It would be a truism to state that large public transportation projects that are freshly conceptualised and cover large tracts of land are likely to have several difficult issues to contend with. This article looks at four high-speed rail (HSR) projects that were taken up in four different countries in four different decades and draws conclusions and lessons that emerge from them. The four projects are Japan’s Tokaido Shinkansen between Tokyo and Osaka, France’s TGV (Train à Grande Vitesse) between Paris and Lyon, China’s Jinghu Railway between Beijing and Shanghai and India’s ambitious HSR project between Mumbai and Ahmedabad. The first three are operational and the fourth is under construction.
The Tokaido Shinkansen, ning 515 kilometres (km) between Tokyo and Osaka, pioneered high-speed rail travel in the world. While the Japanese engineers had begun backing such a project in the 1950s, the Japanese government accepted the concept in 1958 and construction commenced in 1959. Originally, its total estimated cost was put at 200 billion yen; but it soon became clear that this was way off the mark. The actual cost turned out to be 380 billion yen (US $1 billion). The project, however, continued to move ahead and became operational in 1964, showcasing Japanese technology during the first Tokyo Olympics. Running at a speed of 220 km per hour, it cut travel time between the two cities from 6 hours 40 minutes to 3 hours 10 minutes. Today it carries about 159 million passengers annually. The Tokaido Shinkansen also marked a move from narrow gauge to standard gauge, a significant advance in technology, signal system, electrical systems, and improved traction configurations.
The four projects are Japan’s Tokaido Shinkansen between Tokyo and Osaka, France’s TGV (Train à Grande Vitesse) between Paris and Lyon, China’s Jinghu Railway between Beijing and Shanghai and India’s ambitious HSR project between Mumbai and Ahmedabad.
In the 1960s, the Shinkansen inspired France into contemplating its TGV HSR. But it was only in 1976 that the French government agreed to finance it. This delay was because of a technological debate in France—whether to go for gas turbines or to switch over to electric traction. The debate was finally settled in favour of electric traction despite several technological changes and higher capital costs. In September 1981, the TGV began operations between Paris and Lyon. The train covers a distance of about 427 km in about two hours four minutes at an average speed of about 280 km per hour and carries about 110 million passengers per year. Built at a cost of around US $4.8 billion, it is operated by SNFC (Société Nationale des Chemins de fer Français), France’s national state-owned railway company.
The Beijing-Shanghai HSR project was first proposed in the early 1990s. The initial design was completed in 1998. However, the appearance of a newer maglev technology entered the design debate that led to a delay in feasibility studies. The debate ultimately was settled in favour of the maglev technology. China Railway began the construction in 2008 and was completed in 2011. The train went operational in June 2011. Amongst the cited projects, this comprises the longest rail corridor of 1,318 km and runs at the fastest speed of around 350 km per hour, covering the entire distance in about four hours. The initial estimates put the cost of the project between US $16.25 and 21.25 billion. However, the end cost came to US $34.7 billion. Today, the Jinghu Railway carries 533 million passengers annually.
The debate was finally settled in favour of electric traction despite several technological changes and higher capital costs.
The 508 km Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail, unlike the first three, is as yet under construction. The project was proposed for a feasibility study in the National Rail Budget of 2009-2010. This corridor originally included Pune as a section that was later dropped on account of several factors—the hilly terrain and high costs being two of them. The Mumbai-Ahmedabad section continued to be pursued and a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed with Japan for feasibility studies in 2013. Several issues arose, some of them were technical and others administrative, that needed to be sorted out between the state governments of Maharashtra, Gujarat, and the Ministry of Railways. To fast track the project, an SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle), the National High-Speed Railway Corporation Limited, was created in 2016. The project needed many clearances and work could start only in 2020. The train’s operational speed is likely to be 350 km per hour and this ‘bullet train’ will cover the distance between the two cities in less than three hours. The estimated cost of the project is US $15 billion. The project’s initial completion schedule was 2023. However, with the land acquisition being delayed, there is some ambiguity about the project’s completion date.
The train’s operational speed is likely to be 350 km per hour and this ‘bullet train’ will cover the distance between the two cities in less than three hours.
One could pick out several significant issues that appear common to all these large public transportation projects. The first is that all four had a long conceptualisation period. In all these four projects, this period was more than a decade. The questions that emerged at this stage were whether there is a case for the project; what would be the appropriate technology; whether it is sufficiently proven; what could be the best route that it could traverse; and whether its overall environmental and socio-economic benefits would outweigh the costs. Once an overall agreement was reached on these matters, questions of pre-feasibility and more detailed feasibility studies arose. And once these studies yielded satisfactory results in terms of the ‘doability’ of the project, the execution began. The lesson is that the basics of such large projects must be got right before they are undertaken. Mistakes made may cost the country dearly and all care needs to be taken to avoid them.
The lesson, especially in the case of India, is that large projects undertaken without conclusive inter-governmental agreement on matters of land puts the project in jeopardy and cost escalation.
In two of the completed projects, there was a substantial rise in initial financial estimates and the final project cost. In the case of Japan, the cost almost doubled; in China, if the highest initial estimated figures are taken, the final cost rose 163 percent. Whereas the original estimate for the Indian project was USD 15 billion, it is safe to presume that with the project overshooting its anticipated time frame; there would be a steep escalation in costs. Tokaido Shinkansen and TGV took five years to complete and the Jinghu Railway three years. In the case of India, the deadline of 2023 set earlier has now been tentatively pushed to December 2028. The biggest hurdle appears to be land acquisition in Mumbai city. The lesson, especially in the case of India, is that large projects undertaken without conclusive inter-governmental agreement on matters of land puts the project in jeopardy and cost escalation.
Finally, let us turn towards the most striking feature of the three completed projects. Tokyo is
Japan's capital city and also its largest. The Tokaido Shinkansen connects Tokyo to the second-largest city of Japan and its traditional economic hub. The TGV of France links its capital and the largest city of Paris to Lyon, the second-largest urban centre, its third-largest city, and its top banking centre. The Chinese project also connects Beijing, its capital city and Shanghai, the biggest city and its apex financial hub. The choice of destinations in all the three projects was to bring the decision-making centre, the capital city, in travel proximity to the nation’s top business centre. Surprisingly, while the Indian project begins from Mumbai, the financial capital of India, it does not connect it to Delhi, the national capital and largest city. Ahmedabad is neither the top business centre of the country nor amongst the six largest cities. In terms of economic advantages that could have accrued to the country, Delhi would have been the right end-destination.
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Dr. Ramanath Jha is Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Mumbai. He works on urbanisation — urban sustainability, urban governance and urban planning. Dr. Jha belongs ...
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