Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on May 23, 2022
The US recently released the Indo-Pacific strategy, indicating its continued interest in the region and allaying the fears of its allies in South Asia.
Indo-Pacific Strategy 2022: An Analysis

Just days ahead of the high-level United States (US) delegation to the Solomon Islands, a security deal was signed between China and the Solomon Islands, heightening the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) presence in the Southwestern Pacific. The traditional security providers, Australia, New Zealand, and the US, have grown apprehensive over this development, especially as this comes at a time when the future of the European security is under question and the US and Russian relationship remains unpredictable as ever following the invasion of Ukraine. The US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken during his visit to Fiji said, “We see our future in the Indo-Pacific,’ and pledged to build an embassy in the Solomon Islands. This announcement came at the heel of President Xi of China and President Putin of Russia announcing the  “no limits” strategic partnership, marking the “new era” in the global order which emphasises on working closely against the US.

Summoning the military, interagency, treasury, and US Agency for International Development (USAID) and moving along netting partners, allies, and regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), and Australia, the UK and the US trilateral Security Pack (AUKUS) remain key to the security mechanism.

Recently, the Indo-Pacific Strategy 2022 (IPS-22) was also released by the White House. This is typically followed by regional strategies and defense strategies; however, that did not occur this time around. The Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) is very much working towards a region that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient in a similar way as other democracies have been implying. India is viewed as the key player and the US vows to support “India’s continued rise and regional leadership.” President Biden said that  “We envision the Indo-Pacific that is open, connected, prosperous, resilient, and secure and we are ready to work together with each of you to achieve it”. Many sceptics feel that the Russian invasion would sidetrack the IPR but the diplomatic maneuvering executed by Antony Blinken shows a constant commitment to the region. Summoning the military, interagency, treasury, and US Agency for International Development (USAID) and moving along netting partners, allies, and regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), and Australia, the UK and the US trilateral Security Pack (AUKUS) remain key to the security mechanism.

It has become fairly obvious that the China–US competition will transpire in the IPR or the Pacific Ocean as rising China and the US are competing within a single global economic arrangement and with  different political systems.

China’s response and South Asia

Beijing’s sphere of influence, be it economic, diplomatic, military, or technological, is intensifying in South Asian and the South Pacific countries and is unnerving the US and its allies. China has recognised that the creation of the linkages led by the US and its allies is leading to contradicting interests in the region. The increasing competition between China and the US will see a different dimension as compared to the US-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. China has the economic weightage as a global exporter, hub for engineering invention, and a manufacturing center cultivating a momentous superiority in emergent and disruptive technologies such as AI and autonomous systems, hypersonic missiles, and two-fold application of technologies in biotechnology, robotics, and quantum technology.

The China–US competition will transpire in the IPR or the Pacific Ocean as rising China and the US are competing within a single global economic arrangement and with a different political system.

China sees the US to be more of a problem creator than a guardian. China views the IPS-22 as a restatement that China cannot and will not rise peacefully and that it actively seeks to subvert the West and the current world order. Therefore, the West must restrict China’s rise to prevent serious global consequences known as the ‘China threat Theory’ and a ‘Fantasy targeting China’: a geopolitical theory to connect the Indian Ocean and the Pacific region to constrain China’s rise and contain China. For China, the regional groupings such as QUAD, AUKUS, and other aid programmes are being used as tools to contain it.

India and the IPS

Balancing a relationship between China, the US, the European Union, and other regional groupings such as QUAD, The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) will be a critical test for India. While the likely shift in foreign policy from non-alignment to multi-alignment appears to be evident to smaller states in South Asia and India; however, there are major risks ahead for India, particularly with unsettled border disputes and the trade deficit with China. India seeks a good relationship with both China and the US, hoping to cooperate in areas of common global interests such as climate change, free trade, and sustainable development with continuing its regional influence in South Asia. IPS-22 envisages India as a concurring, critical strategic partner, a democracy for closer security and economic ties, efficient to lead South Asia and the Indian Ocean, active in and connected to Southeast Asia, dynamic strength of QUAD, and an apparatus for regional progress and development and supports ‘India’s continued rise and regional leadership’. The strategy reads “We will continue to build a strategic partnership in which the US and India work together and through regional groupings to promote stability in South Asia; collaborate in new domains, such as health, space, and cyberspace; deepen our economic and technology cooperation, and contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific.” The US would advance major defence partnerships and support India’s position as a net security provider when China’s intimidation and hostility are acute along the Line of Actual Control.

IPS-22 envisages India as a concurring, critical strategic partner, a democracy for closer security and economic ties, efficient to lead South Asia and the Indian Ocean, active in and connected to Southeast Asia, dynamic strength of QUAD, and an apparatus for regional progress.

South Asian political affairs

The border dispute between China and India has led South Asian politics to be largely defined by Sino-Indo rivalry where China is perceived as an extra-regional power. China’s interests with the geopolitical theory in South Asia subsists with Afghanistan now under Taliban and Myanmar under military rule; two countries in South Asia moving away from democracy as well as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, Trans Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network, and China Myanmar Economic Corridor. These are alternatives strategic routes to the Indian Ocean and the Indian market of 1.38 billion. China is offering political and economic planetary to seven smaller countries of the nine South Asian nation-states—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—to enclose the regional source of power, India, which is an active part of the IPS. The US presence and strategic engagements can contribute to maintaining the equilibrium and strategically circumventing the rationality of India’s influence in regional politics. At the same time, the US is emboldening India to achieve regional leadership and quelling the fear of certain small nations which see India as a threat.

The South Asian nations are keen on strategic connectivity and infrastructure development to utilise their resources for economic growth. These countries are also recipients of Chinese assistance for development and use China to balance Indian political influence. New opportunities are emerging such as with economic frameworks like the MCC, which Nepal just endorsed, and the new geopolitical theory, Build Back Better World (B3W), an initiative by the US with the G7 to commence from 2022. The likelihood of opposition and putting its interests forward amongst the three powers China, India, and the US will be diplomatically challenging for smaller states. The endorsement of the MCC after the change of government in Nepal as well as China’s response and failure to endorse the MCC in Sri Lanka are examples of the same. This will bear upon the foreign policy autonomy of smaller states with a new bipolarity that is emerging in the IPR.

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