflict in the 1990s saw bloody infighting between the two major political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, with tolls exceeding 5,000 fighters and many more civilians. The key leaders on warring sides represented the two most important families in the Kurdish political establishment, the Barzani and the Talabani family.

Though the Barzani family has substantially consolidated power in recent times, it has been accused of nepotism and filling up of key posts and ranks with loyalists. The head, Massoud Barzani, K.R.G. President since 2005, technically ended his term in 2013 but continues till date, even after expiry of an extension. His nephew is prime minister, while his son heads the powerful Kurdistan Region Security Council.

Third, non-acceptance of permanent Kurdish rule by the ethnic minorities. In pre–ISIS years, the KRI had a population composed of close to 25% minority groups. As one of the most ethnically diverse parts of Iraq, the KRI had atleast 12 different ethnic groups, from the Christians to the Yazidis to the Sunni Arabs as part of this diverse mix in northern Iraq. Little wonder that in the last decade of civil war, most persecuted families from across the country chose this region for refuge.

Source: Lloyd Lyall of the Aleph Policy Initiative

In pre–ISIS years, the KRI had a population composed of close to 25% minority groups. As one of the most ethnically diverse parts of Iraq, the KRI had atleast 12 different ethnic groups, from the Christians to the Yazidis to the Sunni Arabs as part of this diverse mix in northern Iraq.

However, recently, there have been troubling reports of persecution of the minorities and nepotism in the disputed territories of Sinjar and the Nineveh plains. There have been instances of blockades for the Yazidi populations and selective violence against ethnic leaders (largely Yazidi and Christian) who wouldn't toe the line of the Kurdish government.

Though Kurdistan has stood as the safer option for minorities, any perceived mistreatment might result in yet another civil strife over the long run. Also, the experience of Kurdish leaders in resource management, governance and civil administration of more heterogeneous populations is yet to be completely tested.

Finally, the contesting roles that regional and global powers would like to play in this emerging development. Iran and Turkey are allied against the referendum for independence of Iraqi Kurdistan and are vehemently opposed to the idea of lessening control in an area where Israel is seemingly making inroads by supporting the referendum and investing in infrastructure in the region. In a region with few friends, Israel's natural allies in the Middle East are ethnic minorities, such as the Kurds. The perceived cooperation between Israel and the Sunni Kurds could be a source of severe discomfiture to Iran. Another fear could be led by Iran and Turkey fearing their own Kurdish populations demanding independence in the near future.

Political analysts in Iraq believe that the next theatre of conflict in post-ISIS times could be the Kurdistan region, between the Shiite Hashid Shaabi and the Kurds after the IS issue is concluded.

In an area as plagued by strife, mistrust and shifting alliances, it is indeed difficult to predict the possibility of the post- referendum times and the long political road ahead. However, the toss up could also throw up a beacon of hope in the troubled region and a glimmer of hope in the war fatigued Middle East.

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Contributor

Avijit Goel

Avijit Goel

Avijit Goel is a Senior Director with Flipkart. An alumnus of the Oxford University

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