To secure a Chinese withdrawal from Depsang and Demchok as well as deal with the larger continental military of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), India has taken a number of steps, including a massive road infrastructure build-up. The construction of a massive road network called the Arunachal Frontier Highway along the McMahon Line, stretching from Tawang in the Eastern part of Arunachal Pradesh close to the Bhutan border and right up to Vijayanagar in the East. Admittedly, this highway project is long overdue and it is laudatory that the Modi government initiated it with urgency and purpose, but it is only doing so because it is facing a crisis at the moment. The highway, when completed, should undoubtedly bolster the Indian Army (IA)’ capacity to deploy more rapidly men and equipment. The previous Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government made the mistake of not building up India’s ground infrastructure along the Sino-Indian boundary, instead proceeding to invest in the raising of a mountain strike corps without developing the requisite road infrastructure. Without road-based logistics, the Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) will be ineffective. It will be condemned to high dispersion along mountain terrain with poor communications and coordination. The MSC or better known as the 17 Corps has been shelved or if at all, exists in a reduced form since 2018 with at most one of two divisions raised, which constitutes only half of what is required for the establishment of a corps. To be sure, since the onset of the current stand-off, the Modi government did take some steps to bolster the firepower of the 17^th Corps. Notwithstanding this fact, the ostensible reason for shelving the MSC by the Modi government was the lack of adequate funds. The Chinese, for their part, have objected to the construction of infrastructure by India as the reason for the current boundary tensions and their occupation of Indian-claimed territory which, however, as the latest evidence suggests, is still limited. Although they simultaneously warned third parties, particularly their American interlocutors not to interfere to fetter a more proximate relationship between India and the US. If anything, the lack of ground infrastructure along the contentious border with China is likely to prevent India from mobilising forces rapidly in the event of military hostilities with Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). Beijing’s objections to India’s infrastructure build-up obviously overlook China’s own infrastructure build-up on its side of the boundary. However, the underlying challenge facing New Delhi transcends logistical and operational issues facing the Indian military along the Sino-Indian boundary. It extends to the realm of the strategic, which could help compel the Chinese to restore the status quo ante on the LaC.

The Chinese, for their part, have objected to the construction of infrastructure by India as the reason for the current boundary tensions and their occupation of Indian-claimed territory which, however, as the latest evidence suggests, is still limited.

A strategic shift 

One area which may seem obvious is to deepen India’s military ties with a strong external power such as the US, enabling a substantial military build-up. The latter would also entail higher defence expenditure by India to improve the strength of its conventional forces. Forging a closer defence and military synergy with the US is one way to accelerate the accumulation of capabilities necessary to contest Beijing’s refusal to restore the status quo ante. It would also signal to Beijing, New Delhi’s unmistakable displeasure and hostility to China’s conduct since May 2020.

A well-planned nuclear testing regime that credibly establishes and confirms India’s thermonuclear capability would go a long way in helping India in overcoming a key shortfall it faces against the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

India could also supplement tighter defence ties with Washington with a nuclear build-up of its own. If not, it may also substitute the latter as a stand-alone measure and couple it with additional nuclear testing. Reviving the possibility of conducting more atomic tests by India has already received some international attention and analysis lately. For instance, nuclear testing would go a significant way in redressing the deficit in India’s thermonuclear weapons capability. Although the 1998 nuclear tests involved the testing of a thermonuclear device, it is widely recognised to have “fizzled” out or failed. Consequently, a well-planned nuclear testing regime that credibly establishes and confirms India’s thermonuclear capability would go a long way in helping India in overcoming a key shortfall it faces against the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This requirement becomes all the more urgent and relevant to India’s current continental challenges against the PRC, but equally in the face Beijing’s menacing expansion of its atomic capabilities. It is estimated according to the Pentagon in its latest report that the PRC is expected to accumulate an arsenal of 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035 which would be significantly higher than what India is likely to field by the same year, given New Delhi’s current rate of expansion. However, if New Delhi persists in restraining its drive or quest for a larger nuclear arsenal, it will redound to India’s disadvantage as it has to contend with the twin nuclear threats posed by the PRC and Pakistan. Lest we forget, the latter’s arsenal surpasses India’. This evolving atomic asymmetry, if not arrested, will progressively erode its capacity to credibly threaten and execute nuclear retaliation against its primary adversaries. Thus, India will require both a quantitative and qualitative augmentation of its nuclear capabilities. A corollary to the PRC’s persistent boundary stand-off with India and minatory atomic build-up is Beijing’s development of missile defences. Missile defences enable Beijing to pre-empt India with a nuclear first strike taking out a large chunk of its arsenal and any residual Indian arsenal used in retaliation that survives Beijing’s first strike will be significantly neutralised by way of interception with Chinese missile defences. Thus, New Delhi would be well advised not to tergiversate in confronting Beijing’s conventional military posture along the Sino-Indian boundary and its advancing nuclear capabilities if it seeks not only to secure the PRC’s restoration of the status quo ante on the Sino-Indian boundary but in the long run, deter and restrain the assertion of Chinese military power and consequently Beijing’s hegemony over Asia.

• International Affairs
• Indian Foreign Policy
• China
• India
• USA and Canada
• Chinese Military
• defence ties
• Indian Army
• infrastructure
• Sino-Indian

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