The Kargil conflict and India’s rapid growth marked a turning point in India-US relations.
This article is part of the essay series: Kargil@25: Legacy and Beyond
Few decisive moments can transform the bilateral relationship between two countries, especially when they share a contested past. Yet, such moments are etched in the political and strategic memories of the people. The Kargil War of 1999 was one such moment—not just for India’s remarkable turnaround of a topographical disadvantage into a historic defeat for Pakistan, but perhaps equally importantly, for India’s relationship with the United States (US). The Clinton administration played a decisive role in changing the course of India-US relations, setting the stage for altered dynamics in South Asia. Pakistan, a long-standing non-NATO ally of the US, was refused help by the Clinton administration against India. In one fell swoop, the US implicitly recognised Pakistan’s illegal infiltration across the Line of Control (LoC). What followed was a series of policy reversals by the US in South Asia that would reposition India in Washington’s strategic calculus.
The years leading up to and following the Kargil War were decisive in shaping great power engagements in South Asia. Before the Kargil War, India-US relations were low-key, characterised by political estrangement and sanctions resulting from India’s 1998 nuclear tests and the Glenn Amendment sanctions. For India, the tailwind was a rapidly growing economy and an emerging market that the world, including the US, began to recognise the potential of. These factors provided the US with enough reasons to end the sanctions on India, some of which were lifted less than six months after their imposition.
The years leading up to and following the Kargil War were decisive in shaping great power engagements in South Asia.
The US interests in Asia were undergoing significant transformation. In 1997, the Clinton administration conducted a National Security Council Policy Review of South Asia, which resulted in enhanced cooperation with the region. Nearly a decade of unipolar dominance in Asia, coupled with a rapidly changing socio-economic landscape, led the US to factor Asia, in general, and India, in particular, into its long-term strategic vision. The 1990s also witnessed growing radicalisation across the Middle East, prompting the US to look further east towards the Pacific, ultimately what would later become the Indo-Pacific strategy. These structural shifts in the geoeconomic landscape of Asia repositioned US interests, and the Kargil conflict presented the Clinton administration with an opportunity to recalibrate its regional policy in South Asia.
Embedded in the American reaction was a compulsion to reposition itself in the region. Frustration with growing fundamentalism in West Asia, particularly in Afghanistan, strongly influenced the Clinton administration’s decision to pressure Pakistan on the issue of border infiltration in India. The US reiterated that the Kashmir dispute was a bilateral issue and declined to intervene, marking a significant shift in its approach. This decision was a reflection of broader strategic shifts, as the US sought to stabilise its interests in a region increasingly important to its global strategy.
These factors were compounded by the embarrassment the US faced from its inability to detect India’s nuclear tests in May 1998 and the ensuing non-proliferation concerns that emerged from a nuclear-armed South Asia, as Pakistan soon conducted its own nuclear tests. Strategically, the relevance of Pakistan for US foreign policy and strategy in West Asia had considerably deteriorated.
Pakistan’s attempt at incursion and the Kashmir conflict of 1999 was a great cause of concern for the Clinton administration which was trying to reengage with South Asia after tumultuous developments in the form of nuclear testing by both India and Pakistan. When the Clinton administration had taken over in 1993, the Bureau of South Asia created in 1992, was just a year old. The step was geared towards enhancing the US Department of State’s relationship with South Asia. These plans suddenly were being upended by Pakistan’s designs. Between May and July 1999, persistent trends in small infiltrations from Pakistan took the form of a large-scale infiltration and attempt at occupation in the Kargil sector of Kashmir. This resulted in a large-scale war between the two sides, leaving many casualties. The Clinton administration wanted peace and feared a wider regional conflict and therefore agreed to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington D.C. on 4 July. The visit resulted in a rebuke of Pakistan and a clear indication from the Clinton government to withdraw its infiltrators. Meanwhile, a complete breakdown of civil-military relations in Pakistan and the trading of charges between Nawaz Sharif and Chief of Staff Parvez Musharraf culminated in a coup-d’état, putting Pakistan further outside the orbit of Washington’s influence. All US aid to Pakistan was immediately suspended in the aftermath of the coup. In all these, India’s advantage was the fact that the Vajpayee government shared enough evidence with the US regarding Pakistan’s complicity in driving cross broader incursions.
Pakistan’s attempt at incursion and the Kashmir conflict of 1999 was a great cause of concern for the Clinton administration which was trying to reengage with South Asia after tumultuous developments in the form of nuclear testing by both India and Pakistan.
The Clinton administration was driven by the idea of making a breakthrough in regional peace, particularly to prevent a wider war which could climb the nuclear escalation ladder very rapidly. There was no US presidential visit to India since Eisenhower visited in 1959. The Kargil war was both an opportunity and a challenge to the Clinton administration. Both India and Pakistan were the youngest nuclear states which tested the limits of nuclear deterrence—an uncharted territory in South Asia. Even in the domain of conventional war, India was preparing a wider counter-strategy which signalled a wider regional war—in particular, a naval blockade around Karachi by its Operation Talwar. These compulsions led the Clinton administration to break a trend and pressure Pakistan, a key regional ally. The Vajpayee government appreciated the turn of the American tide towards India when for the first time, during wartime, the US openly supported India over Pakistan.
The Clinton visit in March 2000 was both decisive and dramatic. For one, it showed that South Asia had gained renewed importance in the US calculus. Clinton visited Bangladesh, India and Pakistan during the visit. While he received a rockstar welcome in India, his visit to Pakistan was shrouded with concerns of a terrorist attack from Al-Qaida and that his visit would legitimise the Musharraf government and the coup. His visit to Bangladesh had an assassination scare. The emerging contrast in South Asia with India’s large open economy and stable democracy with other regional countries was clear.
Vajpayee and Clinton issued a forward-looking joint statement titled, “U.S.-India Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century”. The statement drew values-based similarities between the two countries and their peoples. By outlining freedom and democracy as strong bases for peace and prosperity, it underscored the sharp difference between India and other regional countries, as much of the region was engulfed in instability ensuing from military dictatorship, terrorism, civil war, and internal conflict. The strong emphasis of the Clinton administration on democracy was evident in the establishment of the Asian Center for Democratic Governance to create a community of democracies.
Vajpayee and Clinton issued a forward-looking joint statement titled, “U.S.-India Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century”. The statement drew values-based similarities between the two countries and their peoples.
India and the US declared their leadership at the dawn of a new information age. India was included in the Internet for Economic Development Initiative (IED), aimed at bridging the digital divide between populations with and without access to information and communication technologies. The joint statement laid the foundations of leadership in an information age by declaring a partnership in peace “with a common interest in and complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security”. Perhaps most importantly, India and the US acknowledged that problems of South Asia can only be resolved by the countries of the region, leaving Pakistan adrift in its efforts to internationalise the Kashmir conflict.
Almost a decade after India opened its economy, India's stable macroeconomic credentials and small business potential presented an opportunity for the US. The Clinton administration made several decisions to establish strong trade relations with India. It announced US$2 billion in US government financial support for American exports to India. The US Export-Import Bank offered substantial new financing for small business exports to India, guarantees for rupee-denominated loans to Indian importers, and funding for the purchase of 10 Boeing passenger aircraft by Jet Airways of India, among other initiatives. In the health sector, the tripartite focus on polio eradication, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS became the mainstay of bilateral health cooperation.
India and the US, positioned on opposite ends of the spectrum due to vastly differing interests through much of the last century, were not on the same page when the Clinton administration took office in 1993. The Kargil conflict and India’s rapid growth marked a turning point in India-US relations. The aftermath of the Kargil conflict and a new realisation in Washington DC about the scope and limits of its cooperation with regional countries in South Asia opened new doors in bilateral relations. Subsequent US administrations have continued to build momentum in the partnership with India while realising the futility of considering Pakistan a non-NATO ally. The Biden administration’s decision to pull out from Afghanistan and the subsequent political-security chaos in both Kabul and Islamabad are strong indicators of where Washington should focus.
Vivek Mishra is a Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation. His work focuses on US foreign policy, domestic politics in the US, ...
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