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When war clouds loomed over South Asia, it was not Washington but Tehran and Riyadh that landed in Delhi with a quiet diplomatic bid.
Image Source: Getty
India’s military operations against terror targets inside Pakistan—Operation Sindoor, following the Pahalgam terror attacks in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in April 2025 —brought the two nuclear powers on the brink of war once again. The international community, particularly the West, bogged down with its own crisis points, for a long time, was unable to push the two sides to de-escalate the situation.
Around three days into Operation Sindoor, as both India and Pakistan escalated into targeting each other’s military bases, the United States (US) President Donald Trump posted on social media that an agreement for a ceasefire had been reached. However, preceding the US role, two states not known to be typically involved in the India-Pakistan dynamic landed in New Delhi to engage with their counterparts on this very issue—namely, regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran. These visits were of interest considering Pakistan’s attempts to push through a solidarity statement via the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.
Preceding the US role, two states not known to be typically involved in the India-Pakistan dynamic landed in New Delhi to engage with their counterparts on this very issue—namely, regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran.
India has been consistent with its policy over the years to neither seek nor allow any third-party mediation on a critical bilateral issue such as Kashmir. However, diplomatic traffic from Riyadh and Tehran amid the escalating tactical operations between the two sides added an interesting dimension to what the Middle East’s seats of power for Sunni and Shia Islam, respectively, wanted to achieve with direct engagements and a perception of shuttle diplomacy.
Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi arrived in Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad, for a one-day visit and urged India and Pakistan to de-escalate. Although his visit was not packaged as an exclusive trip intended to offer mediation, and was pre-planned weeks earlier, the brewing crisis was at the top of the agenda. A few hours later, the Iranian official landed in India.
Araghchi’s visits to both states were orchestrated carefully to minimise exclusivity of the Kashmir issue being the only reason for the diplomatic exchange. In New Delhi at least, the Iranian minister’s visit was centred around the 20th India–Iran Joint Commission meeting, where everything from trade to agriculture was discussed. The official statement highlighted that the Iranian delegation was apprised of the “cross-border linkages” of the terrorist attack in Pahalgam and that both sides “strongly condemn terrorism in all its manifestations”. For New Delhi, it was a good opportunity to rake up support with Pakistan’s other neighbour.
Araghchi’s visits to both states were orchestrated carefully to minimise exclusivity of the Kashmir issue being the only reason for the diplomatic exchange.
The reasons for Iran’s interest in potentially aiding talks between India and Pakistan are conjecture at best, considering the Islamabad–Tehran relationship is not one without significant bumps. Both states had launched missiles at each other merely over a year ago. Iran was relatively neutral during the previous large military escalation during the 1999 Kargil war. However, some facets can be analysed on face value. First, since the US exited Afghanistan in 2021, Iran has enjoyed a relative level of calm on its eastern flank, barring long-standing regional issues, which it is capable of handling. The US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deployments in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the ‘War on Terror’ era made the country’s borders heavily armed. A return to a broader conflict in this region would shift significant political and military resources away from Tehran’s strategic objectives in the Middle East and its contestation with Israel. Second, Iran could also be looking at an opportunity to push itself as an actor willing to play referee for peace, as many of its Arab rivals, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are conducting similar exercises. Its proximity to China could arguably be a mobilising factor, giving it access to Islamabad and Beijing, given that China had brokered the diplomatic thaw between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, this hypothesis gets undercut by the fact that India’s National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval spoke directly to China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi about these developments.
Saudi Arabia’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir arrived in New Delhi on a previously unannounced visit at the same time as the Iranian delegation. Riyadh’s play on the crisis was more of a backdoor diplomacy and behind-the-scenes outreach, led by the fact that it has good inroads within the Pakistani polity and the military. Al-Jubeir’s meeting with the Indian Prime Minister’s (PM) Office (though there is ambiguity if he met PM Narendra Modi) hinted towards making itself available in case help was sought. While no public accounts exist, the probability of a US hand behind Riyadh’s shuttle diplomacy between India and Pakistan, which could have also potentially carried messages between the two parties, is likely.
Riyadh’s play on the crisis was more of a backdoor diplomacy and behind-the-scenes outreach, led by the fact that it has good inroads within the Pakistani polity and the military.
In 2023, a struggling Pakistan got US$2 billion in financial support from Saudi Arabia. A year later, Riyadh extended a US$3 billion debt repayment period after Islamabad failed to meet its targets. This means that Saudi Arabia has financial levers it can mobilise to pressurise the civilian government and, more importantly, the military. If the military faces a cash crunch, its preparedness and personnel costs can be severely undermined. Contrarily, along with the US$1 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout that Pakistan secured in the middle of the conflict, Arab powers may help dangle further economic carrots before the state to prevent it from once again shooting itself in the foot.
The above-mentioned economic lifeline was also previously attached to Saudi Arabia’s defence needs. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power, Riyadh and Islamabad signed the 1982 Protocol Agreement for the deployment of Pakistani military personnel to the Kingdom to provide security and training. The deployment of up to 15,000 (or more) Pakistan Army personnel annually built a unique ecosystem of cooperation and trust between the two states. This arrangement was organised under Pakistan's erstwhile military dictator General Muhammad Zia Ul Haq, who aggressively promoted Islam, and more specifically, a Sunni identity, to consolidate Pakistan’s identity.
Nuclear proliferation emanating from Pakistani ecosystems has been known for years, and Riyadh is known to see Pakistan as its fastest bet to attain nuclear weapons if the need arises.
In 1999, amid the Kargil War, then Saudi Defence Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdelaziz al-Saud visited Pakistan’s missile and nuclear facilities near Islamabad. Nuclear proliferation emanating from Pakistani ecosystems has been known for years, and Riyadh is known to see Pakistan as its fastest bet to attain nuclear weapons if the need arises. To further colour in the Pakistani military’s proximity with the Kingdom, in 2017, former Pakistani Military Chief General Raheel Sharif was appointed to lead a Saudi Arabia-led military coalition of 39 nations built to promote security cooperation and combat terrorism. There have been areas of stress as well. Pakistan, under PM Nawaz Sharif, had refused to send troops to join Saudi Arabia’s campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, not wanting to anger its neighbour Iran.
Ultimately, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s arrival in New Delhi was oddly timed to be just about bilateral relations. New Delhi has maintained for long that it does not seek or support third-party mediation in its issues with Pakistan. On the other hand, Islamabad’s policy is to rake up as much international noise as possible on the longstanding Kashmir issue. On this front, Pakistan’s calls for the international community to step in seem to have worked despite direct support coming only from the likes of China, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan.
Beyond a point, Pakistan’s positioning within the Islamic world, particularly in the Gulf, is increasingly unsustainable. Gulf powers such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, among others, have taken a clear and strong stance against terrorism. This is further highlighted by an increasing clarity on this issue within important institutions such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.
Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow with the Strategic Studies programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow, Middle East, with the Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on India’s relations with the Middle East ...
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