Xi's PLA purges spark domestic unease, but Chinese media spins anti-graft campaign as vital for military strength
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The sudden removal of China’s two top generals, Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Liu Zhenli, Chief of Staff of the CMC's Joint Staff Department, has sent shock waves across the world. There are speculations abound in the international media about the background of the current high-level purges in the Chinese military that seem to have decimated China’s entire high command. A few claim that the generals undermined President Xi’s authority, while others accused them of treason, including leaking China’s nuclear secrets to the United States. However, the fact remains that internal power struggles within the Chinese Communist Party continue to remain a blackbox, with limited reliable information available even for domestic audiences. Against this backdrop, this brief analyses how the Chinese media is justifying and building public support around this development, in particular, and China’s anti-graft campaign, in general.
There are speculations abound in the international media about the background of the current high-level purges in the Chinese military that seem to have decimated China’s entire high command.
Domestically, there has been much unease over President Xi’s anti-graft campaign. Longstanding arguments claim that these anti-corruption efforts hinder China’s economic development by affecting public spending, reducing market demand and discouraging governments at all levels from developing the economy. Some even attribute the current slowdown in China’s economic growth and increased downward pressure on the economy to the government’s ruthless self-revolution or self-rectification drive. As the anti-corruption campaign has lately intensified in military realms, public concern has emerged that this creates anxiety and fear among the military staff, dampens cadres’ enthusiasm, and hinder the development of a strong military, ultimately endangering China’s national security.
The government, in turn, is trying to build a counter narrative through various media platforms that “the more the military combats corruption, the stronger, purer, and more combat-effective it becomes; that only through anti-corruption can the military be strengthened.” China’s Central Military Commission's Discipline Inspection Commission, held at the beginning of the year, projected a rather grim picture; it argued that the situation remains “severe and complex.” At a time when China’s neighbourhood—Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea—continue to remain tense, military preparedness can no longer be mere rhetoric. Additionally, since President Trump’s return to the White House, he has carried out rapid global deployments, especially on the intelligence front. A lack of trust within the Chinese military at this point in time could be exploited by external forces.
Chinese history, they say, serves as a warning. Be it China’s unexpected defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War due to "dud ammunition (sand-filled cartridges)" and "lack of money to buy artillery”, or Qing army’s collapse without a fight against the Eight-Nation Alliance due to rampant embezzlement, the downfall of the various Chinese dynasties can be traced back to internal treachery and corruption.
As the anti-corruption campaign has lately intensified in military realms, public concern has emerged that this creates anxiety and fear among the military staff, dampens cadres’ enthusiasm, and hinder the development of a strong military, ultimately endangering China’s national security.
From that perspective, a PLA Daily editorial argued that the investigation and punishment of corrupt high-ranking military officials such as He Weidong, Miao Hua, He Hongjun, and now Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli are in fact, major achievements of the Party and its military's anti-corruption struggle. Corruption, if left unchecked, will impact the morale of the military and shatter its fighting spirit, inevitably courting defeat. Curbing corruption will remove stumbling blocks on the road to success, trim excesses from combat capability building, and strengthen the military’s morale. The faster China eliminates corruption, the faster it can regenerate and strengthen its military.
Going forward, the Chinese media indicate three likely trends in China’s anti-corruption campaign. First, the campaign may no longer be limited to just fostering discipline; it has become an integral part of China’s “warfare” strategy. Thus, the campaign will only intensify in the coming days. Accordingly, demands are being made of tighter unity within the Party Central Committee, with Xi Jinping at its core, adherence to the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and implementation of Xi Jinping's thought on strengthening the military, among others.
Second, the focus of the campaign has shifted from targeting individuals to purging the entire ecosystem, dismantling networks, breaking chains and eradicating cliques within the system. This includes not just serving officers but also retirees and even those in charge of discipline inspection. The scale or depth of investigation may also be expanded by incorporating technology for retrospective investigations and thereby forging a lifelong accountability system.
The scale or depth of investigation may also be expanded by incorporating technology for retrospective investigations and thereby forging a lifelong accountability system.
Third, the campaign aims to convey that the fundamental purpose of the anti-corruption movement isn't to persecute people, but to rebuild trust—between superiors and subordinates, between comrades, and even between the military and the people, so as to ensure that China can "fight and win battles". Chinese media acknowledges that there are side effects of such stringent crackdown. That people might become too scared to act, fearing that more actions would lead to more mistakes, while inaction will risk none, thereby bringing down the efficiency of various institutions. However, Chinese media is hopeful that the government can tackle such a challenge by balancing intensity and precision of its campaign.
It is interesting to note that as China carried out the largest ever military drill around Taiwan—"Justice Mission-2025"—over the yearend, some Chinese experts believed that one of the main purposes behind “the highest-level and most powerful live-fire exercise” was the need to address the growing public doubts in China about PLA’s combat readiness after a spate of high-level purges. Now with the new round of restructuring, it remains to be seen how the PLA chooses to demonstrate its trustworthiness and battle-readiness, to prove to both domestic and foreign audiences that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is strengthening rather than weakening the PLA.
Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme, the Observer Research Foundation.
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Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Her area of research includes China-India relations, China-India-US ...
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