Kazakhstan’s critical minerals and strategic geography position it at the heart of Eurasia’s power shift, enabling Astana to leverage multi-vector diplomacy to balance competing great powers
Kazakhstan’s geographical centrality lends it geopolitical significance, enabling it to engage various powers. Nestled between Russia and China, the country is a major repository of rare-earth minerals, with around 5,000 deposits valued at US$ 46 trillion. Astana’s resource endowments are indispensable in the backdrop of a global energy transition, placing it at the intersection of competing great-power interests. The state has identified 124 deposits of rare-earth metals, yet has explored only 37, underscoring the massive potential to challenge Chinese dominance. Astana accounts for 40 percent of global uranium production and is one of the world's leading copper producers. It also has one of the largest bauxite reserves globally. After Russia, Kazakhstan has the largest proven oil reserves in Eurasia, estimated at 30 billion barrels, while its proven recoverable gas reserves stand at 3.8 trillion cubic metres. Astana’s strategic geography and vast natural resource endowments have positioned it as a pivotal actor in Eurasian geopolitics.
Astana accounts for 40 percent of global uranium production and is one of the world's leading copper producers.
Post-Soviet states interact with various powers holding conflicting interests, steering clear of bandwagoning and managing great power rivalries through multi-vectorism. This diplomatic posture enables them to maintain sovereignty through strategic autonomy, thereby protecting national interests. Specifically, Astana’s strategic position and vast mineral resources utilise multi-vectorism to counterbalance Russia's influence with other global powers, notably China.
Moscow remains one of Astana’s main trade partners, with the country importing discounted Russian gas and allowing easier market access. According to the Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Astana has over 171 joint projects worth US$ 56 billion underway with Russian firms. Russian state corporation Rosatom controls nearly a quarter of its uranium production. Since the war raised concerns over sovereignty, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) sought to diversify their partnerships away from Moscow to safeguard their territorial integrity. Meanwhile, Western sanctions on Russia forced the region to seek alternative routes to export goods to international markets. Given Kazakhstan’s extensive borders with Russia, the country did not endorse Moscow’s position on eastern Ukraine and provided support to Ukraine after the war began in 2022, reflecting its cautious approach to security and sovereignty. The conflict has heightened security considerations, prompting Kazakhstan to gradually reduce its defence dependence, even as Moscow remains a key arms supplier. Further, its oil sector is closely tied to Russia’s geography, with 75 percent of its oil flowing through Russian territory. Kazakhstan, therefore, aims to diversify its strategic partners to de-risk its defence and oil sectors, as rising dependency threatens the long-standing principles underpinning its multi-vector approach.
The success of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) hinges on Astana, as 80 percent of Chinese exports to Europe transit through Kazakhstan.
As Moscow’s influence wanes, Beijing has moved to occupy the resulting vacuum. Kazakhstan’s relations with China have deepened as Russia’s focus on Kyiv intensifies. In the first half of 2025, Chinese firms invested US$ 23 billion in Kazakhstan. China has invested in over 200 projects in the country, worth US$ 66.4 billion. This partnership extends into the political and social domain. There are about one million Kazakhs in Xinjiang, a Chinese autonomous region with a suppressed history of human rights abuses. Astana actively controls activities or media coverage highlighting Chinese policies against Uyghurs and other Central Asian ethnic populations. Kazakhstan’s deliberate economic and political alignment indicates a growing inclination towards Beijing. Moreover, the success of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) hinges on Astana, as 80 percent of Chinese exports to Europe transit through Kazakhstan. Beyond trade, Kazakhstan’s space programme received a boost from Chinese collaboration, with the country recently launching its mini-satellite, the Dier-5 spacecraft, jointly developed by Kazakhstan and China. Beijing signals its ascendancy in sectors of historical Russian dominance, ushering in a new era of cooperation with Kazakhstan. Astana’s reliance on Moscow is decreasing, replaced by Beijing. However, drawing on its multi-vector approach, Astana is also courting its Western partners to counterbalance ties with Beijing.
Following years of stagnation, the European Union (EU) and the US are developing a concrete policy approach towards CARs. Over the past two years, the West has increased investments and summits aimed at strategically countering a Sino-Russian condominium. Between 2005 and 2024, total foreign direct investment (FDI) from EU member states exceeded US$ 200 billion, accounting for 48 percent of Kazakhstan’s total FDI inflows. To improve connectivity and encourage trade, the EU launched the Global Gateway initiative. Through this cooperative platform, US$ 11.7 billion was mobilised towards developing efficient regional transport corridors. The EU also pledged support for the development of critical infrastructure projects along the Corridor, ensuring mutual market access and long-term cooperation.
Both the EU and the US are top investors and have signed memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on critical minerals with Astana, reflecting the West’s efforts to tackle supply chain vulnerabilities.
Both the EU and the US are top investors and have signed memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on critical minerals with Astana, reflecting the West’s efforts to tackle supply chain vulnerabilities. President Tokayev and President Donald Trump oversaw the signing of 29 agreements totalling approximately US$ 17 billion. However, US-Central Asia trade ties remain limited, as most of these deals have involved investments within the US, with fewer investments in Kazakhstan.
On the other hand, Türkiye is widening its influence through the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS). Ankara leverages cultural and historical convergence to foster strategic partnerships with CARs. To strengthen defence ties, Kazakhstan and Türkiye agreed to pursue joint production of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and expand cooperation in aerospace defence. In September 2024, the two countries signed a military cooperation agreement to improve combat training, alongside other forms of cooperation, including new cultural centres and collaboration in media, tourism, and television. Meanwhile, Türkiye’s visa-free regime rendered it a top tourist destination for Kazakh visitors. Hence, there is growing political, economic, and cultural alignment between Astana and Ankara.
Astana positions itself as a middle power, confidently engaging globally as it diversifies partnerships. Kazakhstan’s regional influence is growing amidst geopolitical shifts, driven by its resources, domestic mining, and strategic foreign policy. Its unexplored rare-earth reserves will increase its value as the global economy shifts toward green energy. Its alignment with China over Russia may limit multi-vectorism, especially amid supply chain disruptions.
Astana positions itself as a middle power, confidently engaging globally as it diversifies partnerships.
Meanwhile, Western interest in energy security offers opportunities to build deeper partnerships and reduce dependence on Beijing. As great-power rivalries intensify, Kazakhstan’s role as a strategic partner may expand, but its sustainability depends on turning resource demand into lasting strategic autonomy rather than another form of dependence.
Shairee Malhotra is the Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Jyotiraditya Sanand is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Shairee Malhotra is Deputy Director - Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation. Her areas of work include Indian foreign policy with a focus on ...
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Jyotiraditya Sanand is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation. ...
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