An impending collapse of the agreement could have significant repercussions for domestic politics in Iran, which is a complex web of multiple interest groups. These range from religious families to wealthy business people, led by the precarious relationship between the democratically elected, moderate government of current president Hassan Rouhani and the conservative-revolutionist camp of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamanei, who remains the ultimate authority.
Iran has a strong sense of protecting the ideals and spirit around which it constructed the revolution of 1979 that ended the rule of Western-backed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The ideals of the revolution, orbiting around the protection and freedom of the seat of Shiite Islam, are non-negotiable, despite Tehran’s longstanding claim otherwise.
<1> Concessions around these ideals were required and, in a rare diplomatic coup, achieved for the JCPOA negotiations to succeed. However, these were to be weaved in concert with Iran’s regional geopolitical policies that largely work around achieving the containment of influence by its enemies, namely, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
For both Riyadh and Jerusalem, a nuclear Iran is an unacceptable prospect, despite it being long suspected that Israel has (or has access to) nuclear weapons. The victory of Trump made Israel and Saudi Arabia strengthen an unusual, covert alliance against the Shiite state (Saudis do not recognise the state of Israel), and aggressively sell it to an already anti-Iran White House.
<2> This tactic has worked well so far for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Saudi heir apparent Mohammed Bin Salman, despite deep opposition by traditional American allies, NATO and even within the White House, which eventually saw the ouster of officials such as former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.
<3>
For both Riyadh and Jerusalem, a nuclear Iran is an unacceptable prospect, despite it being long suspected that Israel has (or has access to) nuclear weapons.
Rouhani’s victory in Iran’s elections in 2013 was a blessing for the international community, paving the way for a coalition of moderates and centrists that replaced the conservative and vehemently anti-US government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. At this time, US-led sanctions had crippled the Iranian economy, leaving a vast population under the age of 30 unemployed and on the edge. In a rare instance, this forced the Ayatollah to concede and support negotiations with the West over their nuclear programme.
The success of the nuclear agreement saw the tactical opening up of the Iranian economy, which in turn had a multifold effect on the country’s domestic politics. Interests that collaborate with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is controlled by the Ayatollah, own a significant mass of Iranian businesses, whether directly or indirectly, as in most cases.
<4> Despite the opening up of the economy following the removal of sanctions as agreed in the JCPOA, Iran has continued to pour money into increasing its regional clout, specifically in theatres such as Syria where Shiite militias now control large swathes of territory, including multiple military bases that they helped secure from the hands of the Islamic State (ISIS). A considerable amount of state funds, in the meantime, have bypassed benefiting the Iranian people and restarting the economy.
The main argument for Trump to have taken the step is the fear of Tehran’s plans for regional dominance supposedly gained from the waiving of the longstanding sanctions. Indeed, Iran already has a stable presence in Iraq and a strong foothold in Syria, apart from building clout by supporting the Houthi militias in Yemen. There is also a prevailing political and electoral narrative in Lebanon via Hezbollah. Concerns over nuclear transparency, in fact, do not top the list for going against Iran; after all, the JCPOA has put in place enough checks and balances to hold the government of Rouhani to task and mechanisms to barter further control of nuclear output with economic benefits.
<5> The pressure point remains in the inability of the West to control Iran’s means to fund its insurgencies — these insurgencies have managed to expand for a good part of the last decade despite the sanctions being in place.
Despite the opening up of the economy following the removal of sanctions as agreed in the JCPOA, Iran has continued to pour money into increasing its regional clout, specifically in theatres such as Syria where Shiite militias now control large swathes of territory, including multiple military bases that they helped secure from the hands of the Islamic State (ISIS).
While the consequences of a complete disintegration of the JCPOA will be felt globally, much of the brunt will have to be absorbed by Rouhani. Iran today continues to face sporadic, largely disorganised protests against the lack of jobs and economic opportunity, despite the period between 2015 and 2018 being open to global trade and multibillion dollar agreements between corporate entities of US, Europe and Iran.
<6>. To put it in perspective, in May, an Iranian judiciary spokesperson said that their security forces will “resolutely confront” any protests against the state after people took to the streets in the town of Kazeroon. The official gave it a spin that such gatherings can be exploited by the “US and other enemies.”
<7> Rouhani himself has to walk a tightrope, and earlier this year in January, he sided with the narratives of the protests, saying people were not only worried about the economy, but had concerns over the societal and political direction of the country as well, such as the amount they spend on funding groups such as Hezbollah and the bulging costs of Shiite expansionism.
<8> This can be translated as Rouhani hedging the risk between his office and the Ayatollah.
The biggest worry over the JCPOA today is the possibility of losing the moderate-centrist stronghold in Tehran, without which negotiations with Western powers in the future will likely hit a deadlock. Despite the challenges facing the Rouhani government, its recent electoral victory in 2017 has added weight to its global outreach to negotiate Iran back into the global economy. Rouhani also remains the best bet for dialogue and the possibility of backchannel negotiated ceasefires across the region with Saudi Arabia and Israel.
This essay appeared in the ORF Special Report ➔ Beyond JCPOA: Examining the consequences of US withdrawal.
References
<1> “Iran’s Priorities in a Turbulent Middle East”, Crisis Group Report, Accessed May 25, 2018
<2> Linah Alsaafin, “What is behind the covert Israeli – Saudi relations?”, Al Jazeera, Accessed May 23, 2018
<3> Jonah Shepp, “How Tillerson is trying to save the Iran deal from his boss”, NY Mag, Accessed May 27, 2018
<4> Ahmad Majidyar, “Khamenei’s ruling unlikely to loosen IRGC’s grip on Iran’s economy”, Middle East Institute, Accessed May 30, 2018
<5> “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: Vienna, 14 July 2015”, US State Department, Accessed May 30, 2018
<6> Alireza Nader, Ali G. Scotten, and James Hoobler, “Iranian Domestic Challenges to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, Rand Corporation (2017), 4
<7> “Iran says security forces to clampdown on protests”, Reuters, Accessed May 29, 2018
<8> Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Rouhani acknowledges Iranian discontent as protests continue”, The Guardian, Accessed May 25, 2018
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