Institutionalising India’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

On 7 February, the Indian Prime Minister visited Malaysia, marking his first foreign visit this year. This was an effort to make up for India’s absence from the East Asia Summit, which Malaysia chaired last year. Despite its short duration, the visit furthered a long-brewing trend: India’s expanding and deepening defence diplomacy with Southeast Asia. It marked a step towards strengthening India’s defence cooperation with Southeast Asian countries and complementing existing economic relations, driven by India’s Act East Policy and the Indo-Pacific Vision. Although India’s defence diplomacy has become more structured and institutionalised in recent years, it still has a long way to go. India’s expanding defence diplomacy merits closer examination, assessing its various strands and exploring ways to institutionalise engagement with Southeast Asia better.

India’s Defence Diplomacy and its Regional Ambitions

Southeast Asia holds strategic importance for India’s security and economic development. ASEAN accounts for 11 percent of India’s global trade. In addition, 55 percent of India’s trade, including critical commodities such as oil, passes through the region’s sea lanes, making regional stability and security vital to India’s national security. However, intensifying geopolitical contestation has recently led to greater regional instability, adding to India’s concerns. Against the backdrop of these developments, New Delhi has begun complementing its regional strategy with more structured defence diplomacy by strengthening defence cooperation in the region. This shift forms part of India’s incremental move towards a more independent approach to Southeast Asia within its broader Indo-Pacific strategy. Through this approach, India aims to emerge as a serious stakeholder in the region’s security, positioning itself as a trustworthy defence partner for Southeast Asian countries seeking alternatives to traditional powers such as the United States (US) and China.

In Southeast Asia, the US, China, and Russia are among the most important defence suppliers. However, in recent years, major Southeast Asian countries have shown reluctance to purchase weapons from them.

In Southeast Asia, the US, China, and Russia are among the most important defence suppliers. However, in recent years, major Southeast Asian countries have shown reluctance to purchase weapons from them. The Russia–Ukraine war has raised questions about the effectiveness of Russian weapons and the sustainability of supply, leaving customers in a dilemma. Similarly, China’s growing belligerence in the South China Sea has made countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia wary of its intentions. On the other hand, the US’s perceived unreliability under President Donald Trump’s second administration has added to these concerns. For instance, restrictions imposed through end-use clauses on US defence supplies, evident during the 2025 Thailand–Cambodia clash, have compounded Southeast Asia’s hesitancy to procure US weapons. In this context, Southeast Asian countries are seeking new defence partners to diversify their procurement. Countries such as India and South Korea have emerged as alternatives.

India’s Defence Diplomacy: Agreements, Soft Cooperation, and Exports

India’s defence diplomacy can be defined as the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives through the peaceful use of its defence capabilities and resources, with trust, reliability, and resilience at its core. The three principal ways in which New Delhi is doing so in Southeast Asia are building and institutionalising strategic defence partnerships, enhancing both soft and hard defence cooperation, and exploring defence export opportunities.

While New Delhi has long maintained defence cooperation Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with several countries in the region, it is now seeking to operationalise these agreements by participating in joint exercises and exploring prospects for Indian defence exports.

As part of its strategy, India is signing critical defence cooperation pacts with Southeast Asian countries, thereby institutionalising its engagement with them. While New Delhi has long maintained defence cooperation Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with several countries in the region, it is now seeking to operationalise these agreements by participating in joint exercises and exploring prospects for Indian defence exports. This not only strengthens defence cooperation between India and its Southeast Asian partners but also expands India’s defence footprint in the region. Growing India–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) defence links further supplement these broader efforts.

Table 1: India’s Major Defence Engagements with Southeast Asian Countries

Source: Compiled by Authors

In addition to initiatives aimed at strengthening interoperability alongside fostering mutual trust and confidence in respective capabilities, New Delhi has also taken pragmatic steps on the ground. In 2024, India announced the appointment of Defence Attachés (DAs) in several Asian countries, including the Philippines, with plans underway to appoint one in Cambodia by March 2026. While the stationing of DAs deepens bilateral defence cooperation, they also play an important role in promoting Indian defence equipment in host countries. Such initiatives reinforce New Delhi’s broader strategic effort to expand its defence footprint in the region.

As part of the broader effort, India has also focused on expanding defence exports. In 2024–25, it registered a record high of around US$ 2.76 billion in overall defence exports, marking an increase of 12.04 percent from the previous year. In Southeast Asia, India’s BrahMos supersonic cruise missile system has emerged as a major export product. India signed a deal worth US$ 375 million with the Philippines in 2022 to export three BrahMos missiles, and other countries, including Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand, have expressed interest. Beyond high-profile platforms, India is also exploring ways to strengthen cooperation across the defence industrial supply chain. For instance, Samtel Avionics, an Indian company, is working with Malaysia to ease supply-chain bottlenecks for critical systems such as the Su-30MKM aircraft.

An Opportunity for India’s Defence Ecosystem

India’s expanding defence diplomacy with Southeast Asian countries is a boon for its defence ecosystem, as it strengthens the country’s defence indigenisation efforts. Private players such as Bharat Forge, Mahindra Defence Systems, and Tata Advanced Systems, which have demonstrated competitiveness in manufacturing and exporting heavy machinery, particularly combat vehicles, stand to benefit. In addition, India’s defence start-up ecosystem, which is developing cutting-edge technologies such as AI-powered machinery and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), can leverage these opportunities. However, certain structural shortcomings cannot be ignored.

For India to capitalise on this opportunity, it must move beyond the traditional model centred on Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs). It is time for New Delhi to recognise the vital role of private enterprises, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and start-ups in expanding India’s defence ecosystem.

For India to capitalise on this opportunity, it must move beyond the traditional model centred on Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs). It is time for New Delhi to recognise the vital role of private enterprises, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and start-ups in expanding India’s defence ecosystem. Steps in this direction include increasing the visibility of SMEs and start-ups. One way to achieve this is by promoting their equipment through joint military exercises, which provide opportunities for demonstration. For instance, during CINBAX 2024 (Cambodia–India Bilateral Army Exercise) — the joint exercise between the armed forces of India and Cambodia — Indian defence equipment, including NEGEV light machine guns and mortar systems, was showcased by the private sector. Moreover, facilitating greater participation by Indian companies in defence exhibitions, seminars, and reciprocal visits to defence facilities is an additional measure to advance this effort.

At the institutional level, existing bilateral mechanisms such as Defence Policy Dialogues, the Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC), and the Joint Defence Industry and Logistics Committee (JDILC) must be better utilised to promote India’s interests, particularly potential export opportunities. India’s defence engagement with regional countries must take into account the opportunities that Indian defence players can offer to enhance their defence industrial capabilities in research and joint production. To this end, a regular consultation mechanism with private sector players must be established. The agreement between Samtel Avionics and Malaysia’s Aerospace Technology Systems Corporation Sdn. Bhd. (ATSC) offers a model that can be replicated. Additionally, India needs to expand and utilise the Joint Defence Industry Cooperation Committee (JDICC), which would create opportunities for greater collaboration in areas such as defence co-production, co-development, technology transfer, defence research and development, and the supply chain ecosystem, with greater participation from the private sector.

India’s increased focus on defence diplomacy should be seen as a strategic step to expand its footprint in Southeast Asia.

In conclusion, India’s increased focus on defence diplomacy should be seen as a strategic step to expand its footprint in Southeast Asia. As the wider Indo-Pacific faces uncertainties, India is seeking to capitalise on the opportunity to consolidate its position as a trustworthy and reliable defence supplier in Southeast Asia. In this effort, defence diplomacy serves as an important instrument for expanding influence and enhancing strategic leverage.

Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Shreya Mishra is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• Defence and Security
• India
• East and Southeast Asia
• act east policy
• ASEAN defence cooperation
• BrahMos missile
• defence exports
• defence indigenisation
• defence industrial cooperation
• India defence diplomacy
• Indo-Pacific strategy
• joint military exercises
• Southeast Asia security

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