Kim Jong Un’s careful elevation of Kim Ju Ae reflects early succession signalling, shaped by regime stability and strategic caution
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On January 1, Kim Ju Ae, the daughter of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, was seen at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun. Since her maiden public appearance in 2022, this was Kim Ju Ae’s first visit to the family mausoleum to pay tribute to her grandfather and great-grandfather. While her visibility has been a point of scholarly and policy debate for a long time, this specific visit lent greater weight to expert assessments regarding Kim Jong Un’s succession plans. However, much remains shrouded in secrecy. This article analyses the process of leadership succession in North Korea, the rationale behind Kim Ju Ae’s increasing political visibility, and lays out what to expect next.
The Geunroja (workers) Magazine for party officials emphasised the issue of succession, supporting the initiation of the process.
Traditionally, leadership succession in North Korea has depended on three critical factors: the health of the ruling leader; internal factors such as economic stability and social cohesion; and the external security environment, including great-power contestation and diplomatic relations with China and Russia. Under Kim Jong Un’s reign, all three factors appear stable, a primary reason why he has not officially announced any succession plans. However, despite the semblance of stability, internal discussions have begun. For instance, last year, the Geunroja (workers) Magazine for party officials emphasised the issue of succession, supporting the initiation of the process.
According to Lee Seung Yeol, North Korean succession can be divided into three stages: the establishment of the successor’s legitimacy; the consolidation of leadership; and finally, the creation of a popular politico-military base around the future leader. Based on precedent, the three stages vary depending on the three factors mentioned above. In Kim Jong Il’s case, the first generation succession began in 1974 and culminated in 1993. For Kim Jong Un, it started in 2009, ending with his father’s death in 2010. Compared to his father, Kim Jong Un had significantly less time—2008 to 2011—to adjust to the succession process, whereas his father had ample time to build political legitimacy starting in the late 1970s .
Table 1: Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un’s Succession Timeline
| Kim Jong Il’s succession | Kim Jong Un’s succession |
|
1961: Joins the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) 1964: Director of the KWP Central Committee’s Organisational Bureau, February 1974: Declared as Kim Il Sung’s heir, elected to the political bureau of the Workers’ Party Central Committee |
28 September 2010: Promoted to Four-Start General |
| 24 December 1991: Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army | 29 September 2010: Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea |
| April 1993: Kim Jong Il was announced as the Chairman of North Korea’sNational Defense Commission (NDC) | 10 October 2010: Kim Jong Un makes his public debut during the 65th Anniversary of the Workers’ Party |
| 8 July 1994: Kim Il Sung dies at the age of 82 | 18 December 2011: Kim Jong Il dies at the age of 69 |
| 1997: Elected as General Secretary of the KWP | 10 February 2011: Officially Appointed as the Vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC) |
Sources: Author’s own compilations[1], KBS, The Guardian
The first phase also includes accompanying the leader to political and social events, alongside foreign trips. For instance, Kim Jong Il started working as the secretary for the party’s organisation, guidance, and propaganda affairs in 1973 and accompanied Kim Il Sung on foreign tours to the erstwhile Soviet Union and Indonesia in 1965 and 1969. Similarly, Kim Jong Un was handed political responsibility immediately after being named the successor in 2009. He, too, travelled with his father to China twice in 2011 before taking over.
North Korea’s second and third generation succession occurred against the backdrop of the Cold War and Kim Jong Il’s declining health. Today, unlike his father and grandfather, Kim Jong Un appears to be in good health and is not facing any internal or external challenges. Considering these factors, the regime feels more secure, further bolstered by the possession of nuclear weapons and its alliance with Russia and China. Given this stable situation, there is no immediate urgency for succession. However, considering the regime’s continuity and stability in the future, Kim Jong Un is expected to start preparing his successor early.
Unlike his father and grandfather, Kim Jong Un appears to be in good health and is not facing any internal or external challenges.
Kim Ju Ae was first seen during the launch of Hwasong-17, North Korea’s largest ballistic missile launch in 2022. Since her first public appearance, speculation regarding Kim Jong Un’s succession has intensified. Kim Ju Ae has increasingly been seen participating in important political and military events, including missile launches, developmental projects, and factory openings. However, given her young age, she has yet to receive any specific political responsibilities or authority. Unlike her father, who was 27 years old when he took over the reins from his father, Ju Ae is believed to be 12 or 13 years old, very young for her to play a vital role in the political sphere. It signals a decade-long period for her to navigate the complexities of North Korea’s political and military apparatus.
In this context, the increasing political visibility should be viewed in the light of how successions are planned in North Korea, as part of laying the groundwork for her future political elevation. It marks her entry into the first phase of the succession process, focused on building her political legitimacy. By accompanying Kim Jong Un atevents, she is being projected as the next leader of North Korea. This sends a clear signal to the political entities in the country.
Besides internal politics, a vital part of the succession is also to assert the political legitimacy of the next leader to close partners, including China and Russia. During Kim Jong Un’s recent visit to China last year for the Victory Day parade, Kim Ju Ae accompanied her father, making her maiden foreign visit. The visit was critical as it introduced her to the Chinese leadership and other socialist friends, following a similar pattern seen during the preparations for the succession of both Kim Jong Un and his father.
During Kim Jong Un’s recent visit to China last year for the Victory Day parade, Kim Ju Ae accompanied her father, making her maiden foreign visit.
By increasing her visibility, Kim Jong Un is attempting to facilitate his daughter’s political legitimacy and authority as the next rightful heir, drawing lessons from his own arduous succession journey. Due to his father's premature death, Kim Jong Un was unable to complete the succession process, which was scheduled to culminate at the Seventh Party Congress. As a result, his political journey became challenging. His initial years after his father’s death were not easy to manage. Most of the time was spent on carefully expanding his influence and consolidating power within the military and the party. He had to purge senior political and military leaders in the party, including eliminating his brother.
Kim Jong Un is attempting to create a cult of personality, portraying his daughter as the upholder of the country’s security and prosperity, through her participation in important events, particularly military launches and ceremonies. With her performative politics—mimicking and repeating her father’s act—she attempts to gain influence and solidify her position. In North Korea’s sociopolitical environment, her ascent is likely to face significant resistance. Additionally, the highly patriarchal North Korean society will add to the challenge. Despite experts supporting the succession theory, others have also cautioned about confusing symbolism for succession.
Recent geopolitical developments, including tensions involving the United States, Venezuela, and Iran, also shape the regime’s calculations regarding Ju Ae’s future political positioning.
Considering Ju Ae’s young age, Kim Jong Un is laying the groundwork for her eventual takeover as she enters adulthood, building her legitimacy and showcasing her leadership. By the time she reaches adulthood, she will have gained the political legitimacy of the elites and the public, as well as control over the party and military institutions. Starting early helps her to remove the unnecessary friction that her father faced and struggled with. Given Kim Jong Un’s absolute hold over the party and the military, Ju Ae’s journey will likely be easier than that of her predecessor. Additionally, recent geopolitical developments, including tensions involving the United States, Venezuela, and Iran, also shape the regime’s calculations regarding Ju Ae’s future political positioning.
At the upcoming Ninth Party Congress, it is expected that Kim Jong Un will announce a series of initiatives, including his objective to advance the country’s military modernisation and strengthen the regime's conventional capabilities. It is also likely that Kim Jong Un will announce his succession plans simultaneously. Traditionally, North Korea’s succession process has begun with symbolism, followed by the building of political clout and authority. Her increasing political visibility sets the first phase of the succession process in motion, underscoring her emerging role as the future leader of North Korea, the legitimate heir to the Paektu bloodline. While it remains uncertain when she will claim the throne, what is certain is that she is strategically being positioned to fill her father’s shoes.
Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the Indo-Pacific regional security and geopolitical developments with a special ...
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